REMEDIOS LAYAG, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JUAN GERARDO, HEARING OFFICER, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 4, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MANILA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

On November 26, 1960, Petitioner herein presented with the Department
of Labor, Regional Office No. 3, Manila, against the Republic of the
Philippines, a complaint for Disability benefits, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, as heirs of Alberto Layag, who died on
May 29, 1960, while working with the Section of Floating Equipment,
Division of Ports and Harbors, Bureau of Public Works. The Republic,
thru the Solicitor General, presented its answer on December 15, 1960,
controverting the claim, stating among others, as defenses, the lack of
any allegation in the said complaint to the effect that the death of
Alberto Layag was directly caused by his employment or was hastened by
or a result of the nature of the same, thus states no cause of action.

Under date of January 26, 1962, respondent hearing officer Juan
Gerardo, rendered a decision, finding that the death was compensate and
ordered the respondent Republic to pay Remedios Vda. de Layag for
herself and for the benefit of her minor children, the sum of P4,000.00
in death compensation benefits and P200.00 as reimbursement for burial
expenses incurred by claimants.

On February 12, 1962, the Republic presented a Motion for Extension of
10 days from February 15, 1962, within which to file a Motion for
Reconsideration. Under date of February 16, 1962, respondent hearing
officer promulgated the following Order—

“The motion for extension of the time within which to file motion for
reconsideration should be as it is hereby granted to expire on February
26, 1962. No further extension will be granted.

Let the parties be notified.”

In a motion dated February 20, 1962, petitioner’s counsel moved to
reconsider the above Order, claiming that the pleading dated February
12,1962, asking for extension, did not comply with the Rules.
Expounding on this claim, counsel alleged that motions must be served
on the parties and proof of service must be shown, which had not been
done in the ease at bar. Pursuant to the Order, the Solicitor General
moved to reconsider judgment of the hearing officer, the merits of
which We deem unnecessary to discuss, for the purposes of the present
appeal.

On February 28, 1962, the hearing officer, handed down an Order of the following tenor—

“The motion of counsel for claimant dated February 20, 1962, praying
that the Order granting an extension of period for the Solicitor
General within which to file motion for reconsideration of decision
should be vacated as it is hereby denied for lack of merit.

Within the reglementary period, counsel for respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which in effect is a petition for review of the
decision rendered herein. Pursuant to Section 49 of Act 8428, as
amended, let the entire record consisting of 144 valid pages be
elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.”

Alleging that the respondent hearing officer, in issuing the Orders of
February 16, 1962 (granting extension) and February 28, 1962 (denying
motion for reconsideration), acted with grave abuse of discretion
and/or excess of jurisdiction, and that petitioner had been denied a
day in court or deprived of “due process of law”, she presented on
March 6, 1962, with CFI of Manila a petition for Writ of Certiorari. On
March 22, 1962, the CFI ordered the respondent hearing officer to
answer the petition. Respondent instead of answering, moved to dismiss
the petition on three (3) grounds. Under date of May 22, 1962,. the CFI
of Manila entered an Order, the pertinent portions of which are
reproduced below—

“This is a motion to dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari on the
grounds (1) that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) that the petition lacks a valid cause of action as there is still
available remedy of appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
and (3) that the petition is defective and in violation of Section 5,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

Of the three grounds mentioned, the most important is the first.

Under Section 46 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act No. 3428, as
amended, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and his decision is subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court, in the same manner as provided by law and by Rules of
Court for appeal from the Court of Industrial Relations to the Supreme
Court. * * *.

Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
certiorari may be filed in a Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction thereof, if the petition relates to the acts or omissions
of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person.

Certiorari is defined as ‘writ issued from a superior court to an inferior court or tribunal commanding the latter to send up the record of a particular case.’

Considering the legal provisions mentioned and the ruling and the
statement of the Supreme Court quoted, this Court is of the opinion
that the Workmen’s Compensation Commission or its Commissioner is not
an ‘inferior court‘
or the ‘officer or person’ within the meaning of Section 4, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court. The Court of First Instance is not a ‘superior
court’ within the meaning of the definition of certiorari and in
contemplation of the Supreme Court in the cases cited.

Such being the case, and. in view of the first ground of the motion to
dismiss, the dismissal of the petition for writ of certiorari is in
order. It would be unnecessary to consider the other grounds of the
motion to dismiss.

Wherefore, the motion to dismiss is granted and the petition for writ of certiorari is dismissed.”

The above judgment is now before Us for review on two (2) points, to
wit: (1) the lower court erred in dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) in not granting the petition. As the second is a
necessary; consequence of the first, it seems that the only question We
are called upon to determine is whether the CFI had jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the petition for certiorari.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, vests exclusive
jurisdiction to the WCC to hear and decide claims for compensation,
under the said Act, appealable to the Supreme Court, in the same manner
and in the same period, as provided by law and by the Rules of Court
for appeal from the Court of Industrial Relations to the Supreme Court
(See. 46, Act 3428). Under Reorganization Plan 20-A; promulgated
pursuant to Rep. Act 997, as amended by R. A. 2241, “Except as
otherwise provided in this Article the powers and duties heretofore
pertaining the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Workmen’s
Compensation are transferred to and shall be assumed and exercised by
the Commission, which body is authorized to delegate the same to the
extent that it shall remain as an appeal source with corresponding
duties of promulgating related rules and regulations. Pursuant hereto
the Commission shall delegate to appropriate regional offices all cases
currently pending before said Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner,
which offices shall take jurisdiction thereof, administer and settle
the same, subject to appeal to the Commission in accordance with
prescribed rules and regulations. * *” (Art. III, par. 12), The
Reorganization Plan further provided that “Each regional office shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under
the Workmen’s Compensation Law and cases affecting all money claims
arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions * *”
(Art. VI, par. 25). The above provisions considered, it becomes
manifest that the CFI had no jurisdiction to review the orders of the
regional hearing officer complained of. The same could have been a
proper subject of an appeal to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
and finally to this Court.

Furthermore, even if the CFI had the jurisdiction to consider the case,
We believe that certiorari did not lie, since the granting of
extensions, specially motions for reconsiderations, are interlocutory
and are moreover within the discretion of the Commission. In this
particular case, the extension asked did not prejudice any right of the
petitioner. And even if respondent hearing officer committed an error
in granting the extension, this did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion, for it might only be a mistake of law or an error of fact,
not correctible by certiorari. If the Court, board, or person had
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and of the persons; the orders or
decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or
decisions within its/his jurisdiction and, however, irregular or
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari, but by
appeal (Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. vs. E. Bello, et als., G.R. No. L-18957, April 23, 1963).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.