G.R. No. L-12996. December 28, 1961
[With resolution of January 31, 1962]
DIZON, J.:
is an appeal taken by Antonio Albert from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. sentencing him to pay the Republic of the
Philippines the sum of P16,889.00 as deficiency income tax for the year
1951, with 5% surcharge, and 1% monthly interest thereon from October
16, 1953 until full payment, plus costs.
On February 28,
1952, appellant filed his income tax return for the calendar year 1951.
After examination and audit thereof by the personnel of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, a deficiency tax for said year was found due from
appellant in the amount of P6,889.00 computed as follows:
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On
August 31, 1953, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued and caused to be
served on appellant the corresponding Income Tax Assessment Notice No.
43-AR-4429-53/51 (Exhibit C) requiring him to pay the sum aforesaid or
or before October 15, 1953. Thereupon appellant, through his counsel,
filed a letter of protest (Exhibit D) with the Bureau, but the same was
overruled on June 21, 1955 (Exhibit E).
The above-mentioned
income tax deficiency was due to: (1) the inclusion-as taxable
income-of the sum of P453.60 received as dividend from the Atok
Goldfield Mining Co. for the year 1951, which appellant failed to
include in his return; (2) the disallowance of the amount of P18,552.24
claimed by appellant as a deductible item because it was spent in
attending technical international conferences abroad in representation
of the Government and of the University of the Philippines: and (3) the
reduction of the charitable contributions claimed by him as a
deductible item from P7,500.00 to P3,960.53. Of these disallowed items
appellant disputed only the second.
On February 4, 1957, an
action to recover the deficiency tax above mentioned, with 5%
surcharge, and 1% monthly interest thereon from October 16, 1953 to the
date of full payment, was filed by the Republic of the Philippines
against appellant.
In his answer to the complaint, appellant
alleged that the disallowance by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the
amount of P18,852.24, which he had claimed as a deduction in his income
tax return for the year 1951, was wrong because said amount was a
legitimate and deductible business expense, the same having been
incurred by him in 1951 in attending technical international
conferences held abroad as a duly appointed representative of the
Republic of the Philippines and of the University of the Philippines.
After
due trial the lower court rendered the appealed decision on the ground
principally that appellant was already estopped from questioning the
assessment which had become final and executory because he did not
appeal therefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals.
The facts
involved in the present case are very similar to, if not on all fours
with those involved in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Enrique Magalona, Jr. et al., (109 Phil., 723) where we held that upon
the facts before the Court, the income tax assessment in question
therein was a final assessment of the income tax liability of the
Magalonas for the calendar year 1950; that they had 30 days to dispute
said assessment by appealing to the Court of Tax Appeals in accordance
with the provisions of Section 11, Republic Act No. 1125; that having
failed to do so, the assessment became final, executory and demandable.
In
the present case, therefore, after receiving the denial of his protest
(Exhibit D) against the deficiency tax assessment made against him
appellant should have appealed therefrom within 30 days from June 21,
1955, his failure to do so having caused said assessment to become
finaly executory and demandable. Therefore, when on February 4, 1957
the action for collection was commenced, appellant was already barred
from invoking any defense that would reopen the question of his tax
liability, on the merits. In this connection we quote with approval the
pertinent portion of the decision of the lower court:
“As
it is really true that any person who is aggrieved by an assessment
issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue is given only 30 days to
appeal therefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals, the only effect should be
that after that period should have expired that assessment can no
longer be questioned by the taxpayer; and if this is the case as a
necessary corollary, if afterwards the Government comes in aid presents
an action for the collection of the tax under the assessment, to permit
the taxpayer in the case presented by the Government to question the
assessment would have no other effect than to nullify the finality of
the assessment made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, notwithstanding
that it had already become final under the provisions of Act 1125 in
its sec. 11; and the Court cannot construe the law to result in that
absurdity.”
In view of the conclusion we have reached, we deem it unnecessary to decide the other questions raised in appellant’s brief.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
R E S O L U T I O N
January 31, 1962
DIZON, J.:
The
matter before us is a motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant
praying that our decision promulgated on December 28, 1961 be set aside
and that another be rendered absolving him form liability in connection
with the deficiency tax in question, the 5% surcharge thereon and the
1% monthly interest from October 16, 1953. Appellants contends that he
is not barred from contesting the assestment in question, there being
no evidence in the record to sustain a finding that the Bureau of
Internal Revenue’s letter on June 21, 1955 (Exh. D) was sent to, and
received by him on the aforesaid date or on any other date thereafter.
The
lower court found that, upon the evidence before it, the period of 30
days within such appellant could have appealed from the deficiency
assessment to the Court of Tax Appeals had expired, and held, as a
consenquence, that said assessment had become final, demandable and
beyond appellant’s power to assail or contest. This finding we cannot
review, appellant having taken this appeal directly to us to raise
questions purely of law.
Moreover, the record shows that the
answer filed by appellant expressly admitted that he had received the
assessment notice on or before October 14, 1953. This notwithstanding,
his answer made no mention to his protest against, or motion for a
reconsideration of the assessment against aforesaid; to the contrary,
it admitted (Rec. on Ap. p. 15) that appellant “had not appealed from
the aforesaid assessment to the Court of Tax Appeals.” and while
denying that the same had become final, the only reasons adduced in
support of such denial were (1)that the allegation made in the
complaint regarding the executory and final character of the assessment
was a mere conclusion of law and that (2) at any event, appellant’s
failure to appeal “has not rendered the assessment final in the sense
that it can no longer be resisted, controverted or disputed by the
defendant in a judicial proceeding brought against the latter”. The
appellant, therefore, clearly failed to allege that the assessment had
not become final because he had not received any notice of denial
thereof or that there was no evidence to prove that exact date on which
such notice, if any was sent, was received by him. For this reason we
are of the opinion that he is without right to raise these points for
the first time on appeal in connection with his assignment of error.
Wherefore, the motion of reconsideration is denied.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.