HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS AND KARL BECK, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN IN HIS CAPACITY AS…

Stonehill versus Diokno

The Case

This is Stonehill versus Diokno, an original action in the Supreme Court of the Philippines, decided in June 1967. The petitioners — Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John Brooks, and Karl Beck — were corporate officers whose offices and homes were searched under forty-two search warrants issued at the instance of the Secretary of Justice, the Acting Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and several special prosecutors. The petitioners asked the Court to quash the warrants as general warrants, to restrain the use of the seized effects in deportation proceedings, and to order their return. The case matters for two enduring reasons: it defines what probable cause and particularity of description demand under the Bill of Rights, and it abandoned the old Moncado doctrine, adopting the exclusionary rule in Philippine constitutional law.

Procedural History

This was not an appeal from any lower court. On March 20, 1962, the petitioners filed directly with the Supreme Court an original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction against the respondent prosecutors and the judges who issued the warrants. Two days later, on March 22, 1962, the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. By resolution dated June 29, 1962, the Court partially lifted that writ as to papers, documents, and things seized from the offices of the corporations, but maintained it as to those seized from the residences of the petitioners. The petitioners then moved for reconsideration and amendment of that resolution, and the Court resolved all matters in its single decision.

Facts

Between March 3 and March 9, 1962, upon applications by the respondent prosecutors, several judges issued forty-two search warrants against the petitioners and the corporations of which they were officers. The warrants directed any peace officer to search the persons named and the premises of their offices, warehouses, and residences, and to seize books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions, including disbursements, receipts, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements, as well as bobbins or cigarette wrappers.

The applications described the offense only as a violation of Central Bank laws, Tariff and Customs laws, Internal Revenue laws, and the Revised Penal Code, without specifying any particular provision or any specific act. The petitioners alleged that the warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized, that cash money not mentioned in the warrants was actually seized, that the warrants were issued to fish evidence in deportation cases, that the searches were illegal, and that the seized items were not delivered to the issuing courts.

The seized effects fell into two groups: those taken from the offices of the corporations, and those taken from the residences of the petitioners. The Court treated the two groups differently, and that distinction drives the result.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to assail the warrants and seizures made in the offices of the corporations.
• Whether or not the search warrants, and the searches and seizures made under them, are valid under the constitutional requirement of probable cause and particular description.
• Whether or not the documents, papers, and things unlawfully seized may be used in evidence against the petitioners.
• Whether or not the motion for reconsideration, seeking to include additional premises as residences and to claim personal effects seized from corporate offices, should be granted.

Applicable Provisions

The Constitution, as quoted in the decision, provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

This is the yardstick against which the warrants were measured, and the Court found both requirements — probable cause and particular description — wanting.

The Revised Rules of Court, as amended by the Court itself, provide:

A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.

The Court cited this amendment to underscore how seriously it regarded the irregularities, since the warrants here rested on no specific offense at all.

The same Rule further provides:

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

This paragraph, added by the Court, confirms that a warrant spanning several undefined offenses is constitutionally infirm.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioners had no cause of action as to the effects seized from corporate offices. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, and the right to object to an unlawful search is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. The objection belongs exclusively to the corporations.

On the second issue, as to the residences, the Court held the warrants null and void. No specific offense was alleged; the averments were abstract, making it impossible for the issuing judges to find probable cause. The Court called it a legal heresy to convict anyone of a violation of several codes without reference to any determinate provision. The description of the things to be seized was equally defective, for the warrants authorized seizure of all business records regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, openly contravening the command that things to be seized be particularly described.

On the third issue, the Court abandoned the Moncado doctrine and adopted the exclusionary rule, reasoning that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. The Court quoted with approval the American formulation that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible.

On the fourth issue, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration, noting that the new theory of personal possession was raised for the first time in that motion and was not sufficiently established, leaving the matter open for future cases.

Doctrine

• A search warrant must rest on probable cause determined by the judge upon sworn examination, in connection with one specific offense; an application citing only broad violations of several codes, without specific acts, cannot support probable cause.
• A warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized; a warrant authorizing seizure of all business records, legal or illegal, is a general warrant and void.
• The right to contest an unlawful search and seizure is personal and belongs to the party whose rights were impaired; corporate officers cannot invoke it as to effects belonging to the corporation.
• Evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure is inadmissible — the exclusionary rule, which superseded the Moncado doctrine.

Disposition

The Court declared the warrants for the three residences null and void, made the injunction permanent as to the effects seized there, granted the writs to that extent, denied the motion for reconsideration, and dismissed the petition as to the effects seized from the twenty-nine corporate offices and premises.

Remember This

Memorize this line: Stonehill abandoned Moncado and installed the exclusionary rule, while insisting that probable cause attach to one specific offense and that things to be seized be particularly described. Examiners use it to test the requisites of a valid search warrant, the personal nature of the right against unreasonable searches, and the shift to the exclusionary rule.