FELIPE B. PAREJA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original action for certiorari to annul certain orders
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and secure an order for the
release of petitioner Felipe B. Pareja.

The essential facts are not disputed. Petitioner Pareja is accused
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, together with Cesario Orongan, Avelino Monzolin, and Gaspar Mesa, of the crime of murder. In the
information, dated July 24, 1961, it is alleged:

“That on or about the 3rd day of July, 1961, at
about 6:30 in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill one Attorney Antonio Abad Tormis, did then and there willfully, feloniously and criminally shoot Antonio Abad Tormis suddenly and
unexpectedly three times with a .32 caliber revolver, thus causing the
following injuries:

1. Wound, gunshot, penetrating skin, subcutaneous tissue,
   pectoralis major and minor muscles, external and internal intercostal
   muscles of the 3rd right intercostal space, at an area 5 cms. from the
   right border of the anterior median line, upper lobe of the right lung,
   pericardium, proximal portion of the ascending aorta, left ventricle of
   the heart, to the 5th left rib with comminuted fracture, to the muscles
   of the left side of the chest and up to the subcutaneous tissue. There
   was no point of exit. Diameter of the wound of the muscle of the left
   ventricle was 1.2 cms.

2. Wound, gunshot,
   penetrating skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscles of the middle third,
   right arm, with comminuted fracture of the right humerus.

3. Wound, gunshot, penetrating skin, muscle of the posterior aspect of the
   chest, with comminuted fracture of the 7th rib, middle lobe of the
   right lung, thoracic aorta, diaphragm, stomach, lower lobe of the left
   lung, internal and external intercostal muscle of the left 8th
   intercostal space, muscles and subcutaneous tissue. There was no point
   of exit;

as a result of which injuries, Antonio Abad Tormis
died almost instantaneously; with the attendant qualifying circumstance
of treachery, and the aggravating circumstances of: (1) evident
premeditation; (2) nocturnity; (3) taking advantage of superior
strength or employing means to weaken the defense; (4) with the aid of
armed men or persons who insured or effort impunity; and (5) in
consideration of a prize reward, or promise.

“Contrary to Art. 248, par. 1 in relation to Art. 14 pars. 6, 8, 11, 13, and 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon his arrest and detention, counsel for Pareja moved that he be
provisionally released on bail. The prosecution objected thereto,
alleging that petitioner is charged with a capital offense and that the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Thereupon, it introduced evidence
establishing the following facts:

Tormis died in Cebu City on July 3, 1961, in consequence of three
(3) gunshot wounds then inflicted upon him. The three (3) slugs found
in his body were fired from a colt revolver, marked Exhibit B, which
was found in one of the safes of petitioner as City Treasurer of Cebu
City, where his office as such was searched by peace officers on July
11-12, 1961, upon the authority of a search warrant duly secured
therefor, on the basis of information furnished by Caspar Mesa, Cesario
Orongan and Avelino Monzolin, to the effect that Orongan had killed
Tormis upon the request of Monzolin, acting on behalf of Pareja, who
supplied said Exhibit B.

Respondent Judge held that, unimpeached, these facts would warrant
a conviction, in view of which the application for bail was denied. A
motion of reconsideration of the order to this effect, likewise,
failed. Hence, the present action for certiorari.

Petitioner maintains that in not permitting him to be released on
bail, respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion mainly
upon the following grounds, namely: (a) that the evidence
against him (excluding the admissions allegedly made by Mesa, Orongan
and Monzolin, which—insofar as the incident under consideration is
concerned—were disregarded by respondent Judge) is purely
circumstantial and does not satisfy the requirements of section 98 of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court; (b) that petitioner could not,
in all probability, be sentenced to the extreme penalty, for he had
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities, and even the
self-confessed triggerman had been sentenced to life imprisonment; and (c) that petitioner’s conduct, social standing and other personal circumstances indicate non-probability of flight.

Despite the well written petition and memorandum filed by counsel
for the petitioner, whose actuations in the lower court merited the
well earned commendation of no less than respondent Judge, we cannot
see our way clear to granting the writ prayed for. Although relevant to
the issue whether the evidence on record is strong or not, the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, reading:

“SEC. 98. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the interferences are derived are proven;

and

(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” is not decisive in the case at
bar. This section governs the quantum of evidence essential “for
conviction,” for which guilt must be established “beyond
reasonabledoubt”, whereas to forfeit the constitutional right to bail
in capital offenses, it is enough that the evidence of guilt be
“strong.”

Besides, the alleged voluntary surrender on the part of petitioner
is not necessarily, not even, generally, sufficient to offset the five
(5) aggravating circumstances alleged in the information. The penalty
meted out to Cesario Orongan is understandable, in view of the fact
that two (2) mitigating circumstances, one of which was his plea of
guilty, were considered in his favor. It is not claimed that petitioner
has entered or will enter such plea.

Moreover, the scant data on record permits the Court to do no more
than speculate on the probability or non-probability of flight on the
part of petitioner herein.

Again, the case of Montano vs. Ocampo, G. R. No. L6352
(January 29, 1953) 49 Off. Gaz. 1855; relied upon by petitioner herein
is not in point. To begin with, the evidence available in said case is
not comparable to that introduced by the prosecution in the case at
bar. Secondly, there were in the Montano case strong indications that
certain proceedings therein took place under circumstances amounting to
a denial of due process, and even suggesting bias or prejudice against
the accused, if not persecution for political reasons. Upon the other
hand, in the present case, the record abundantly shows the fairness and
impartiality of respondent Judge, aside from the ample opportunity by
him given to both parties for the proper elucidation of the issue
raised by petitioner.

In any event, the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case
are such that reasonable men may honestly disagree on the question
whether petitioner should be released or not on bail. As a consequence,
it cannot be said that respondent Judge had abused his discretion much
less gravely, in issuing the orders complained of.

Wherefore, the writ prayed for is denied and the petition herein dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.