G.R. No. 18775. November 30, 1963
LO SAN TUANG, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. EMILIO L. GALANG, AS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
REGALA, J.:
Philippines as a temporary visitor on July 1, 1960. She was authorized
to stay in this country until June 30, 1961 only, tout instead of
departing on that day, she asked the Commissioner of Immigration for
the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration on the ground
that her husband, Ngo Seng alias Fong Seng Shwan, had been
admitted to Philippine citizenship on January 7, 1961 and that
therefore she followed the citizenship of her husband.
The Commissioner denied her request, whereupon, she filed this
petition for prohibition and mandamus in the Court of First Instance bf
Manila, submitting, among other things, an affidavit jointly sworn by
her and her husband, in which she stated that she is not disqualified
under the law from becoming a citizen of the Philippines.
The trial court held that under Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law (Com. Act No. 473), an alien woman, claiming
Filipino citizenship by virtue of marriage to a citizen, must prove
that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
for naturalization. In dismissing her petition, the trial court held
that petitioner had not even proven that she was not suffering from any
disqualification. Petitioner appealed to this Court.
Section 15 provides in part as follows:
“Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
The issue here is whether the phrase “who might herself be lawfully
naturalized” requires the alien woman to prove both that she has the
qualifications [1] of an applicant for naturalization and that she is not laboring under any of the disqualifications [2] provided by law, or whether it merely requires her to prove that she is not disqualified.
In the case of Ly Giok Ha, etc. vs. Galang, 101 Phil., 459; 54 Off. Gaz., 356, this Court, speaking through Justice Concepción, held:
“Pursuant thereto (Sec. 15), marriage to a male
Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife,
unless she ‘herself may be lawfully naturalized.’ As correctly held in
an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),
this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized
as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act
No. 473, namely: * * *”
Then, in Cua vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 101 Phil, 521; 53 Off. Gaz., 8567, this Court, through Justice J. B. L. Reyes, stated:
“The appeal cannot be sustained. Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, L-10760, May 17, 1957, that the bare fact of a valid marriage
to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife.
Sec. 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who
marries a Filipino must show in addition, that she ‘might herself be
lawfully naturalized’ as a Filipino citizen. As construed In the
decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who
married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law.”
Much later, in Lee Suan Ay, et al. vs. Galang, et al., 106 Phil., 706; this Court, this time through Justice Padilla, stated:
” * * * Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen
to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon
the latter She must possess the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization. (Section 15, Commonwealth
Act No. 473; Ly Giok Ha alias Wy Giok Ha vs. Galang,
54 Off. Gaz., 346). There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.”
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchord her claim for
citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of
Leonard vs. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit
Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman “should
be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by
existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of
her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be
regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen.” [3]
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was
a free white woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order
to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of
the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was
presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of
persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it
provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that
law provided:
“SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens.—Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the
United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.“SEC. 2. Who are disqualified.—The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a)
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing
ail organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching
the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.“SEC. 3. Qualifications.—The persons comprised in subsection (a)
of section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine
citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day
of the hearing of their petition.“The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c)
of said section one shall, in addition to being not less than
twenty-one years of age On the day of the hearing of the petition, have
all and each of the following qualifications:“First.
Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less
than five years, except as provided in the next following section;“Second.
To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of their residence in the Philippine Islands,
in their relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which they are living;“Third. To hold in the
Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or have some known trade of profession; and“Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish or some native tongue.
“In
case the petitioner is a foreigner subject, he shall, besides, declare
in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or
sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.”
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard vs. Grant, supra,
to our law as it then stood, alien woman married to citizens of the
Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be
either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the
United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who
under the laws of the United States might become citizens of that
country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set
forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same
for all intents and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since
discarded class or racial considerations from the qualifications of
applicants for naturalization, [4]
even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is
that the phrase “who might herself be lawfully naturalized” must be
understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so
different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard vs. Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial
consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase
“who might herself be lawfully naturalized” must now be understood as
referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to
become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase “who might
herself be lawfully naturalized” must now be understood as requiring
merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of
disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard vs.
Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to
become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats
“qualifications’ and “disqualifications” in separate sections. And then
it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given
to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien woman was not
disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonardo vs. Grant
did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to
the class of disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to
follow the citizenship of her husband. What that case held was that the
phrase “who might herself be lawfully naturalized” merely means that
she belongs by naturalization—the assumption being always that she is
not otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of
the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of
the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if sue
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all
the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to
a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen.
Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to
become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial
court, the same being self-serving.
More recently, in Kua Suy etc. et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, this Court ruled through Justice Reyes that—
” * * * Under section 15 of the Naturalization Act,
the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she ‘might
herself be lawfully naturalized’, so that the fact of marriage to a
citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship as
this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 54 Off. Gaz. 356, and in Cua vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 Off. Gaz., 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Liu Giok In. * * *.” (Italic ours)
Wherefore, the order dated August 8, 1961 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] SEC. 2. Qualifications.—Subject
to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with
the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living;
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less
than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in
any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office
of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.
[2] SEC. 4. Who are disqualified.—The following can not be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamist or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in
the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
(g) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United
States, whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
[3] In explanation of its
conclusion, the Court said: “If, whenever during the life of the woman
or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal
proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her
marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also
that the woman then possessed all the further qualifications necessary
to her becoming naturalized untied existing laws, the statute will be
practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a snare. The proof of the
facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after,
when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult
to find.”
[4] According to its
proponents, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first,
to remove the features of the existing naturalization act which
discriminated in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our
neighbors and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to
foster amity with all nations. (Sinco, Philippine Political Law 502
[11th ed.])