NATIONAL UNION OF RESTAURANT WORKERS (PTUC), PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On June 9, I960, a complaint for unfair labor practice was lodged
against the owners of Tres Hermanas Restaurant, particularly Mrs.
Felisa Herrera, on the ground, among others, that respondents refused
to bargain collectively with the complaining union; respondents made a
counter-proposal in the sense that they would bargain with said union
and would accept its demands if the same would become a company union,
and one Martin Briones, an employee, was separated from the service
because he was found to be the organizer and adviser of the complaining
union.

After respondents had filed their answer, wherein
they denied the charges of unfair labor practice filed against them,
Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, who was assigned to act on the complaint,
received the evidence, and on July 28, 1961, rendered decision
exonerating respondents. He found that the charges were not proven and
dismissed the complaint.

The case was taken to the court en banc,
where in a split decision the court affirmed the decision of Judge
Tabigne. The case is now before us on a petition for review.

The important findings of the court a quo
which are now disputed by the union are: (1) respondents did not refuse
to bargain collectively with the union as in fact they met its members
with the only particularity that they were not able to accept all the
demands of the union; (2) respondents did not interfere, coerce or
restrain their employees in the exercise of their right to join the
complaining union; and (3) the dismissal of Martin Briones was due to
the concern of Mrs. Herrera for her life on account of the hatred that
Briones had entertained against her, she being always with him in the
car he used to drive during their business routine. It is claimed that
Judge Tabigne committed a grave abuse of discretion in making the above
findings.

Anent the first issue, the court a quo
found that in the letter sent by the union to respondents containing
its demands marked in the case as Exhibit 1, there appears certain
marks, opposite each demand, such as a check for those demands to which
Mrs. Felisa Herrera was agreeable, a cross signifying the disapproval
of Mrs. Herrera, and a circle regarding those demands which were left
open for discussion on some future occasion that the parties may deem
convenient. Such markings were made during the discussion of the
demands in the meeting called by respondents on May 3, 1960 at their
restaurant in Quezon City. The court a quo concluded that the
fact that respondent Herrera had agreed to some of the demands shows
that she did not refuse to bargain collectively with the complaining
union.

We can hardly dispute this finding, for it finds
support in the evidence. The inference that respondents did not refuse
to bargain collectively with the complaining union because they
accepted some of the demands while they refused the others even leaving
open other demands for future discussion is correct, especially so when
those demands were discussed at a meeting called by respondents
themselves precisely in view of the letter sent by the union on April
29, 1960. It is true that under Section 14 of Republic Act 875 whenever
a party serves a written notice upon the employer making some demands
the latter shall reply thereto not later than 10 days from receipt
thereof, but this condition is merely procedural, and as much its
non-compliance cannot be deemed to be an act of unfair labor practice.
The fact is that respondents did not ignore the letter sent by the
union so much so that they called a meeting to discuss its demands, as
already stated elsewhere.

It is contended that respondents refused to bargain with the
complaining union as such even if they called a meeting of its officers
and employees hereby concluding that they did not desire to enter into
a bargaining agreement with said union. This conclusion has no rational
relation with the main premise of the union for it is belied by the
fact that respondents did actually agree and bargain with the
representatives of the union. While it is true that respondents denied
the capacity of the complaining union to bargain collectively with the
respondents this is because they were of the impression that before a
union could have that capacity it must first be certified by the Court
of Industrial Relations as the duly authorized bargaining unit, as in
fact this is what they stated in their answer to the petition for
certification filed by said union before the Court of Industrial
Relations (See Case No. 763-MC). In said case, another union known as
the International Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines claimed to
represent the majority of the employees o£ respondent restaurant, and
this is what it alleged in a letter sent to the manager of respondents
dated May 25, 1962.

Anent the second issue, the claim of the complaining union has also no
basis. This is premised on a document marked Exhibit C which contains
certain alleged counter-proposals tendered to complainant union the
nature of which would apparently indicate that respondents made use of
coercion which interferes with the right of the employees to
self-organization. On this document certain notations were made by one
Ernesto Tan which are indeed derogatory and which were allegedly made
by him upon instructions of respondent Felisa Herrera. Thus, this
pertinent notation on which the union relies is one which states that
respondent Herrera would be willing to recognize the union “if union
would become company union”, which would indeed show that Mrs. Herrera
interfered with tha employees’ right to self-organization. But
respondents denied that they ever authorized Ernesto Tan to make such
notation or to represent them in the negotiations, for he was merely a
bookkeeper whose duties were confined to the keeping and examination of
their books of accounts and sales invoices. It appears that he was not
even invited to the meeting but merely volunteered to be present and
made those notations on his own account and initiative. The court a quo
gave credence to this stand of respondents, as can be seen in the
following finding: “There is no evidence to show that Ernesto Tan was
authorized to represent management in the meeting held on May 3, 1960,
and that Ernesto Tan being a mere bookkeeper of respondents, he is not
a part of management although he is the nephew of Mrs. Herrera.” We are
not prepared to disturb this finding of the court a quo.

Finally, it is alleged in connection with the third issue that
respondent Herrera dismissed Martin Briones without sufficient cause
other than his being the organizer and adviser of the complaining
union. It however appears from the very testimony of Martin Briones
that he is not the only one who organized the complaining union but
together with Galicano Apiz, Pablo Cabreros and Juan Morales, with the
particularity that, as Briones himself had intimated, Apiz, Cabreras
and Morales were more active than himself in organizing the union so
much so that they were appointed officers of that union. And yet Apiz,
Cabreros and Morales were never touched and continued to be employed in
respondents’ restaurant. For this reason, the court a quo
discredited the claim that Briones was dismissed because of union
activities but rather because of the threats he made on Mrs. Herrera,
as communicated to her by her sister Aureata. The following is the
finding made by the court a quo on this point: “If it is the
union activities of complainant’s members that Mrs. Herrera did not
like, Apiz, Cabreros and Morales should have been dismissed by her
also, because said persons were more active than Briones in the
organization of the union. Verily, it was not the union activities of
Martin Briones that prompted Mrs. Herrera to dismiss him, but her fear
for the safety of her life on account of the smouldering embers of
hatred that the former had against the latter, the said persons being
always together in her car driven by Briones during business routine.”
This finding finds support in the evidence.

On the strength of the foregoing considerations, we find no justification for disturbing the findings of the court a quo which led to the dismissal of the complaint under consideration.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.