FRANCISCO LAGUNILLA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUAN O. REYES, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF LA UNION AND FERMIN MOTAS, RESPON…

Upon complaint of one Fermin Motas, petitioner Francisco Lagunilla was
charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of Bangar, La Union, with the
crime of slight physical injuries and, after trial, convicted of the crime
charged and ordered to pay a fine P20.00. Lagunilla appealed to the Court of
First Instance of La Union, where the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding
information on February 16, 1960 (Criminal Case No. 2925). The case was set for
trial on July 7, 1960, and at the hearing on said date, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty. After the plea, the case was called for trial, but the
assistant provincial fiscal moved for postponement on the ground that the
complainant Fermin Motas and his witnesses were not present although according
to the fiscal himself, “* * * complainant appeared in his office yesterday (July
6, 1960) and informed him (sic) of the trial of this case that is set for this
morning” (Order of July 7, 1960, Annex “B”, Petition). Whereupon, the accused
moved for the dismissal of the case, but the Court waited until 10:30 for the
complainant and his witnesses to appear. When they still failed to show up, the
Court promulgated the following order dismissing the case:

“ORDER”

(Information, Filed February 16, 1960; Hearing, July 7, 1960;
Case Dismissed July 7, 1960.) (sic)

When this case was called for the arraignment of the accused and trial of the
case, the accused appeared with hia counsel. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea
of not guilty. The Fiscal in charge moved for the postponement of the hearing on
the ground that neither the complainant nor his witnesses are now present
although according to the Fiscal the complainant appeared in his office
yesterday and informed him of the trial of this case that is set for this
morning.

In view of the apparent lack of interest on the part of the complainant to
further prosecute this ease as shown by his failure to appear today (the Court
waited until 10:30 a.m.), on motion of the defense this case is hereby dismissed
with costs de oficio. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of
the accused is declared cancelled and whatever papers submitted to support said
bail bond may be returned to the respective owners or to the counsel of the
accused.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”

(Annex B, Petition)

On July 11, 1960, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion to
reconsider the above order on the ground that his witnesses were not present at
the trial because complainant Fermin Motas “had not been duly served with
subpoena”, that while it is true that one day before the trial, the Chief of
Police accompanied said Fermin Motas to his (the fiscal’s) office because of a
previous subpoena issued to him, “perhaps the said complaining witness and his
witness may have thought that the hearing of the said case was on that day”; and
that it was not true that complainant lacked interest ta the prosecution, of the
case and that if the order of dismissal was reconsidered, complainant and his
witnesses would be present at the hearing (Annex “C”, Petition). Accused
Lagunilla opposed the motion for reconsideration, insisting that the fiscal
himself had informed the court that complainant Motas knew of the date of the
hearing, and that anyway, the dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal and
reconsideration of the same would place him . twice in jeopardy for the sanje
offense. In spite of the opposition, however, the trial court, on July 26, 1960,
reconsidered its previous order, setting the same aside, and ordered that the
case be set for trial on August 22, 1960. Unable to obtain reconsideration of
this second order, accused Lagunilla interposed this petition for certiorari
with prohibition.

We find the petition well-taken.

In the case of Gandicela vs. Hon. Lutero, 88 Phil., 299, we held that
if the prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and the court
believes that the hearing cannot be postponed without violating the right of the
accused to a speedy trial, the court should deny the postponement and proceed
with the trial, and if the fiscal fails to prove th£ defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the court, upon the motion of the defendant, should dismiss
the case; and that this dismissal is not in reality a dismissal in the general
sense but an acquittal based on the failure of the prosecution to prove the
defendant’s guilt, which bars another prosecution for the same offense.

Later, in the case of People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil., 714, wherein the
prosecution was not even present at the trial, we reiterated the Gandicela
ruling, pointing out that there was more reason to dismiss the case upon the
instance of the accused because the prosecution was not even: present on the day
of the trial so as to be in a position to proceed with the presentation of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, and that said dismissal should
likewise be regarded ag an acquittal.

Still later, in People vs. Tacneng, L-12082, April 30, 1959, wherein
the prosecution, after asking for several postponements, confessed to the court
that it was not ready for trial because none of its witnesses had appeared, and
the accused, invoking his constitutional right to a speedy trial, asked for
dismissal, and the court dismissed the case, we also ruled that such dismissal
amounted to an acquittal.

Finally, in the case of People vs. Robles, 105 Phil., 1016, wherein
the court ordered dismissal of the case upon the motion of the accused because
the prosecution was still not prepared for trial after several postponements, we
again held that the dismissal was tantamount to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.

In the case now before us, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case against petitioner because of the apparent lack of interest of the
complainant to prosecute the case. Such dismissal, made unconditionally and
without reservation, after plea of not guilty, and apparently predicated on the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial, is, following the
above-cited authorities, equivalent to an acquittal. And being an order of
acquittal, it became final immediately after promulgation and could no longer be
recalled for correction or reconsideration (People vs. Sison, L-11669,
January 30, 1959; Catilo vs. Abaya, 94 Phil., 1014; 50 Off. Gaz., [6]
2477; People vs. Yelo, 83 Phil., 618; 46 Off. Gaz., [11th Supp.] 71),
with or without good reason.

Wherefore, the order of the court below of July 26, 1960 is set aside and the
order of dismissal of July 7, 1960 reinstated, with costs de
oficio.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.