G.R. No. 16474. January 31, 1962
TOMAS B. TADEO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PANGASINAN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MANGALDAN, EMILIA ACOSTA AND LEONCIO MAICONG, RESPONDENTS AND APPEL…
PADILLA, J.:
Third Branch, dated 30 July 1957, denying Tomas B. Tadeo Sr.’s petition for a
writ of prohibition to enjoin the Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and the
Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, from conducting the
preliminary investigation in criminal) case No. 263 of the said Justice of the
Peace Court for estafa, against the appellant, at the instance of the
spouses Leoncio Maicong and Emilia Acosta.
In the appellant’s amended petition filed and admitted in Court on 26 June
1957, in lieu of the original filed on 13 May 1957, the appellant alleged that
in civil case No. 10759 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the
appellees spouses sued him for damages allegedly for preparing a deed of sale of
their parcel of land conveying it to Francisco Bongato and fraudulently inducing
them to sign the deed of sale which they did sign under the belief that it was a
partition of their conjugal partnership property they had asked the appellant, a
lawyer and notary public, to prepare and ratify; that after instituting the
foregoing action the appellees spouses filed against the appellant a complaint
for estafa in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
arising from the same facts alleged in Civil Case No. 10759 (criminal ease No.
129); that the Court of First Instance dismissed civil case No. 10759; that
after the dismissal of the said civil case by the Court of First Instance, the
Justice of the Peace Court dismissed criminal case No. 129 for estafa
against the appellant on the ground that the dismissal of the civil case which
was prejudicial precluded the continuation of the criminal case which arose from
the same transaction alleged in the civil case; that after the dismissal of
civil case No. 10759 by the Court of First Instance the appellant filed in the
same Court a complaint against the appellees spouses for declaratory judgment
basing his cause of action upon the same transaction alleged in civil case No.
10759, which was still pending hearing and determination (civil case No. D-413);
that after the appellant had instituted civil case No. D-413 in the Court of
First Instance the appellees spouses again filed a complaint for estafa
against the appellant in the same Justice of the Peace Court upon the same facts
alleged in civil ease No. 10759 and criminal case No. 129, which already had
been dismissed, and civil case No. D-413, still pending hearing and
determination (criminal case No. 263); that civil case No. D-413 is prejudicial
to criminal case No. 263; that the dismissal of civil case No. 10759 and
criminal case No. 129 constitutes a bar to further criminal prosecution of the
appellant for estafa arising from the same facts alleged therein; that
all these notwithstanding the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and
the appellee Justice of the Peace Court were conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal case No. 263 against the appellant; that the act of
the aforesaid appellees in conducting the preliminary investigation in the said
criminal case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; and that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the appellant. The
appellant prayed that the appellees be enjoined from conducting the preliminary
investigation in criminal case No. 263 for estafa against him (civil case No. D-539).
In their answer entitled “opposition” filed on 22 June 1957, the appellees
alleged that civil case No. 10759 had been dismissed without trial on the merits
and criminal case No. 129 had been dismissed without prejudice; and contended
that civil case No. D-413 for declaratory relief does not raise any question
prejudicial to the determination of criminal case No. 263 because the former
refers to facts separate and distinct from those alleged in the latter case;
that as the same acts that constitute the crime of estafa alleged in
criminal case No. 263 are referred to in civil case No. D-413, the criminal case
for estafa should first be decided before trial in the civil case could
proceed; and that in civil case No. D-418 the appellant is not the real
party-in-interest because he was not privy to any of the parties in the deed of
quitclaim sought to be construed.
After trial and after the appellant had submitted his memorandum, on 30 July
1957, as stated at the outset of this opinion, the Court entered an order
denying the writ prayed for, on the ground that although the appellant’s “claim
of persecution” by the appellees seems to be “borne out by the previous cases
between the parties which were dismissed,” yet the former has a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, for at the opportune time he
could set up all defenses and appeal in case of an adverse judgment; and that
the Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and the Justice of the Peace Court
have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation in criminal case No.
263.
On 2 August 1957 the appellees Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel filed a
motion praying that the statement of the Court in its order, to wit: “There
seems, however, to be a justification on the claim of persecution on the part of
petitioner. This is borne out by the previous cases between the parties which
were dismissed,” be deleted.
On 10 August 1957 the appellant filed his notice of appeal “to the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the said decision is contrary to law and the
evidence.”
On 14 August 1957 the Court entered an order setting the motion of the
appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel for hearing on 21 August 1957 at
8:30 o’clock in the morning and directing that a copy of the motion be furnished
the appellant immediately.
On the same day, 14 August 1957, the appellant filed the appeal bond and
prayed that the Court approve it.
On 21 August 1957 the court granted the appellant until 26 August 1957 to
answer the motion of the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel. On 24
August 1957 the appellant filed his answer to the said motion.
On 11 September 1957 the Court approved the appeal bond filed by the
appellant and denied the motion of the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special
Counsel for the reason that it had lost jurisdiction of the case by the
perfection in due time of an appeal taken by the appellant. The Court also
ordered the transmittal of the record of the case to the appellate court. On 14
September 1957 the Court of Appeals received the record of the case. On 28
November 1959 the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court on the
ground that only a question of law is involved.
The undisputed facts of the case are: On 29 January 1949 the appellees
spouses brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against
the appellant for recovery of P2,000 as damages suffered and P1,500 as
attorney’s fees spent by the former as a result of a fraudulent drafting by the
latter of a deed of sale purporting to convey their parcel of land to Francisco
Bongato and execution thereof by the appellees spouses under the belief that it
was a deed of partition of their conjugal partnership property they had asked
the appellant to draft (civil case No. 10579, Exhibit A). To this complaint the
appellant and codefendant Francisco Bongato filed an answer with counterclaim
for P5,000 and P500, respectively, as damages for maliciously bringing an
unfounded suit calculated to embarrass them (Exhibit B). After filing the suit
in the Court of First Instance (civil case No. 10579), the appellees spouses
filed a criminal complaint for estafa arising from the same facts alleged
in civil case No. 10579, against the appellant in the Justice of the Peace Court
of Mangaldan (criminal case No. 129). At the preliminary investigation of
criminal case No. 129 on 5 January 1956, the Justice of the Peace Court, at the
behest of the appellant, suspended further proceedings until after civil case
No. 10579 of the Court of First Instance, which has a direct beating on criminal
case for estafa, shall have been finally decided (Exhibit G). On 21 March
1956, upon motion of counsel for the appellees spouses that they were no longer
interested in the prosecution of the case, but over the objection of the
appellant who asked to be allowed to prove his counterclaim, the Court of First
Instance dismissed the appellees spouses’ complaint and the appellant’s
counterclaim in civil case No. 10579, because the latter could prosecute his
claim in another action, his counterclaim being permissive only and not
compulsory (Annex C). On 18 June 1956 the appellant filed a complaint for
declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance against the appellees spouses
and co-defendant Vicente Torralba praying that the deed of quitclaim executed
by them on 27 March 1948 in favor of Francisco Bongato be declared “the genuine
document representing the true intention” of the appellees spouses and that he
(the appellant) be relieved from civil and criminal liability arising from the
part he had taken as lawyer and notary public in the drafting and execution
thereof; that the appellees spouses be enjoined from impeaching the genuineness
and due execution of said deed of quitclaim; that the appellees spouses and
their co-defendant Vicente Torralba, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay
the appellant moral and actual damages in the total sum of P2,900; that during
the pendency of the case a writ issue to attach the appellees spouses’ and
co-defendant’s properties to secure the satisfaction of the judgment for damages
that the appellant might recover from them; and that the appellant be granted
other just and equitable relief (Exhibit D). On 22 June 1956 the appellant
filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan a motion to dismiss
criminal case No. 129 on the ground that civil case No. 10579, upon the facts of
which criminal case No. 129 for estafa was based, already had been
dismissed and that the determination of the question of whether or not the crime
of estafa had been committed by the appellant depends upon the outcome of
civil case No. B-413 for declaratory judgment filed by the appellant in the
Court of First Instance (Exhibit F). On 9 July 1956 the Justice of the Peace
Court dismissed without prejudice criminal case No. 129 (Exhibit H). On 30 April
1957 the appellees spouses again instituted criminal proceedings for
estafa against the appellant in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, based on the same facts alleged in civil case No. 10579
(criminal case No. 263).
A Provincial Fiscal, a duly appointed Special Counsel or a Justice of the
Peace has the power and authority to conduct preliminary investigations of
crimes committed within their territorial jurisdiction. In the case at bar the
crime of estafa imputed to the appellant in criminal case No. 263 was
allegedly committed by him in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Undoubtedly, the appellees
conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 263 have the power
and authority to do so. But in taking cognizance of the case and conducting the
preliminary investigation, did they act with grave abuse of discretion which
would entitle the appellant to the extraordinary legal remedy of prohibition and
justify the intervention of a court exercising supervisory authority over them?
Civil case No. 10579 for damages, brought by the appellees spouses against the
appellant, was dismissed by the Court of First Instance for lack of interest on
the part of the plaintiffs therein and not because the fraud constituting their
cause of action and the crime of estafa allegedly committed by the
appellant in fact had not been committed by him (Exhibit C). Criminal case No.
129 for estafa against the appellant was likewise dismissed by the
Justice of the Peace Court but without prejudice (Exhibit H). The pendency of
civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment, commenced by the appellant
against the appellees spouses in the Court of First Instance, was one of the
reasons given by the Justice of the Peace Court to dismiss criminal case No.
129. However, the appellant not being one of the constracting parties to the
deed of sale executed by the appellees spouses but took part only as notary
public before whom they acknowledged the execution thereof is not entitled to
file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or duties thereunder
need be declared.[1]
Another valid and good reason relied upon by the Court in denying the writ
prayed for is that the appellant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In the appropriate case and at the opportune time he may
set up all defenses available to him and may appeal from an adverse
pudgment.
As regards the motion to delete from the decision the statement of the Court
to the effect that the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel are
persecuting the appellant, on 2 August 1957 when the motion was filed, the Court
still had jurisdiction of the case for it was only on 10 and 14 August 1957 when
the appellant filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond dnd the appellant had
not yet perfected his appeal. Hence the Court should have acted upon it.
In fairness to the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel, their act
of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 263 for
estafa against the apppellant does not constitute persecution; on the
contrary they should be commended for their zeal and devotion to duty. It was
incumbent upon them to Inquire whether an offense had been committed, and, if
they should find it had been committed, to charge and prosecute the guilty
part.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
[1] In the order appealed from the Court
states that after trial of civil case No. D-539, on 3 July 1957 it dismissed
civil case No. D-413 “on the ground that said action is improper.”