G.R. No. L-18860. November 30, 1963
CARLOS AVENDAÑO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LADISLAO PASICOLAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
PAREDES, J.:
rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 145 (Unlawful Detainer), entitled
“Tomasa D. Salonga vs. Carlos Avendaño, et al.” the dispositive portion of which reads—
“WHEREFORE, the defendant Carlos Avendaño is hereby
ordered to vacate the premises in question and to restore the
possession thereof to the plaintiff Tomasa D. Salonga.“It is
further ordered that the defendant Carlos Avendaño pay to the plaintiff
Tomasa D. Salonga the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) Philippine
Currency, per annum, from March 1, 1955 up to the restitution of the
premises to the plaintiff, as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises; and costs.”
The above judgment was appealed to the CFI of Pampanga and docketed
as Civil Case No. 1152. In order to stay the execution of the judgment,
a yearly deposit of P2,000.00, was made by petitioner, with the Clerk
of the CFI of Pampanga on the following dates:
a. Nov. 14, 1956, for the agricultural year, 1955-1956;
b. Jan. 23, 1958, for the agricultural year, 1956-1957;
c. March 19, 1958, for the agricultural year, 1957-1958;
d. March 30, 1959, for the agricultural year, 1958-1959;
e. March 14, 1960, for the agricultural year, 1959-1960;
f. March 29, 1961, for the agricultural year 1960-1961.
Under date of March 19, 1958, the respondents (Salongas), claiming
that petitioner failed to deposit the annual rentals pertaining to the
agricultural year 1957-1958, presented with the lower court a motion
for immediate execution of the judgment of the JP Court. An opposition
was presented by petitioner, alleging among others, that said amount
was deposited and while it was not made during the first ten (10) days
of March, as required by Section 8, Rule 72, is of no moment, since
said Rule does not apply to cases of unlawful detainer involving
agricultural lands, including fishponds, when rentals are on the yearly
basis. The Court resolving the point, said—
“**, the motion dated March 19, 1958 which was set
for hearing on March 22, same year, asking for the immediate execution
of the judgment on the ground that the defendants did not make deposits
for the year 1958, and it appearing from the answer of defendant Carlos
Avendaño dated March 31, 1958 that he has already made a deposit in the
sum of P2,000.00 for March 1, 1957 to March 1, 1958, as shown by
Official Receipt No. 4502957, the said motion for immediate execution
is hereby denied.” (Order on May 23, 1958).
Upon the authority of the above Order, the respondent Salongas, withdrew from the Clerk, the sum of P2,000.00.
On March 24, 1959, respondents, again petitioned for the immediate
execution of the judgment, claiming that the rentals for the
agricultural year 1958-1959 had not been deposited during the first ten
(10) days of March, 1959. Petitioner again opposed the motion, invoking
the same grounds that he interposed in his opposition to the first
motion for immediate execution. On April 13, 1959, respondents Judge
issued an Order of the following tenor—
“This is a motion for execution under section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.
It
appears that the yearly deposit of P2,000.00 was made on March 30,
1959, as evidenced by the certificate of the cashier, Annex ‘A’,
instead of on or before March 10, 1959 (See decision of the Justice of
the Peace dated October 25, 1956).Considering that the
property is a fishpond and considering further the fact that the motion
for execution was filed on March 30, 1959, the court believes that the
provisions of section 8, alluded to above, have been substantially
complied with.Motion denied. Hereafter, the defendant shall
deposit the said yearly rental of P2,000.00 during the first ten (10)
days of March of every year until this case shall have been finally
adjudged and decided.”
On March 15, 1961, the Salongas presented with the lower Court an
Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution of the judgment, for failure of
the petitioner to deposit the annual rent of P2,000.00 for the
agricultural year 1960-1961 within the first ten (10) days of March,
1961. A corresponding opposition was filed by petitioner, reiterating,
once more, his contention that Sec. 8, of Rule 72, does not apply,
since the agricultural year 1960-1961 ended in the month of March,
1961, the rental need not be deposited within the first ten (10) days
of said month.
On June 7, 1961, respondent Judge issued an Order, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below—
“Upon the facts, it is clear that this is a case
where the Justice of the Peace has determined the amount to be paid and
the period within which it must be paid, if an immediate execution is
to be stayed, that is, P2,000.00 per annum from March 1, 1955 up to the
restitution of the fishpond.Considering the period of ten
(10) days fixed in Section 8, Rule 72, is a reasonable period, and
considering further that the defendant has been admonished under order
of April 13, 1959 to pay the annual rental within ten (10) days from
March 1 of every year.It is hereby adjudged that the deposit
made on March 29, 1961 is a direct violation of Section 8, Rule 72, the
judgment of the Justice of the Peace court quoted above, and the order
of April 13, 1959.The argument that the agricultural year of
the fishpond in question expired on March 31, 1961, is untenable. As
aforestated, the date of payment has been specifically fixed in the
judgment of the justice of the peace, and said date and no other date,
shall prevail.The case of Cruz vs. Judge Dollete has no application as the facts are entirely different.
WHEREFORE,
let a writ of execution issue immediately upon the judgment of the
justice of the peace rendered in this case, dated October 25, 1956.”
A writ of execution was correspondingly issued, but the effects
thereof were suspended per order of respondent Judge dated June 13,
1961. On July 17, 1961, petitioner presented a Motion for
Reconsideration against the Order of June 7, 1961, which was denied on
August 31, 1961.
Petitioner claiming that the Order of June 7, 1961 constitutes a
violation of his rights and that the implementation thereon would work
grave and irreparable injury to him; that it had been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, for which there is no other plain, adequate and
speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, he brought the matter to
this Court, on a petition for Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction. The petition was given due course and ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of a P2,000.00
bond. Respondents answering the petition, called the attention of this
Court, to the fact that during the pendency of the instant proceedings
in this court, the CFI of Pampanga rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
1152 on July 19, 1961 (petition was submitted on September 13, 1961),
ordering petitioner herein to vacate the fishpond and to pay P2,000.00
from March 1, 1960 until he leaves the premises. The appeal of
petitioner with the Pampanga CFI was dismissed for having been filed
out of the reglementary period. The motion for reconsideration directed
against the dismissal of the appeal was also denied on January 22,
1962, and the corresponding writ of execution based upon a final
judgment was issued by the respondent Court. Respondents maintain,
under the above set of facts, that the issue raised in the petition
(the propriety of the writ of execution pending appeal), has become
moot and academic and that hearing on the petition would be out an
empty gesture and waste of time. Petitioner did not file any pleading
to counteract these allegations of the answer, and did not appear
during the hearing set on June 18, 1962, thus showing lack of interest
on his part to further prosecute this case.
We do not believe that the JP Court, in ordering that the plaintiff
should pay the respondents, rentals in the amount of P2,000.00 per
year, “from March 1, 1955, up to the restitution of the premises”, that
it intended the payments should be made on the first ten (10) days of
the month of March. Such date, in our opinion, is merely the starting
point of petitioner’s liability to pay. Moreover, section 8, Rule 72,
insofar as execution of judgments in unlawful detainer cases, involving
fishponds, is concerned, finds no application. We said—
“* * From this rule it appears clear that the
immediate execution of the judgment can only be demanded if the
defendant fails to pay on or before the tenth day of each calendar
month, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises
for the preceding month at the rate determined by the judgment. This
rule contemplates payment of a monthly rental the failure of which
would give rise to execution, and not the payment of rental in any
other manner. In the present case, the rental fixed by the justice of
the peace court is not monthly but yearly, and this is understandable
considering the fact that the property subject of the lease is a fishpond.
The court can take judicial notice that fishpond is operated on a
yearly basis because by its very nature the harvest accrues only once a
year with rare exceptions and generally the rental is computed on a
yearly basis. It is for this reason that the justice of the peace court
fixed a rental of P2,750.00 a year as the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the fishpond in litigation. Such being the case, it
is our opinion that Section 8, Rule 72 cannot be invoked as basis for
the execution of the judgment of the justice of the peace court. As it
now appears the rental fixed by the court is not yet due and,
therefore, the order of execution issued by the respondent judge is
premature.” (De la Cruz vs. Hon. Dollete, et al., 96 Phil., 797; Off. Gaz., 51 OC, p. 1826, April 1955).
As the facts obtaining in the case at bar comes within the purview
of the above quoted legal pronouncements, We hold that the lower court
erred in having the immediate execution of the judgment of the JP Court.
However, inasmuch as our ruling will no longer benefit the
petitioner, since a final judgment on the merits of the case had been
rendered by the lower court which ordered his ejectment from the
premises in question, and for which a writ of execution has been
correspondingly issued;
The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Barrera, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.