FELIX YUSON AND MARIA DE GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. ANACLETO DIAZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARIANO LIBUNAO, ANDRES HIZON, AND LAZARO G…

This is an original petition instituted in
this court, asking for the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus
against the respondent judge, ordering him to issue a writ of
possession in order to oust the other respondents, Mariano Libunao,
Andres Hizon, and Lazaro Geronimo from the land occupied by them within
the boundaries mentioned in the certificate of transfer No. 563.

The petitioners allege that they acquired the parcel of land,
as stated by the certificate of transfer No. 563, from Saturnino Lopez
and Mercedes Tombo, to whom certificate of title No. 999 of the
registry of property of Nueva Ecija was issued, as applicants in case
No. 290 of the Court of First Instance of said province; and that when
the petitioners took possession of the parcel of land purchased they
found the respondents, Mariano Libunao, Andres Hizon, and Lazaro
Geronimo, in possession of part thereof which part they had been in
possession of for three years and on which are located their houses,
and who, upon being asked to leave the parcel of land in question,
refused to do so. It is also alleged by the petitioners that the
respondent judge failed to comply with a duty imposed by law, in
refusing to issue the writ of possession prayed for by them, they
having acquired, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, the
absolute ownership of all the parcel of land within the limits
expressed in the certificate of transfer No. 563 and all the rights and
actions which the vendors had to enjoy said land free from all
incumbrance, according to section 39 of Act No. 496.

The respondents Mariano Libunao, Andres Hizon, and Lazaro Geronimo
admit in their answer that they are in possession of the parcel claimed
by the petitioners but they allege that they have acquired it by
purchase in good faith from one Graciano Garcia, justice of the peace
of the municipality, that they have been occupying it in the belief
that they are the owners thereof, cultivating and spending great sums
of money to improve it, and that at the time they had a growing crop
thereon. They maintain that, in view of the right of possession which
they claim to have acquired over the parcel of land, they cannot be
dispossessed thereof by means of a simple motion, as that presented by
the petitioners and overruled by the court.

It being admitted by the parties that the court, at the petition of
the applicants in said registration case No. 290, issued in favor of
them on March 29, 1919, a writ of possession and that the officer in
charge of enforcing the writ certified that on May 14 of said year he
had placed the petitioner Saturnino Lopez in possession of the land
described in said writ, the question which arises in this case is
whether the successors in interest of the applicants, that is, the
petitioners, can acquire possession of said parcel of land actually
occupied by the respondents by means of a petition asking for a writ of
possession.

As already stated, the petitioners, in asking the court by means of
a motion to issue a writ of possession, rely upon section 39 of the
Registration Law. The meaning of the words “free of all incumbrance”
used in section 39 of Act No. 496, has been interpreted by this court
in the case of De Jesus vs. City of Manila (29 Phil., 73). In the syllabus of that case it is stated among other things:

“It was the purpose of the Land Registration Act to
guarantee that every purchaser of registered land for value should take
and hold the same free and clear from any and all prior claims, liens,
and incumbrances except those set forth in the decree of registration
and those expressly mentioned in the Act as having been preserved
against it.

“A title obtained by registration under the Land
Registration Act is an indefeasible title and in order to preserve that
character, the title is cleaned anew with every transfer for value; and
when lands the title to which is registered under the Land Registration
Act are transferred for value, the purchaser takes them free and clear
from all taxes that might have been assessed on said lands but which
were not assessed by reason of an erroneous declaration for taxes made
by his vendor whereby they escaped taxation in his hands.”

There is nothing to indicate that adverse possession constitutes a
charge, lien, or burden within the meaning of said article or that it
authorizes the court to issue the writ of possession prayed for by the
petitioners.

In the case of Hart vs. Revilla, Judge of First Instance
of Pampanga, R. G. No. 16498, decided by this court in December 18,
1920 [not reported], the following are the facts found:

“Jose Legarda is the owner of a parcel of land
registered under Torrens title No. 213, issued on June 19, 1917, in a
proceeding had in accordance with the Land Registration Law.
Subsequently a cadastral proceeding was instituted with respect to the
same parcel of land and it was decided in favor of the same Jose
Legarda. On July 20, 1918, Jose Legarda and W. C. Hart executed a
contract of lease on this parcel of land for the period of ten years.
On March 25, 1920, W. C. Hart presented this contract to the registrar
of property, but, for reasons not stated, it was not registered. On the
29th of the same month, Patrick McCrann presented in turn to the
registrar a contract of sale of this land by Jose Legarda to him. On
the 27th of the following month, April, W. C. Hart presented in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action against Jose Legarda,
Patrick McCrann and the registrar of deeds of Pampanga, Augusto A.
Reyes, for the purpose, among others, of compelling the registrar,
Augusto A. Reyes, to register the contract of lease entered into
between Jose Legarda and W. C. Hart, a preliminary injunction having
also been asked against the registrar Augusto A. Reyes to prevent him
from registering any document bearing on this land, unless he first
should register the said contract of lease between Jose Legarda and W.
C. Hart. The court, by order of April 27, 1920, issued the writ of
preliminary injunction asked. On the 29th of the same month of April,
Patrick McCrann appeared in the cadastral case, to which reference has
already been made, and, alleging that he had purchased the land from
Jose Legarda, asked that possession thereof be delivered to him. The
court granted this petition and by order of the 30th of the same month
of April, 1920, ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in favor
of Patrick McCrann. It was held: That the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga has no jurisdiction to issue that writ of possession in favor
of the purchaser Patrick McCrann.”

The fact that in that case it was neither alleged nor proved that
the contract of sale between Legarda and McCrann was registered, does
not affect our conclusion in the case at bar. It is beyond question
that sections 38 and 39 of Act No. 496 invest Torrens titles, issued
after the necessary judicial proceedings, with an absolute and
conclusive character. Section 38 declares that “the decree of
registration” which the court enters shall bind the land and shall be
“conclusive upon and against all persons.” In section 39 certificates
of title issued “in pursuance to the decree of registration” are
declared to be conclusive. (De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil.,
480.) By virtue of section 17 of the Land Registration Law, as amended
by section 5 of Act No. 1108, the Court of Land Registration may, in
cases falling within its jurisdiction, enforce its orders, judgments or
decrees in the same manner as Courts of First Instance, and in this
connection it may issue writs of possession, ordering the governor or
sheriff of any province or of the City of Manila to place the
petitioner in possession of the property included in the decree of the
court rendered in his favor. (Pasay Estate Co. vs. Del
Rosario, 11 Phil., 391.) Such was the case here. But when other persons
have subsequently taken possession of the property, claiming the right
of possession thereto, the owner of the registered land, or his
successors, cannot dispossess them by merely asking the court for a
writ of possession. The Land Registration Law (sec. 46) provides that
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner
can not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Nevertheless, in order to recover the ownership or possession of land
possessed by a third person, it is absolutely indispensable to resort
to the proceedings established by law. This court has repeatedly
declared that it is sufficient for a person to be in possession in
order that he may be respected in the possession enjoyed by him of a
real property, so long as no other claimant appears who has and proves
a better right. (Dancel and Mina vs. Ventura, 24 Phil., 421.)
He who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the possession
of a thing, so long as the possessor refuses delivery, must request the
assistance of the proper authority. (Art. 441, Civ. Code.) In other
words, he who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the
possession of real property must come to the courts of justice,
instituting, as the case may be, an action for unlawful entry or
detainer under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or the
revindicatory action authorized by article 348 of the Civil Code.

From what has been said we are of the opinion and so hold that it
is not proper to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus in the present
case and the petition is therefore denied, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

Mapa, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Avancena, JJ., concur.