G.R. No. L-17202. April 29, 1961
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COTO LABOR UNION (NLU), ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Inc. and respondent Coto Labor Union (NLU) concerning certain demands made by
the latter. When the Secretary of Labor failed to settle the case amicably, he
certified the same to the Court of Industrial Relations, which was docketed as
Case No. 1029-V, and immediately it was taken cognizance of by its presiding
judge, Hon. Jose S. Bautista.
Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction for the reason that the case having been endorsed by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Section 16 (c) of the Minimum Wage Law, it
should be heard not by a single judge but by the court en banc.
Respondent judge denied the motion, and its appeal to the court en banc
having been denied, petitioner elevated the case to us which led this Court to
promulgate a decision on May 29, 1959 in G. R. No. L-12394,[*] the pertinent portion of which reads as
follows:
“We agree with the claim of petitioner that whenever the Secretary of Labor
endorses a dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations concerning a demand for
minimum wage which involved an actual strike, the same should bo acted upon by
the court en banc as provided for by law [Section 16 (c), Republic Act
602], but this claim is now of no consequence it appearing that the decision of
Judge Bautista was affirmed by the court en
banc.”
Upon the receipt of our decision denying said petition, the trial judge set
the case for hearing on July 29, 1960. Six days before the scheduled trial,
however, petitioner found that no formal complaint and answer were filed therein
and so it moved for postponement of the trial stating that the filing of said
pleadings is necessary in order that the issues may be properly joined. Again,
on July 26, 1960, petitioner filed a supplemental motion calling the attention
of respondent judge to the ruling of this Court in the above-cited case (G. R.
No. L-12394) that this controversy can only be acted upon by the court en
banc, and not by him alone; so that if the calendar of the court would not
permit a hearing of the case en banc, the same should be postponed.
Respondent judge denied both motions on July 27, 1960, and pending determination
of petitioner’s urgent motion for reconsideration before the court en
banc, the former proceeded with the trial manifesting that he will receive
the.evidence only as a trial court or representative of the court en
banc. This move of respondent judge prompted petitioner to interpose the
present petition raising as main issue whether the case can be heard by a single
judge or by the court en banc only.
As held by us in the former controversy between the same parties, in cases of
this nature the industrial court shall act en banc in rendering the
decision as provided by Section 16 (c) of Republic Act 602. But this does
not necessarily mean that all the judges should sit for the reception of the
evidence, or that the evidence should be received by the court en banc.
It is enough that one judge be assigned to receive the evidence who will submit
his report to the court en banc for deliberation and decision. To
literally interpret the law as petitioner wants us to do, that is, to have all
the judges sit during the trial, would not only be cumbersome and inexpeditious
but will jeopardize the functions of the other judges in trying the cases
pending before them. This cannot be the intendment of the law.
Anent the contention of petitioner that a formal complaint and answer should
first be filed before proceeding with the trial in order that the issues may be
properly joined, suffice it to state that such is unnecessary for when the
Secretary of Labor certified the case to the industrial court he already
specified in his certification the points he wanted to be passed upon by the
court. What is important is to have the case set for hearing immediately in
order that it may be decided within the period prescribed by law.[1]
Wherefore, petition is denied. The order appealed from is affirmed, without
costs. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
dissolved.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[*] 105 Phil., 915.
[1] “The decision shall be rendered by
the court en banc within 15 days after the case has been submitted for
determination” [Section 16 (c), Republic Act 602].