ANACLETO P. NAVARRO, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal by Anacleto P. Navarro from the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated July 1, 1959, dismissing his
application for registration of lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-117149,
both residential properties located in Malate along the Dewey Boulevard.

The application was filed on February 6, 1958 and docketed as Case’
No. N-53, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-14566. The Director of Lands interposed an
opposition, alleging that the lots applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. Evidence was
submitted by the applicant on February 11 and March 30, 1959, after
which the hearing was adjourned to June 18. On May 8 of the same year
the Director of Lands filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1)
that the application was barred by prior judgment and (2) that the same
was improper as an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48, paragraph (b), of Public Land Law, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1942, which applies only to public agricultural
lands and not to those which are residential in character. The trial
court, in its order from which this appeal has been taken, sustained
the motion on both grounds.

It appears that sometime in 1950 the Director” of Lands instituted
a cadastral proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila
(G.L.R.C. Cad. Rec. No. 6, G.L.R.O. Cad. Case No. 1) to settle and
adjudicate title to the same lots now in litigation. The Republic of
the Philippines claimed them as part of the public domain. One Caridad
Guillen Cortez filed an answer and was later on substituted by
appellant Anacleto P. Navarro, who sought registration of the
properties in his name pursuant to the provision of Section 48,
paragraph (b), of the Public Land Act. In the decision of the aforesaid
Court dated July 17, 1954 his claim was denied and the two lots were
declared public lands. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which rendered a decision of affirmance on June 29, 1957 (CA-G.R. No.
L-13983-R). Still unsatisfied, Navarro elevated the case to this Court
for review by certiorari, but the petition was dismissed “for being
factual and for lack of merit” in a resolution dated September 6, 1957.

The plea of res judicata must be upheld. The requisites of
this plea are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties (b) identity of subject matter and (c)
identity of cause of action. The only controversy here is with respect
to the last element, namely, identity of cause of action, the others
being concededly present. In the case of De la Rosa vs. Director of Lands, et al., 96 Phil., 641; 53 Off. Gaz. No. 13, p. 4092 this Court held:

“The parcel of land (Lot No. 4) sought to be
registered being the same lot already declared public land in Land
Registration Case No. 295, G.L.R.O. No. 30055, where the herein
appellant and the Director of Lands were parties and the applicant
therein failed to establish title secured from the Spanish Government
or possession of the land in accordance with the Public Land Act then
in force, the decision in the former case declaring Lot No. 4 as part
of the public domain must be deemed res judicata.”

The cause of action in both the present ease and the former
cadastral proceeding is the registration of the two lots in question.
The specific issue involved is whether the lots applied for are part of
the public domain or have so far been possessed by appellant that he
must be deemed to have acquired title thereto which is sufficient for
registration in his name. The declaration by final judgment in the
cadastral proceeding that they are public lands settled this issue once
and for all.

It is contended that the basis for such declaration was the
insufficiency of appellant’s evidence in the former case to prove
continuous possession by him and by his predecessors-in-interest since
July 26, 1894, as required by the Public Land Law before its amendment
by Republic Act No. 1942, and that since in the present case his claim
is based on possession only for a period of thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of his new application in 1958, in accordance with
the amendatory law, the issue has entirely changed and consequently he
should have been allowed to prove such claim. Even on this theory,
however, we note that both in the decision of the Court of First
Instance in the cadastral case and in the decision of affirmance
rendered by the Court of Appeals, the fact as well as the length of the
alleged possession of appellant and his predecessors-in-interest were
placed in issue and duly passed upon. The appellate court stated
therein:

“The evidence of appellant Anacleto P. Navarro
stems mainly from his own testimony. He declared that since 1936, he
was lessee of the two lots from the spouses Emilio Arceo and Margarita
Jimenez. He fenced it and built a dike because when, it was low tide,
part of the land was submerged in water. He made fillings on the
property, planted coconuts thereon and built two houses, which were
destroyed during the liberation of Manila. Sometime later he heard that
the property was sold to Rosario Dumlao, who, in turn, sold it to
Bernardino Landeta; that thereafter the latter sold the land to Caridad
Guillen Cortez from whom he (appellant Anacleto P. Navarro) leased and
later bought the property. Appellant Navarro admits that neither
Caridad Guillen Cortez nor her predecessors ever declared the land in
question for taxation purposes; and that none of them paid taxes on
said land.

“We start with the statement that it is a rule
long familiar in this jurisdiction that all lands are presumed to be a
part of the public domain; that to overcome this presumption, evidence
must be more than a mere preponderance and that vague and indecisive
proofs are insufficient even in the absence of opposition on the part
of the government.

“Considering the averment in appellant’s
answer to the effect that his title over the two lots is supposed to
have been derived from Margarita Jimenez, the question of whether or
not the latter, that is Margarita Jimenez, ever became owner of the
property looms large in the resolution of the present case. To begin
with, it is well to remember, as a pivotal point, that said Margarita
Jimenez only claims ownership over Lot No. 2 which is the smaller of
the two lots. Of course, she made a statement that Lot No. 1 is not
included in her claim, but that if, in fairness, it be disclosed at the
hearing that some portion of it is really owned by her, she would also
include that portion in her claim. This vague and uncertain claim to
Lot No. 1 remains what it is, uncertain. Unable to pinpoint her alleged
property, Margarita Jimenez, was, during the course of the trial, taken
to the place. And true enough, she laid claim to Lot No. 2 and also but
to a small fraction of Lot No, 1.

“On the face of this
uncertain evidence, we are persuaded to state that right at this point,
Lot No. 1 should be excluded from appellant’s claim and declared public
land.

“Inspite of the averment that the two lots in
controversy constitute privately owned property, the evidence is
unanimous to the effect that none of the alleged owners ever declared
the land for taxation, purposes. None of them ever paid taxes on the
property. It has been truthfully said that tax declarations and tax
receipts constitute evidence of great weight in support of possession
or ownership. Tupaz et al. vs. Eicamora, et al. 37 Gaceta Ofiicial , No. 28, pp. 617, 618; Director of Lands vs. Aaron, et al., CA-G. R. No. 10337-R, October 28, 1954; Director of Lands vs. Baligod, et al., CA-G. R. No. 8749-1R, May 13, 1955; Director of . Lands vs. Depositario, et al., CA-G.R. No. 10308-R, May 20, 1955; Angeles, et al. vs.
Duran et al., CA-G.R. No. 16333-R, March 4, 1957. Any owner, the most
ignorant included, knows his obligation, of seeing to it that his real
property is declared for taxation purposes and that he regularly pay
the taxes thereon. This obligation could perhaps have escaped the
attention of one person. But to say that all the alleged owners from
Juana Guinto, thru Margarita Jimenez and her husband Francisco Arceo,
Bernardino Landeta, Caridad Guillen Cortez and finally appellant
Anacleto P. Navarro forgot to declare the property for taxation
purposes and to pay the taxes thereon, is utterly unbelievable. Moraza vs. El Director de Terrenos, 37 Gaceta Ofiicial, No. 129, pp. 2819, 2821. Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Torres in Cruzado vs.
Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil., 17, 35, none of the foregoing persons
ever did ‘believe himself to be the owner of the land he claims.’

“One look at the sketch, Exhibit 1, and sketch, Exhibit 2, of the
Director of Lands, will readily show why Lots 1 and 2 in question could
not have been private property. The whole of Lot No. 1 and part of Lot
No. 2 were originally under water forming part of Manila Bay; while the
remainder or upper portion of Lot No. 2 forms part of the mouth of
Estero Maytubig which flows into the Bay.

“Then there is the oral evidence for the government.

“Novardo Advincula, Civil Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works,
testified as follows: When the government proposed to extend Dewey
Boulevard, he was assigned to locate the right of way from Cortabitarte
to Libertad. He used the plan Exhibit 1 of the Bureau of Lands and was
guided by the technical description furnished by the said bureau in his
job to locate exactly the proposed line of the right of way. In 1939 he
made an ocular inspection of the place. It was then that he found that
the two lots m question were under water; so much so, that at that time
there were bancas tied to the poles in that place and that there were
no improvements on the land. Of course, the place at present is no
longer under water as it was drained and filled up by the Bureau of
Public Works which dredged the Manila Bay and pumped the dredged soil
from the Bay into the area and throughout Dewey Boulevard Extension.
This filing was made before the war.

“Another witness,
Enrique Alcantara, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, testified: He knows
the land in question because he was ordered by the Chief Surveyor to
identify the adjoining owners: that the land consisting of the two lots
described in plan Exhibit. A has a lot been included in the cadastral
survey in 1913-1914 because the said lands were outside of the
shore-line of Manila . Bay. He likewise declared that he executed a
survey of Dewey Boulevard Extension in 1935; that at that time he had
to wade from Vito Cruz to Libertad for the reason that the water
thereon was hip deep and that Lots Nos. 1 and 2 were under water and no
improvements were found thereon. In 1951, so this witness continued, he
made an investigation of the adjoining owners of the land in question
and that, then he found that said lots were already filled up. Not
knowing who the owners of the two lots where, he tried! to gather
information from the Office of the City Assessor of Manila. The said
Office gave out a written statement to the effect that the lots
aforesaid definitely were never declared for taxation or assessment
purposes. The fact that the property in question was under water prior
to the filling thereof is corroborated by appellant Navarro himself,
Navarro testified that in the year he leased the land, he built a dike
as part of the land was submerged under water during low tide. During
the course of the ocular inspection, Margarita Jimenez declared that
the land she was claiming became high thru the sand thrown from the
sea by means of the machinery’ probably belonging to the government.
Tr. ocular inspection, p. 8.

“True it is, that there is
testimony in the record calculated to show that when Margarita Jimenez
and her husband acquired this property in 1907, they were informed by
their vendor, Jacinto Villalon—not Juana Guinto—that said Villalon had
been in possession of the land since the Spanish regime. However, the
exact date such alleged possession by Villalon commenced has not been
established, and neither appellant nor any of his alleged predecessors
in interest, has shown acquisition of the land by composition title
from the Spanish government or by possessory information title or by
any of the legal modes of acquiring public lands.

“Upon the
facts, the conclusion is irresistible that appellant’s evidence is
utterly inadequate to support his claim of ownership over the lots in
question.”

It is quite clear from the foregoing that the Court of Appeals, in
dismissing appellant’s claim in the cadastral case, found it as a fact
that he had not possessed the lands in question for even the thirty
years now asserted by him. Such finding is conclusive on the question
of possession and precludes any new litigation concerning it.

“The foundation principle upon which the doctrine
of res judicata rest is that parties ought not to be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with them in law or
estate.” (National Bank vs. Barreto, 52 Phil., 818, 824; Esscudero vs. Flores, et al., 97 Phil., 240; 51 Off. Gaz. 3444.”

One further point may be noted: When Republic Act No. 1942 was
approved on June 22, 1957, appellant’s appeal in the cadastral case was
still pending in the Court of Appeals and after it was decided therein
he filed before us a petition for review by certiorari, invoking
precisely the provision of the new law requiring only continuous
possession, under claim of ownership, for a period of thirty years to
entitle the possessor to apply for judicial confirmation of his
imperfect title. The dismissal of the petition by this Court for lack
of merit, therefore, constituted an adjudication of appellant’s claim
in the light of such new legislation.

Having thus sustained appellee’s plea that this case is already
barred by prior judgment, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the
second legal point raised by him, namely, that the lots in question
being residential in character, they do not fall within the purview of
Section 48, paragraph (b) of the Public Land Law, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1942, and hence cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.