ILOILO CHINESE COMMERCIAL SCHOOL PETITION, VS. LEONORA FABRIGAR AND THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

As a result of the death of Santiago Fabrigar, on June 28, 1956, his
heirs in the person of Leonora Fabrigar (common-law wife) and their
children, filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, Case No. 1085, W.C.C., entitled “Leonora
Fabrigar, et al., Claimants, vs. Iloilo Chinese Commercial School,
Respondents”. In this claim, it was alleged that the cause of death was
“pulmonary tuberculosis contracted during and as a result of
his employment as janitor”. The Hearing Officer of the WCC denied the
claim and dismissed the case, finding that the claimant failed to prove
the casual effect of employment and death; nothing was shown that the
disease was contracted in line of duty; that whatever evidence claimant
presented about the cause ‘of death was only a mere suggestion that
progressively developed from tuberculosis with heart trouble to a
sudden fatal turn, ending up for the cause of “beriberi adult” at the
time of death, as per certification of Sanitary Inspector Dr. P. E.
Labitoria, of Dao, Capiz (Exhibits C & 4).

The heirs of Santiago Fabrigar appealed the decision with the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which, on November 12, 1959, rendered
judgment reversing the decision of its Hearing Officer, making the
following findings of facts:

That Santiago Fabrigar had been employed from 1947 to March12, 1956,
as a janitor-messenger of the respondent Iloilo Chinese Commercial
School, his work consisting of sweeping and scrubbing the floors,
cleaning the class-rooms and the school premises, and other janitorial
chores; that on March 11, 1956, preparatory to graduation day, he
carried desks and chairs from the class-rooms to the auditorium, set
the curtains and worked harder and faster than usual; that although he
felt shortness of breath and did not feel very well that day, he
continued working at the request of the overseer of respondent; that on
the following day he reported for work, but on March 13, he spat blood
and stopped working; that from April 29, 1956 to May 15, 1956, he was
under treatment by Dr. Quirico Villareal “for far advanced pulmonary
tuberculosis and for heart disease”; and that previous to said
treatment, he was attended by Dr. Jaranilla for pulmonary tuberculosis.
The Commission concluded that the short period of intervention between
his last day of work (March 13, 1956) when he spat blood and his death
on June 28, 1956, due to pulmonary tuberculosis, indicated that he had
been suffering from such disease even during the time he was employed
by the respondent and considering the strenuous work he performed, his
employment as janitor aggravated his pre-existing illness; that
although there is a discrepancy between the cause of death “beriberi
adult”, as appearing in the Death Certificate and the testimony of Dr.
Villareal, the latter deserves more credence, because their Information
(cause of death) was given by (the Sanitary inspector who did not, in
any way, examine the deceased before or after his death. The
Commission, therefore, ordered the respondent Chinse Commercial School,
Inc., in said case—

“1. To pay to the claimant, for and in behalf of her
minor children by the deceased, namely Carlito, Gloria, Rosita and
Ernesto, all surnamed Fabrigar, the amount of Two thousand four hundred
ninety six and 00/100 Pesos (P2,496.00) as death benefits; and

2. To pay to the Commission the amount of P25.00 as fees pursuant to Section 55 of Act 3428, as amended.”

The above decision is now before Us for Review on a Writ of
Certiorari, after the motion for reconsideration had been denied,
petitioner alleging that the Commission, erred:

1. In disregarding completely the evidentiary value of the death
   certificate of the attending physician which was presented as evidence
   by both claimants and respondent (Exhibits C & 4) to prove the
   cause of death;

2. In finding that the cause of death of said Santiago
   Fabrigar was tuberculosis and was contracted during and as a result of
   the nature of his employment;

3. In holding that the herein petitioner was the employer of the deceased Santiago Fabrigar; and
4. In not holding that the herein petitioner is exempt from the scope of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

Petitioner contends that the preponderance of evidence on the
matters involved in this case, militates in its favor. Considering the
doctrine that the Commission, like the Court of Industrial Relations,
is bound not by the rule of preponderance of evidence as in ordinary
civil cases, but by the rule of substantial evidence (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635; Phil. Newspaper Guild vs.
Evening News, 86 Phil., 303; 47 Off. Gaz. No. 12, p. 6188; secs. 43
& 46 R. Act No. 772 W.C. Act), petitioner’s pretension is without
merit. Substantial evidence supports the decision of the Commission.
While seemingly there exists an inconsistency in the cause of death, as
appearing in the death certificate by Dr. Labitoria and in Dr.
Villareal’s diagnosis, it is a fact found by the Commission, that the
Sanitary Inspector did not examine the deceased before and after his
death. “Undoubtedly”, says the Commission, “the information that he
died of beriberi adult, as appearing in the death certificate
was given because it appears that the deceased had also edema of the
extremities (swollen legs)”. The evidence of record sustains the
following findings of the Commission, as Fabrigar’s cause of death, to
wit—

“The short period of time intervening between his
last day of work (March 13, 1956) when he spat blood and his death on
June 28, 1956 due to pulmonary tuberculosis indicates that he had been
suffering from the disease even during the time that he was employed by
the respondent. Considering the strenuous work that he performed while
in the service of the respondent and the unusually long hours of work
he rendered (6:00 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. or
7:00 p.m.) beyond the normal,and legal working hours, we find that his employment aggravated his pre-existing illness and brought about his death.
Moreover, our conclusion finds support in the fact that immediately
preceding his last day of work with the respondent, he had an unusually
hard day lifting desks and other furnitures and assisting in the
preparations for the graduation exercises of the school. Considering
also his complaints during that day (March 11), among which was
shortness of breath’, we may also say that his work affected an already
existing heart ailment.”

We find no plausible reason for altering or disturbing the above
factual findings of the Commission, in the present appeal by certiorari.

It is claimed that actually the deceased was not an employee of the
petitioner, but by the Iloilo Chinese Chamber of Commerce which was the
one that furnished the janitor service in the premises of its
buildings, including the part thereof occupied by the petitioner;that
the Chamber of Commerce paid the salaries of janitors, including the
deceased; that the petitioner could not afford to pay rentals of its
premises and janitor due to limited finances which depended largely on
funds raised among its Board of Directors, the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and Chinese nationals who helped the school. In other words,
it is pretended that the deceased was not an employee of the school but
of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce which should be the one responsible
for the compensation of the deceased. On one hand, according to the
Commission, there is substantial proof to the effect that Fabrigar was
employed by and rendered service for the petitioner and was an employee
within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensatioh Law. On the other
hand, the most important test of employer-employee relation is the
power to control the employee’s conduct. The records disclose that the
person in charge (encargado) of the respondent sehool supervised the
deceased in his work and had control over the manner her performed the
same.

It is finally contended that petitioner is an institution devoted
solely for learning and is not an industry within the meaning of the
Workmen’s Compensation Law. Consequently, it is argued, it is exempt
from the scope of the same law. Considering that this factual question
has been properly put in issue before the Commission, it may not now be
entertained in this appeal for the first time(Atlantic Gulf etc. vs. CIR, et al. supra, p. 650 citing International Oil Factory Union vs.
Hon. Martinez, et al., 110 Phil., 595; ). The decision of the
Commission does not show that the matter was taken up. We are at a loss
to state whether the issue was raised in the motion for reconsideration
filed with the Commission, because the said motion is not found in the
record before us. And the resolution to the motion for reconsideration
does not touch this question.

In view hereof, the appeal interposed by the petitioner is
dismissed, and the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the herein petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.