HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS AND KARL BECK, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN IN HIS CAPACITY AS…

Upon application of
the officers of the government named on the margin^[1]– hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors – several judges^[2] – hereinafter referred to as
Respondent-Judges – issued, on different dates,^[3] a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein^[4] and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,^[5] directed to any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or re­sidences,
and to seize and take possession of the follow­ing personal property to wit:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, type­writers,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers).”

as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and pro­ceeds
or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense,” which is de­scribed in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Re­venue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code.”

Alleging that the
aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court – because, inter alia:
 (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued
to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered
to the courts that issued the war­rants, to be disposed of in accordance with
law – on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued re­straining Respondent-Prosecutors, their
agents and/or repre­sentatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned,
or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already ad­verted to, and that,
in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents,
their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things
and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer,
respondents-prosecutors alleged^[6] (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent; and (3) that, in any
event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this
Court issued the writ of prelimi­nary injunction prayed for in the
petition.  However, by re­solution dated
June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned are con­cerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.^[7]

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups,
namely:  (a) those found and seized in
the of­fices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no
cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective per­sonalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well set­tled that
the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties.10 Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.11 In­deed, it has been held:

x x
x that the Government’s action in gain­ing
possession of papers belonging to the corporation
did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants.  If these papers were unlawfully seized and
thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants.  Next, it is clear that a question of the law­fulness
of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded.  Certainly, such a seiz­ure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitu­tional
rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves
the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with
reference to the rights of another. 
Remus vs.
United States (C.C.A.) 291 F501, 511. 
It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not ex­tend
to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose
property was taken.  x x x.” (A. Guckenheimer &
Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d, 786, 789, underscoring supplied.)

With respect to the
documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondent-Prosecutors from
using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said
documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely:  (1) whe­ther the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority
thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is
in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.

Petitioners
maintain that the aforementioned
search war­rants are in the nature of general warrants and that, accord­ingly,
the seizures effected upon the
authority thereof are null and void.  In
this connection, the Constitution13 provides:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the com­plainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and par­ticularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”

Two points must be
stressed in connection with this con­stitutional
mandate, namely:  (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.

None of these
requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.    Indeed, the same were issued upon appli­cations
stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications.  The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.  As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presup­poses the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws.  As a matter of fact, the
applications in­volved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed
by herein petitioners.  It would be a
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code,” – as alleged in the aforementioned applications – without reference
to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

To uphold the validity of
the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspond­ence
at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace of­ficers.  This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted – to outlaw the so-called
general warrants.  It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.

Such is the seriousness
of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court14 by providing in its counterpart under the
Revised Rules of Court15 that “a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific of­fense.” 
Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that “no search warrant shall is­sue for more than one specific offense.”

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the appli­cation
for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, type­writers,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and re­lated profit and loss
statements.”

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of peti­tioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.  The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the
things to be seized be particularly described – as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People’s Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondent-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein.  Upon mature delibera­tion, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned.  Said position
was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be
allowed to go free merely “because the constable has blundered,”16 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means
other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained,17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of
the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal re­medies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law
jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.  In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

“As we understand it, the reason for the ex­clusion of
evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitu­tional
privilege.  In earlier times the action
of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer.  Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.”18

In fact, over thirty (30)
years before, the Federal Su­preme Court had already declared:

“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.  The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punish­ment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great princi­ples established by years of endeavor and
suf­fering which have resulted in their embodiment  in the fundamental law of the land.”19

This view was, not only
reiterated, but, also broadened in subsequent decisions of the same Federal
Court.20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

“x x x Today we
once again examine the Wolf’s constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on
our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a speci­fic guarantee against that very same
unlawful conduct.  We held that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a State court.

“Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as
it used against the Federal Govern­ment. 
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be ‘a form of words’,
valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, with­out that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to permit this Court’s high regard as a freedom
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ At the time that the Court
held in Wolf that the Amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held
that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in viola­tion of its provisions.  Even wolf ‘stoutly ad­hered’ to that
proposition.  The right to privacy, when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of des­truction
by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always
been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.  Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally un­reasonable searches –
state or federal – it was logi­cally and constitutionally necessary that the
exclu­sion doctrine – an essential part of the right to privacy – be also
insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf Case.  In short, the admission of
the new constitu­tional right by Wolf could not consistently toler­ate denial
of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by rea­son
of the unlawful seizure.  To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment.  Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter –
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way – by removing the incentive to disregard it.’  x x x.

“The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State
tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest.  Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitu­tional in origin,
we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.  Because it is enforceable in the same manner
and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we
can no longer_permit it to be revocable at the whim
of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment.  Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law enforce­ment is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”  (Underscoring ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule
is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.  To be sure, if the applicant for a search
warrant has competent evi­dence to establish probable cause of the commission
of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law.  Upon the other hand, if
he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for
the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification
for the issuance of the warrant.  The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime.  But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the
criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
un­reasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are,
in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not
have.  Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually – but, understandably – finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the
pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
committed.

In their Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petition­ers allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House
No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of
the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other ef­fects seized in the offices of
the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said
petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and con­trol,
for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the
federal courts of the United States.22

We note, however, that
petitioners’ theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforemen­tioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged
“personal” nature thereof, has been advanced, not in their petition
or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Recon­sideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962.  In other
words, said theory would appear to be a readjustment of that followed in said
petitions, to suit the approach in­timated in the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered and amend­ed.  Then, too,
some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion
for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not
satisfied that the alle­gations of said petitions and motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other
papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently esta­blished the
facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners,
to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree
thereto.  At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determi­nation in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the
doctrine adopted in the Mon­cado case must be, as it
is hereby, abandoned; that the war­rants for the search of three (3) residences
of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are
null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that
the writ of preliminary injunction hereto­fore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
peti­tioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted,
insofar as the documents, papers and other ef­fects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concern­ed; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and
Sanchez, JJ. concur.

Castro, J. concurred and dissented in a separate opinion.

^[1]
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of
Jus­tice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting Director Na­tional Bureau
of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon,
Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr., and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes,
City of Manila.

^[2]
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of the
Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes
Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.

^[3]
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

^[4]
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks
and Karl Beck.

^[5]
U. S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development
Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc.,
Industrial Business Manage­ment Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation,
Ameri­can Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corpora­tion, Holiday
Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation,
In­dustrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The
Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying
Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel
Corporation.

^[6]
Inter alia.

7
“Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the
decision to be rendered in the case, the writ of prelimi­nary injunction issued
by us in this case against the use of the papers, documents and things from the
following premises:  (1) The office of
the US Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by
Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts., Port Area, Mla; (4)
527 Rosario St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or
Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St.,
Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11)
IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Mla.;
(12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San
Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts., Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15)
Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila South Blvd.; (17)
Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.,
Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila;
(20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area,
Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC,
2nd Flr., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24) IBMC,
2nd Flr., Go­changco Bldg.,
610 San Luis Manila; (25) United Housing Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis Manila;
(26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437
Colorado St., Malate Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco
Flue-Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and
(29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases
Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioner before the Deportation Board, is hereby
lifted.  The preliminary injunction shall
continue as to the papers, documents and things found in the other premises
namely:  in those of the resi­dences of
petitioners, as follows:  (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2) 15 Narra Road, Forbes
Park, Makati, Rizal; and
(3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta
Village, Makati, Rizal.

8 Newingham,
et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

9
Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

10 In re Dooley (1931) 48 F. 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d 916; Lusco
v. U.S. 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287
F. 60; Moris vs. U.S. 26 F. 2d 444.

11 U.S. vs. Gass, 17
F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384, 394.

12 On March 22, 1962.

13 Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

14 Reading:  xxx
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

15 xxx A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge
or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.  (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)                  

16 People v. Defore,
140 NE 585.

17 Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed 1782.

18 Pugliese (1945) 153 F.
2d. 497.

19 Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 US 383,
58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; underscoring supplied.

20 Gouled vs. United
States (1921) 255 US
298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs. United
States (1928) 277 US
438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564; Wolf vs.
Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United
State, 364 US
206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs.
Ohio L91961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed 2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.

21 Even if remote.

22 Particularly, Jones vs. U.S., 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. Republic, 216 Fed. Supp. 48; U.S. vs.
Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93; Villano vs. U.S., 300
Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S. 296 Fed. 2d
650.

Clean

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