RAMON VELEZ, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. GABINO SAAVEDRA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. GAVINO SAAVEDRA, P. G. MALIWANAG AND PELAGIO GUTIERREZ, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Pelagio Gutierrez, allegedly an employee of petitioner Ramon Velez, filed
with the Regional Office No. 7 of the Department of Labor, a complaint (Case No.
LSC-RO7-50) seeking recovery of unpaid wages and separation pay. After hearing,
conducted by Gabino Saavedra, Hearing Officer of the Regional Office, and P.G.
Maliwanag, Associate Commissioner, Labor Standards Commission, judgment was
rendered sentencing Ramon Velez to pay Pelagio Gutierrez the sum of P1,280.00. A
writ for the execution of the judgment was issued thru the Provincial Sheriff of
Misamis Occidental. Claiming that he (Velez) would suffer great and irreparable
damage and injury, unless the execution of the judgment was restrained and
alleging that Regional Offices and the Labor Standard Commission are not clothed
with authority to decide cases of similar nature and that there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Velez filed a
petition for Prohibition with Injunction, with the CFI of Misamis Occidental,
(Civil Case No. 2152) praying that an order issue:

(a)	directing and commanding the respondent Associate Commissioner of the Labor Standards Commission, Department of Labor, to certify, transmit and elevate to this Honorable Court the original records of said office in case No. LSC-R07-50 (Pelagio Gutierrez vs. Ramon Velez, for Unpaid Wages and Separation Pay);
(b)	declaring as null and void the decision as well as the writ of execution sought to be enforced by the respondents;
(c)	commanding said respondents to desist from enforcing the decision and the writ of execution already referred to;
(d)	that upon the filing of a bond, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against respondents enjoining them from proceeding with the aforesaid decision and writ of execution and;
(e)	declaring and holding as unconstitutional and null and void ab-initio the rules and regulations of the Labor Standards Commission, otherwise known as Reorganization Flan No. 20-A.

On November 10, 1958, and upon the filing of a P2,000.00 bond, the CFI issued
a writ of Prohibition and Injunction.

Separate Answers were filed by the Respondents, all of which were premised on
the constitutionality of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, and the authority of the
Hearing Officers and Commissioners of the Labor Standards Commission to hear
and adjudicate cases similar to the one under consideration.

Respondents therein moved to dismiss the petition on the alleged ground that
it was filed to delay the payment of wages due to respondent Gutierrez, which
was in effect denied when on June 26, 1959, the lower court handed down an
Order, which was amended on August 10, 1959, of the following tenor:

“The Court, after having discovered an error in the order dated June 26,
1959, hereby amends the dispositive part of the said order to read as
follows:

” ‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED, making the
injunction permanent, without special pronouncement as to costs.’
“

The above Order is now before Us on appeal, the Solicitor General urging a
reversal thereof on two counts, to wit:

(1)	The lower court erred in holding, in effect, that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is unconstitutional; and
(a)	The lower court erred in granting the petition.

The other respondent-appellant Gutierrez adopted the brief of the Solicitor
General. Appellee did not file his brief.

We have had occasions to dispose of the issues at bar in several recent
cases:

“In G. R. No. L-14837, respondent Arturo Delaniel brought a complaint against
petitioners Jose Corominas, Jr. and Coromdnas, respondent claiming to be a
driver of the petitioners from January 6, 1956 to August 31, 1956, for which
services he was not given both overtime and separation pay. He prayed for
judgment for the amount due him for overtime service rendered and for separation
pay. Judgment having been rendered in favor of Delaniel by the hearing officer
of the regional office, appeal therefrom was prosecuted to the Labor Standards
Commission, which reduced the amount of the judgment to P1,184.28, with legal
interest and attorney’s fees. A ‘motion to quash’ the decision was denied, and,
instead, the commissioner of Labor Standards ordered its execution. Thereupon
petitioners filed this petition for certiorari with prohibition before us,
alleging that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void; that the Labor
Standards Commission and Regional Office No. 3 have no authority and
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claims for overtime and separation pay of
respondent Delaniel, in view of which it is prayed that the decision be declared
null and void and the sheriff be enjoined from executing the same. * * *.

A cursory study of these provisions of Republic Act No. 997 will show that
nowhere therein is there a grant of authority to the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission to grant powers, duties and functions to offices or
entities to be created by it which are not already granted to the offices or
officials of the Department of Labor. Section 4 above quoted authorizes the
elimination of overlapping services, activities and functions, and the
consolidation of agencies or instrumentalities exercising said duties and
functions. There is no grant of power to allocate to the bodies and offices to
be created or set up functions, powers and duties not then already vested in the
various offices and officials of the Department of Labor. Section 3 limits the
powers of reorganization by the Commission to the offices, bureaus and
instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government only. So that it was
not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize
the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice from
these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the
Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the
Constitution that judicial powers are vested ‘only in the Supreme Court and in
such courts as the law may establish’. The Commission was not authorised to
create courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and
transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under
the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power
to legislate or create courts of justice to any other agency of the Government
(Chinese Flour Importers’ Assoc. vs. Price Stabilization Board, 83 Phil., 459; 46
Off. Gaz., 5466; Surigao Consolidated vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 94
Phil., 492; 50 Off. Gaz., 1018; U.S. vs. Shreveport, 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. Ed. 175
and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 B. 249).

* * * * * * *

In consequence, we are constrained to hold and declare the provision of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, particularly Section 25, which grants to the
regional offices original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims of
laborers, is null and void, said grant having been made without authority by
Republic Act No. 997. * * *”

(Jose Corominas, Jr. and Corominas & Co., Inc. vs. Labor Standards
Commission, et al., Manila Central University vs. Calupitan, et al., Wong Chun,
alias Ha Hing, vs. Diego Carlim, Regional Office No. 8 of the Department of
Labor and Sheriff of Manila and Balbogan Co., Ltd., and Mauro B. Ganzon vs. F.
A. Fuentes, et al., 112 Phil., 551; 59 Off. Gaz., [43] 7432).

(See also Miller vs. Mardo, 112 Phil., 792; 59 Off. Gaz., [14] 2307 1961;
Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Villanueva, et al., 112 Phil., 897; V. Tan vs. De Leon,
113 Phil., 9 and La Mallorca vs. Ramos, et al., 113 Phil., 72).

In view hereof, the order granting the writ of prohibition and making the
injunction permanent in the case at bar, should be, as it is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.