DONATO IGNACIO AND BONIFACIO SUAVERDEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. PASTOR L. DE GUZMAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS AND LAO OH KIM, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners Bonifacio Suaverdez and Donato Ignacio seek the review by
certiorari a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Respondent Lao Oh Kim is the landholder of two (2) parcels of land with an
area of two and a half (2 1/2) hectares and three (3) hectares, respectively, in
Anao, Tarlac. These parcels of land are cultivated, the first by petitioner
Bonifacio Suaverdez, and the second by Donato Ignacio as tenants of Lao Oh Kim.
On February 24, 1959, the latter filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a
petition, docketed therein as CAR Case No. 684-T59, for permission to eject
Suaverdez. On May 5, 1959, a similar petition was presented by Lao Oh Kim,
before the same court, where it was docketed as CAR Case No. 725-T’59, against
Ignacio. Both petitions were based upon the ground that Suaverdez and Jgnacio
had reaped the products of said parcels of land without the knowledge and
consent of Lao Oh Kim and/or his overseer and agents. Lao Oh Kim further alleged
that Suaverdez failed to follow the proven farm practices for the proper care of
the land on which he worked and tending to increase its production, and that
Ignacio had not given Lao Oh Kim his share of the vegetables grown in the land
cultivated by him (Ignacio). After a joint trial, Hon. Pastor L. De Guzman,
Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, rendered judgment for Lao Oh Kim.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

Respondent Judge found in the decision appealed from that Lao Oh Kim had
advised petitioners herein not to reap their products without his previous
permission and that, this notwithstanding, they harvested their respective
palay, without said permission. The same is not required, however, by Republic
Act No. 1199 (section 39), except when the reaping or threshing of the crops
takes place “at any time previous to the date set” therefor, and there is no
evidence or finding, either that a date had been set therefor, or that
petitioners had harvested their respective crops prior to the customary or usual
period. What is more, the very evidence for Lao Oh Kim corroborated the
testimony of petitioners herein to the effect that the former’s overseer or
representative, one Martin Salazar, was present when the harvesting took
place.

It appears, also, that the hearing of said two (2) cases had began before
January 5, 1961; that when said cases were called for continuation of the
hearing on said date, petitioners herein and their counsel were not in the
courtroom; that on motion of counsel for Lao Oh Kim, the lower court thereupon
issued an order declaring that said cases were deemed submitted for decision;
that, immediately thereafter, on the same date, petitioners filed a
“manifestation” to the effect that they, their counsel and their
witnesses—Sisenando Ignacio, Arsenio Carino, Marcelino Baguisi, Teodoro Gajes
and Pedro Abon—had arrived at the courthouse at about 9:55 a.m., and were
informed that the cases had been deemed submitted on the evidence already on
record, and that said petitioners had no objection thereto, provided that their
testimony be deemed corroborated by the witnesses above mentioned; that on
January 16, 1961, the lower court issued an order rejecting the qualification
contained in said “manifestation,” for the reason, among others, that it would
deprive Lao Oh Kim of the opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses; that on
January 23, 1961, petitioners filed a motion praying, either that said order of
January 16, 1961 be reconsidered, or, else, that they be allowed to present
their additional witnesses; that this motion was denied on January 31, 1961;
that on March 3, 1961, Lao Oh Kim, in turn, moved that he be allowed, “for the
sake of equity and justice” to present a “rebuttal witness” who was “very
important” to said movant; that petitioners objected to this motion upon the
ground that it would be unfair to grant it, after they had been denied an
opportunity analogous to that sought by Lao Oh Kim; that, in their opposition to
said motion, petitioners, likewise, alleged that the same had been set for
hearing on March 7, 1961, on which date their counsel could not appear before
the Jower court, because as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac,
he would have to preside over the municipal council thereof at the hearing,
scheduled to be held on the same date, of an administrative case against the
chief of police and a patrolman of Moncada, and, accordingly, prayed that the
hearing of said motion of Lao Oh Kim be postponed to some other date; that, this
notwithstanding, the lower court, without acting on said request for
postponement, heard the motion of Lao Oh ‘Kim, in the absence of herein
petitioners and their counsel on March 7, 1961 and forthwith received, on that
date, the testimony of the rebuttal witness for Lao Oh Kim, without any
opportunity for said petitioners to cross-examine said witness, and that, soon
thereafter, or on March 28, 1961, the decision appealed from was
promulgated.

Upon the foregoing facts, we feel that the lower court was not fair to
petitioners herein. It should be noted that, taking advantage of the fact that
petitioners had not arrived in time at the hearing held on January 5, 1961,
counsel for Lao Oh Kim succeeded in securing an order of said court declaring
the aforementioned cases submitted for decision on the evidence introduced prior
thereto. Petitioners, who arrived a few minutes after the issuance of said
order, were thus deprived of the chance to introduce the testimony of their
corroborating witnesses. Two (2) motions filed by petitioners to offset the
disadvantageous position in which they Had been placed thereby were denied by
the lower court.

However, counsel for Lao Oh Kim had, in turn, committed the mistake of asking
on January 5, 1961, that the cases be deemed submitted for decision without
introducing his own rebuttal evidence. He did not undertake to cure such mistake
until March 3, 1961 or three (3) months later. He did not give any reason to
justify the late reception of said rebuttal evidence, except that it was
“important” and that its admission was demanded by “equity and justice”. He made
no effort whatsoever to show that his negligence in not presenting rebuttal
evidence, before asking that the cases be deemed submitted for decision, was
excusable. Lao Oh Kim did not attach to his motion of March 3, 1961, an
affidavit of his rebuttal witness. In fact, the latter’s name was not given in
said motion. Neither was the same verified. When the lower court granted it,
despite its technical defects, and after being technical in connection with the
corroborating witnesses for petitioners herein, it committed to the latter an
injustice which we cannot sanction.

That injustice becomes more patent when we consider: (1) that petitioners had
asked for the postponement of the hearing of said motion of Lao Oh Kim, invoking
a good ground therefor; (2) that petitioners had no notice that the testimony of
Lao Oh Kim’s rebuttal witnesses would be taken on March 7, 1961; (3) that
petitioners were thereby deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine said
witnesses; and (4) that the determination of the issues between the parties
herein hinge on the credibility of the witnesses, so that the introduction or
non-introduction of corroborating evidence is likely to effect the result of the
aforementioned cases.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and said cases are
remanded to the lower court for reception of the testimony of said corroborating
witnesses of petitioners herein and cross-examination by the latter of the
rebuttal witness of Lao Oh Kim, as well as the rendition, thereafter, of such
decision as the facts then on record and the law may warrant, with the costs of
this instance against Lao Oh Kim. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.