TEODORO SUMLJAG BONGAL WITH HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND NATURAL MOTHER, SEVERINA SUMALJAG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. BARBARA P. VDA. DE BONGAL, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

On February 1, 1960, Teodoro S. Bongal, about 20 years
old at the time, represented by his guardian ad litem and natural
mother Severina Sumaljag,
filed an action for acknowledgment, partition and damages in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte against Barbara P. Bongal, surviving spouse of the late decedent Zosimo Bongal, who died intestate
on November 7, 1959 in Palompon, Leyte.  It was alleged in the complaint that during
the period from 1938 to 1940, the deceased Zosimo Bongal and Severina Sumaljag – who were then without legal impediment to marry
each other – lived and cohabited under one roof in Ormoc
City as husband and wife; that as a result of that cohabitation plaintiff Teodoro Sumaljag Bongal was born; that subsequently Zosimo
Bongal married
Barbara P. Bongal; that plaintiff lived for
sometime in the household of the said spouses; that when Zosimo
died on November 7, 1959 he left real and personal
properties, but no legitimate issue; that demands for extrajudicial partition
had been made upon defendant, but she refused to accede to them; and that plaintiff sustained damages and expenses for
attorney’s fees as a consequence.

On May 4, 1960, defendant filed an answer with counterclaim,
denying the allegations in the complaint and setting up several special and
affirmative defenses, to wit:  that
plaintiff is not the natural child of Zosimo Bongal, the latter being, in his lifetime, incapable of
procreation as he was sterile; that the present action is barred by a prior
judgment, rendered in Special Proceedings No. 111-0, also by the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, wherein the deceased and his wife,
defendant herein, filed a petition for the adoption of one Rustico
Bongal, which petition was favorably acted upon in an
order dated November 29, 1955.

On May 25, 1960, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which was
admitted by the Court.  The amendment
consisted of the addition of another plaintiff, Dalmacia
Ruiz Vda. de Bongal,
deceased Zosimo Bongal’s
mother, who had allegedly executed and filed a “Manifesto” to the effect
that all her shares in the estate of Zosimo Bengal
should be given to plaintiff by virtue of an alleged Deed of Donation executed
by her in his favor.

On June 9, 1960 defendant filed an “Urgent Motion to
Dismiss,” which was subsequently amplified by an “Amended Motion to
Dismiss,” based on the grounds:  (1)
that the cause of action was barred by
the prior judgment in Special Proceedings No. 111-0 granting the adoption of Rustico Bongal; and (2) that the
amendment of the complaint by the addition of Dalmacia
as additional plaintiff had not been authorized by her.  The Court a quo granted the motion and
dismissed the case on the first ground alleged. 
The said Court said:

“In his argument, counsel for the plaintiff insisted that the
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in Sp. Proc.
No. 111-0 on the strength of the plaintiff’s allegation that the plaintiff was
an acknowledged natural son of the adopting father, Zosimo
Bongal.  If
this is the case, if we are to consider the plaintiff as an acknowledged natural
son in the present case, this case for acknowledgment will be considered a mere
surplusage for the purpose of compelling the
surviving spouse of the estate of Zosimo Bongal.  It is impossible to consider the plaintiff as
the acknowledged natural son of the deceased Zosimo Bongal.  The Court,
therefore, holds that for lack of opposition on the part of the present plaintiff
at the time the Sp. Proc. No. 111-0 was heard notwithstanding its proper
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Ormoc and in the province of Leyte, this Court had jurisdiction over Sp. Proc.
No. 111-0.  The Court, therefore, holds
that the present action is barred by the order of this Court dated November 29,
1955, in Sp. Proc. No. 111-0 and the plaintiff is already estopped
from questioning the said special proceedings.”

Plaintiff moved to reconsider, and after his motion was denied
interposed the present appeal.  He
assigns four errors allegedly committed by the court a quo.  However, reduced to essentials, the main
issue presented is whether or not the present action is barred by the final
judgment in Special Proceedings No. 111-0 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.

Appellee’s position, which was upheld
by the lower court, is that the decree of adoption is conclusive as to the fact
that the adopting father, the deceased Zosimo Bongal, had no acknowledged natural child, and therefore
was determinative of appellant’s lack of status as such child.  Reliance is placed expressly on Article 335
of the Civil Code, which provides that “those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction” cannot
adopt.  Since the adoption was valid,
according to the lower court, having been decreed after jurisdiction was duly
acquired upon compliance with all the requisites of the law, and since
appellant failed to appear in the proceeding and register his opposition to the
petition for adoption, his claim as acknowledged natural child is already
foreclosed by the decree.

There seems to be a misapprehension of the facts, as alleged in
the complaint, and of the resulting legal situation, both by the parties and by
the trial court itself.  They proceed on the assumption that plaintiff Teodoro
S. Bongal had been voluntarily acknowledged by the
deceased Zosimo Bongal as
his natural child prior to his death. 
From this premise they derive conflicting conclusions:  on the part of plaintiff, that the whole
adoption proceeding was a nullity in view of Article 335 of the Civil Code; and
on the part of appellee and of the lower court,
invoking the same provision, that the adoption being valid, it settled not only
the status on the adopted child, Rustico Bongal, but also the status of appellant – the latter in
the sense that he was not an acknowledged natural child.

However, appellant’s case is not based on the theory that he bad
been voluntarily acknowledged.  It is in
fact a complex action for compulsory recognition and partition.  The complaint nowhere categorically affirms
that there was voluntary recognition made “in the record of birth,
in a will, in a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing,” as provided in Article 278 of the Civil Code.  To be sure, appellant alleges that his record
of birth shows that he is the son of the late Zosimo Bongal, and that his school records make the same
showing.  But such documents, as thus
referred to, fall short of making out a case of voluntary recognition; if
anything, they are evidence of filiation upon which
an action for compulsory recognition may be based, pursuant to Article 283 of
the Civil Code.

From the foregoing the
following conclusions may be drawn: 
(1) that since appellant did not have the status of an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Zosimo Bongal at the time of the adoption of the child Rustico Bongal, the provision of
Article 335, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code did not apply and constituted no
impedi­ment to the proceeding; (2) that by the same token, appellant had no
personality then to contest the adoption and could not be bound thereby in any
way insofar as his own status was concerned; and (3) that the adoption of Rustico Bongal did not deprive
plaintiff of his right to seek recognition as a natural child in a proper
petition and upon evidence that is competent and legally admissible.  It would have been irregular for plaintiff to
appear in the adoption pro­ceeding with a petition for compulsory recognition
in his own behalf, and at the same time use such petition as a ground for
opposing the adoption.

But on the theory that plaintiff was voluntarily recognized by
the deceased Zosimo Bongal
as his natural child and therefore his status as such has been duly established,
that status is of a permanent character and cannot be deemed lost by reason of
the fact that the natural father subsequently adopted another child.  As soon
say that a legitimate child
loses his status for the same reason, considering that under Article 335 of the
Civil Code a person cannot adopt if he has a legitimate child.  The absurdity of the situation is
self-evident.

The only instance when recognition already made may be impugned
is if the child does not possess all the con­ditions stated in Article 269 of
the Civil Code, that is, if the child is not really natural, as defined in said
provision, or if the requirements of the law concerning recognition have not
been fulfilled (Art. 286, Civil Code). 
In fact, this is a defense raised by appellee
in her answer to the complaint, but this defense should properly be the subject
of evidence at the trial.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside, and the
case is remanded to the court below for trial and judgment on the merits.  Costs against defendant-appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
and Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.