JUAN FERY, PETITIONER, VS.. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CABANAPTUAN, NUEVA ECIJA, RESPONDENT.

This is an original action for the writ of
mandamus, commenced in the Supreme Court. The respondent presented a
demurrer to the petition.

The important facts admitted and found in the petition may be stated as follows:

1. That sometime prior to the 3d day of October, 1913, the
   municipality of Cabanatuan, of the Province of Nueva Ecija, commenced
   an action in the Court of First Instance of said province, for the
   purpose of expropriating certain pieces or parcels of land for a public
   market. The action was known as No. 950 and was entitled “El Municipio
   de Cabanatuan vs. Gregorio Crisostomo y otros.”

2. That on the 9th day of July, 1915, the Court of First Instance rendered
   a final judgment in said action, granting to said municipality the
   pieces or parcels of land in question without condition, and ordered
   said municipality to pay to the various owners of said parcels of land
   the specific amounts which were mentioned in the dispositive part of
   the decision.

3. That later (the exact date not appearing of record) the said municipality constructed upon said land houses to be rented.

The petitioner herein now alleges that, in view of the fact that
the municipality expropriated the parcel of land in question for the
purpose of a public market and that it abandoned that purpose, it
thereby lost its right to the parcel of land so appropriated. The
petitioner prayed that the writ of mandamus be issued requiring the
said municipality to return said land to its former owner—the
petitioner herein. The petitioner further alleged that he has not been
paid the amount due him as the value of his land.

The question presented by the petition and demurrer is this: When
private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that
particular public use is abandoned, does the land so expropriated
return to its former owner?

The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title
acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a
municipality, or a corporation which has the right to acquire property
under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is
expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its
former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If,
for example, land is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it
for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as
a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary. Many other similar examples might
be given. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation
gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the
State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does
not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the
expropriation proceedings. (10 R. C. L., 240, sec. 202; 20 C. J., 1234,
sees. 593-599, and numerous cases cited; Reichling vs. Covington Lumber Co., 57 Wash., 225; 13.”i Am. St. Rep., 976; McConihay vs. Wright, 121 U. S., 201.)

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either
by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or
the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of
the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
(Fort Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L. R. A., 367.)

The petitioner having admitted that the municipality of Cabanatuan,
in the year 1915, had acquired a fee simple title to the land in
question, it (the municipality) is the owner of the land in question,
notwithstanding the fact that it is making a use of the same other than
that for which it was expropriated.

If the petitioner has not been paid for his land, that is another question, and he has his remedy by an ordinary action.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the demurrer presented by the
prosecuting attorney of the Province of Nueva Ecija is hereby
sustained, and it is hereby ordered that a final decree be issued in
accordance herewith, with costs, unless the petitioner amends his
petition within five days from the notice hereof. So ordered.

Mapa, C. J
., Araullo, Street, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.