IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.  ALFONSO PO CHU KING, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

In a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, petitioner Alfonso Po
Chu King alleged that he was born on July 18, 1936 at
Iligan City, although he has been residing at Ozamis City since 1945; that he is single, 25 years old,
and a citizen of Nationalist China; that he speaks and writes the English language and the Cebu-Visayan dialect; that he is a businessman by trade or profession, being an employee
and a stockholder of the Po Sun Que Sons Corporation from
which he derived an annual income of P3,000.00, more or less; and that he is
exempt from filing a declaration of intention because he was born in the
Philippines and graduated from high school
at the Ozamis Chinese School.  Petitioner further alleged that he believed
in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines;
that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to
embrace their customs, traditions and ideals; that he is not opposed to
organized government; that he is not a polygamist nor a believer in polygamy;
that he was never convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; and that he
is not suffering from any incurable contagious disease.  In short, petitioner claims that he has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be a Filipino citizen
as provided in the Naturalization Law.

The petition was accompanied by the joint affidavits of two
character witnesses, namely, Maximo Lago and Filemon Tan.  After the requisite publication, the case was
heard on March 31, 1962.  The Government, which was represented by the
City Fiscal of Ozamis City, did not file any formal
opposition.  On July 28, 1962, the lower court rendered a
decision finding petitioner qualified for Philippine citi­zenship and granted
the petition for naturalization.  In due
time, the Solicitor General interposed the present appeal to this Court, assigning
the following errors:

1.     
The lower court erred in not finding that petitioner is not exempt
from filing a declaration of intention;

2.     
The lower court erred in not finding that petitioner possesses no
lucrative employment; and

3.     
The lower court erred in not finding
that the evidence adduced by petitioner’s character witnesses is insufficient
to sustain the allegations in their joint affidavit supporting the petition.

We find the appeal
meritorious.

It is alleged in the petition for naturalization
that petitioner is exempt from filing a declaration of intention for having been born in the Philippines and
had graduated from a high school recognized by the Government of the
Philippines and not limited to any race or nationality.  Petitioner,
however, did not mention in his petition, nor in his
testimony, the primary or elementary schools that he attended; and no evidence
whatsoever was presented to show that the Ozamis Chinese School where he finished his high school is an
institution recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality.  This Court has held that a petitioner for naturalization, who fails to
mention in his petition the schools
where he finished his elementary and secondary education and fails to prove
that the elementary and high schools he attended were recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality, is not exempt from filing a declaration of intention, as provided in
Sections 5 and 6 of the Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 535).

“x x x
Considering that section 6 of the Naturalization Law expressly requires that to
be exempt from filing declarations of intention Philippine-born applicants
must; inter alia, have received both
primary and secondary education
in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any
race or nationality; that there is no evidence that the Manila Chinese School
(where petitioner received primary education) was not limited to any race or nationality, but, on
the contrary, its name clearly imported that it was limited to Chinese students
(cf. Wang I. Fu vs. Republic, L-15819, Sept. 29, 1962;
Hao Su Siong vs. Republic,
L-13045, July 30, 1962; Sy See vs. Republic,
L-17025, May 30, 1962); and considering
that the burden lies on applicant to satisfactorily show that all schools attended
by him are not limited to students of a particular nationality, but are regularly
attended by a sizable number of Filipino students from whom applicant could
have imbibed Filipino customs
and traditions, we agree that petitioner should have filed in due time his
declaration of intention, and not having done so, his application was erroneously
granted.” (Len v. Republic, L-20151, March 31, 1965; emphasis supplied)

“It is to be noted from the above-quoted allegation that
petitioner omitted to mention the school where he received his primary education
and whether or not the primary school he
attended is recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality.  In his testimony at the hearing before the
trial court, petitioner declared that he studied from the third grade of the
elementary course up to the first year high school at the Hope
Christian High School
(formerly Chia-Nan School), a school run and managed by Chinese and where he did not
have Filipino classmates but only Filipino teachers.  Although there is a certification issued by
the Bureau of Private Schools, dated April 3, 1962, stating that said Hope
Christian High School is recognized by the Government, and another
certification issued by the Principal of the same school, dated February 6,
1962, stating that said school is not
limited to any race or nationality, no proof was submitted to show that at the
time petitioner was enrolled and studying at the said school it was not limited
to any race or nationality.  The importance of this factor in petitioner’s
early education lies in the fact that it is in the formative early years of
schooling that the more lasting impressions are received and absorbed by the
child’s mind.  His imbibing our customs
and traditions, therefore, depends in the greater extent upon his opportunities
to mingle with Filipinos while receiving elementary education.

“For these deficiencies (omission to state in the petition the
school which petitioner attended and where he received his primary education
and failure to satisfy this Court that Chia-Nan
School (now Hope Christian High School) was not limited to any race or
nationality at the time petitioner attended it), we hold that petitioner is not exempted from filing a
declaration of intention, contrary to his contention.” (Sia v. Republic, L-20290, August 31, 1965)

Moreover, as the Solicitor General points out, there is no
sufficient evidence in the record which establishes the fact that the
petitioner was born in the Philippines.  The petitioner tried to prove the fact of his
having been born in the Philippines
by his own testimony and by the affidavits
of his mother and his older brother. 
These affiants – his mother and his brother – did not take the witness
stand so that they could not be cross-examined by the representative of the Government. 
The petitioner presented
his alien certificate of registration and his immigrant certificate of residence, also to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines; but these two certificates, like the affidavits of his mother and
brother, are hearsay evidence and therefore not satisfactory to prove the fact
of petitioner’s birth in the Philippines.^[1] No explanation was offered by petitioner why
he could not produce his birth certificate.  There is no evidence whatsoever that the record of birth of the petitioner
had been lost or destroyed.

It having been shown
that the petitioner has not established that he is exempt from filing a
declaration of intention, and it appearing that he had not filed a declaration
of intention one year before the filing of his petition for naturalization as required by law, the
lower court erred when it granted the instant petition for naturalization.

The Solicitor General
also correctly points out that petitioner does not have a lucrative trade or
profession.  It appears in the income tax
return of the petitioner for 1961,^[2] that
his net income is P2,814.74, and of this amount P1,814.74
represents his salary and
P1,000.00 as bonus, from the Po Sun Que Sons Corporation.  Considering
that “contingent income,
like bonuses and commissions, do not constitute dependable remuneration
entitled to consideration in deter­mining lucrative trade or work for the
purposes of the Naturalization Law”^[3] because “they are, by their nature, in­definite
and unsteady,”^[4] the yearly income of P1,814.74
of petitioner, even if he is single, can not be considered lucrative, or
sufficient, to meet the requirement of the law.^[5]

A cursory examination of the joint affidavit of pe­titioner’s
character witnesses reveal that they practically reiterated what is contained
in it when they testified in court, without giving any instance showing why
petitioner, if admitted to Philippine citizenship, would be a good citizen of
the Philippines.  Thus, when asked the
question, “what is your impression of petitioner’s conduct toward the
community and the constituted authority?“, their
answers were either, he is good, satisfactory, or law-abid­ing.  And when further queried:  “Do you believe that the petitioner
possesses the qualifications necessary to be­come a Filipino citizen?“, their answer is, “Yes, sir.” In the case
of Santiago Ng v. Republic, L-16302, February
28, 1962, this Court declared: 
“The belief expressed by the witnesses that the petitioner would
make a good citizen, and that they recommend his admission to Filipino
citizenship, is a mere conclusion unsupported by facts, and, therefore, an
opinion entitled to no weight.”

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is reversed, and
the petition for naturalization is
denied, with costs against
petitioner-appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez,
and Ruiz Castro, J.J., concur.

^[1]
De Lara v. Republic, L-18203-04, May
29, 1964.

^[2]
Exhibit H.  The
petition for naturalization was filed on June 17, 1961.

^[3]
Chie v. Republic, L-20169, February
26, 1965; So v. Republic, L-20145, June 30,
1965.

^[4]
Tse v. Republic, L-19642, November 9, 1964; Sia v.
Republic, L-20290, August 31, 1965.

^[5]
Sia v. Republic, supra; Chuan v. Republic, L-18850, February 28, 1964; Yap v.
Republic, L-19649, April 30, 1965; Tan
v. Republic, L-19694, March 20, 1965; Uy v.
Republic, L-19916, June 23, 1965; Uy v.
Republic, L-20799, November 29, 1965; Uy v.
Republic, L-20208, June 30, 1965.