CONSUELO T. DE CASAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TERESITA F. PEYER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the
defendant Teresita F. Peyer to vacate the premises known as Lot No. 4-C-ID-3-M
of the subdivision plan Psd-21891, with an area of 3,716.1 square meters,
situated at 150 V. Mapa, Sta. Mesa, Manila, to deliver possession thereof to
plaintiff, and to pay to plaintiff the sum of P2,082.20 as rents for the year
1956, plus the rentals which may accrue from January 1, 1957, at the same rate
of P2,082.20 per annum, up to the date the premises are delivered to plaintiff,
plus costs. The Court of Appeals, to which the case was appealed, forwarded the
case to this Court on the ground that the errors assigned by defendant-appellant
raised only questions of law.

The present case was commenced in the municipal Court of Manila on November
21, 1956, when plaintiff filed an action for unlawful detainer against defendant
for the latter’s failure to pay the annual rent, payable in advance, for the
year 1956 in the sum of P1,475.83 plus real estate tax of P606.37 for that year,
which amounts defendant agreed to pay in accordance with a contract of lease
(Annex “A” to the complaint), entered into between plaintiff and defendant in
February, 1951.

After hearing the municipal court on December 28, 1956, rendered judgment
whereby defendant and all persons claiming under her were ordered to vacate the
premises described in the complaint, and defendant made to pay plaintiff the
total amount of P2,082.20 representing rentals in arrears, the real estate tax
for the year 1956, plus the sum of P122.99 a month beginning January, 1957,
until she actually vacates and surrenders the possession of the lot to the
plaintiff, etc. From that judgment defendant appealed to the Court of First
Instance.

In her answer in the Court of First Instance defendant denied having entered
into a contract with plaintiff in February, 1951, alleging that she had been
occupying the premises in question for about 30 years, by virtue of a contract
other than that alleged in the complaint, and that her failure to pay the rental
for the year 1956 was due to plaintiffs refusal to accept the sum of P700.00
which she had always paid as yearly rental. By way of affirmative defenses,
defendant alleged that the action was not an ejectment suit as contemplated in
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court; that defendant owns a house on the premises worth
P25,000 more or less; that defendant is ready and willing to pay P700.00 yearly
rental which she has always paid since she first occupied the premises 30 years
prior to the filing of the action; and that the increased annual rental for the
land claimed by plaintiff, P1,475.83 plus real estate tax of P606.37, is
unjustified. As a counterclaim, defendant alleged that the complaint is
unwarranted and unjustified and plaintiff, knowing this to be a fact, by her
complaint compelled the defendant to litigate, and prayed that defendant be
awarded P500 to be paid by plaintiff as attorney’s fees. In answer to
defendant’s counterclaim, plaintiff averred that in a prior valid and final
judgment in Civil Case No. 18346 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
between her and defendant over the same subject matter, the validity of Annex
“A” to the present complaint (contract of lease dated February, 1951) had been
declared as binding upon the parties.

Issues having been joined, the case was scheduled for hearing on March 19,
1957. Prior to said date, plaintiff filed a motion for immediate execution of
the judgment, alleging that defendant failed to pay to plaintiff or deposit with
the court the amount of rents due from January, 1957 to the date of the filing
of the motion, and that defendant has not filed a supersedeas bond to answer for
the back rentals amounting to P2,082.20. After hearing counsel for both parties,
the court on March 18, 1957 granted the motion for immediate execution of the
judgment rendered by the municipal court, and pursuant to said order, issued on
April 4, 1957, a writ of execution ordering defendant to pay the different sums
stated therein in addition to vacating the premises subject matter of the
action.

On April 15, 1957, defendant deposited with the clerk of court the sum of
P1,500 and asked for the suspension of the writ of execution. On June 1, 1957,
the sheriff submitted his return as proof of service of execution on defendant
and her consistent refusal to vacate the premises. On June 10, 1957, plaintiff
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition and to withdraw deposit
of payment in order that the same may be applied to the partial satisfaction of
judgment in the case. The court gave defendant up to June 22, 1957, within which
to show cause why the building constructed by her on the premises in question
should not be demolished. On June 20, 1957, counsel for defendant, without
complying with the order to show cause, filed a motion to postpone hearing of
the motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition to June 29, and also a
motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the case was subject to the
provisions of R. A. No. 1162, as amended by R. A. No. 1599. On July 10, 1957,
the court issued an order granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of
demolition and to withdraw deposit, and on July 24, issued the writ of
demolition.

The case originally scheduled for hearing on March 18, 1957 was, due to
numerous postponements at the instance of either party, tried only on November
19, 1957, on which date plaintiff presented and closed her evidence.
Continuation of the hearing was set for December 3, 1957 for the presentation of
evidence by the defendant, but on said date the latter did not appear. The
hearing of the case was postponed to January 16, 1958, and again to March 13,
1958. Two days before this date, attorney for defendant filed a motion for
postponement alleging illness of the defendant, but this motion was denied in
open court on March 13, 1958. A motion to reconsider the order of denial was
also denied, and on May 29, 1958, the court rendered the judgment set forth in
the beginning of this opinion. A motion to set aside said judgment and for new
trial having been denied, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as
stated above, forwarded the case to us.

In this appeal appellant alleges that in refusing to grant her motion for
postponement the lower court committed an abuse of discretion for it thereby
deprived her of her right to present her evidence.

In the case of McEntee vs. Manotok, 113 Phil, 249, October 27, 1961, we held
that in considering motions for postponement of trials, as well as in those for
new trial, two circumstances should be taken into account by the court, namely
(1) the merits of the case of the movant and (2) the reasonableness of the
postponement. There may be an accident, surprise or excusable neglect justifying
postponement or reconsideration (which apparently exists in the case at bar by
reason of defendant’s illness), but if movant does not present a meritorious
claim or defense, denial of his motion for postponement may not be considered as
an abuse of the discretion of the Court. Defendant-appellant herein does not
seem to have any apparent valid defense to offer in her favor. The only defense
she presents in her brief is her willingness to pay a reasonable rental, but not
the increased rent claimed by plaintiff-appellee, which the former believes to
be unreasonable and unjustified. It is noteworthy that the validity of Annex
“A”, the contract of lease between plaintiff and defendant of February, 1951,
wherein the rental to be paid by the latter was fixed, and which was attached to
the complaint filed in the municipal court, was previously passed upon as valid
and binding between the parties in Civil Case No. 18346 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. As defendant-appellant does not seem to have any valid
defense, her request for postponement appears to be but a delaying tactic.
(Vaswani vs. Tarachand, 110 Phil., 521, December 29, 1960). The lower court must
have taken this circumstance into account, together with the fact that it had4
already granted numerous postponements in the past, when it denied
defendant-appellant’s motion for postponement. The lower court may not,
therefore, be held to have acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner when it
denied the motion to postpone and rendered judgment on the evidence presented by
the plaintiff-appellee, (Hap Hong Hardware Co. vs. Phil. Milling Co., 111 Phil.,
1096).

Another error attributed to the lower court is its having denied
defendant-appellant’s motion to suspend the proceedings pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1162, as amended by Republic Act No. 1599.
Republic Act No. 1599 refers to the expropriation of landed estates or haciendas
and the sale thereof to its tenants and occupants, and the suspension for a
period of two years of ejectment proceedings against any tenant thereof.
Defendant-appellant did not at all prove that the land in question is an
hacienda or part of an hacienda covered by said Republic Act. It is but 3,716.1
square meters in area; it can hardly be considered a landed estate. Hence, the
second error she imputes to the lower court does not merit any
consideration.

For the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila is
hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, J.J., concur.