CONSUELO S. CALALANG, PETITIONER, VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GERVACIO TANJANGCO, THRU HIS ADMINISTRATRIX, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Consuelo S. Calalang is the grantee of a legislative franchise
approved June 19, 1959 (Republic Act Xo. 2290) to construct, operate, and
maintain an ice plant and cold storage in Hagonoy, Bulacan, subject to the
following conditions, among others:

“Section 2. Said grantee shall manufacture and supply ice up to the limit of
the capacity of her plant, said limit to be determined by the Public Service
Commission or its legal successor in such certificate of convenience and public
necessity as may be issued by it av prescribed by section four of this Act.

* * * * * * *

Section 4. The grantee shall not exercise any right or privilege under this
franchise nor commence any construction thereunder, unit’s and until the grantee
shall first file with the Public Service Commission within one hundred and
twenty days from the date of approval of this Act:

1. Her acceptance of the terms and provisions of this Act;
2. Her written acceptance of the terms and conditioiis of the certificate of
   convenience and public necessity required by law for the granting of this
   franchise and issued by the Public Service Commission of the form and character
   provided for in Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty-six, as amended, and

3. A document or documents evidencing receipt hy the Treasury of the
   Philippines of the deposit or deposits required by law for each certificate of ¦
   convenience and public necessity as au earnest proof of good faith and guaranty
   that the grantee shall complete the work within the period to be fixed by the
   Commission.

* * * * * * *

Section 6. This franchise is granted subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty-six, as amended. *
* *

* * * * * * *

Pursuant to the above franchise, petitioner, on August 17, 1959, filed an
application with the Public Service Commission (Case No. 126911) for the
issuance of the corresponding, certificate of public convenience in her
name.

It appears, however, that on July 27, 1959, or about three weeks before
petitioner filed her application with the Commission, Aurora Tanjangco,
administratrix of the intestate estate of Gervacio Tanjangco, an established
operator of an ice plant in Hagonoy, Bulacan, filed with the Commission an
application to increase the capacity of her ice plant from 10 tons to 40 tons
(Case No. 126537). Believing that the grant of Tanjangco’s application to
increase the capacity of her ice plant would nullify the legislative franchise
granted her to operate an ice plant in the same municipality, and that as
grantee of a legislative franchise, she has the preferred right to serve the
public need therein, petitioner, on August 31, 1959, entered an opposition in
Case No. 12653J. A few days later, she also moved for a joint hearing of her
application and that of Tanjangco (Cases Nos. 126911 and 126537), on the ground
that a common issue of fact, as well as the question of preference or priority,
is involved in the two applications.

On September 10, 1959, the Public Service Commission, through Commissioner
Aspillera, issued an order overruling petitioner Calalang’s opposition in Case
No. 126537 and also denying her petition for a joint hearing of said case with
her own application, Case No. 126911. Basis of the order was Commissioner
Aspillera’s belief that petitioner’s legislative franchise, being conditioned on
her first obtaining a certificate of public convenience from the Commission, who
in turn is authorized to grant the same to her only if it finds that public
convenience so requires, did not invest her with any right as an operator to
oppose the application of an established operator for authority to improve her
service, nor did said legislative franchise deprive the Commission of the power
to act on an established operator’s application for additional capacity without
first giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard.

On September 21, 1959, petitioner Calalang moved for the reconsideration of
the above order, which motion Commissioner Aspillera denied on September 23,
1959. Whereupon, Calalang filed the present petition for certiorari before this
Court, charging respondent Commissioner Aspillera with having acted with grave
abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in denying her right to
interpose an objection in Case No. 126537, as well as in denying her motion for
reconsideration without submitting the same to the members of the Commission
en banc. Upon petitioner’s filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00,
we issued an order restraining the respondent Commissioner from promulgating any
decision in Case No. 126537 until further orders from this Court.

However, on November 21, 1959, petitioner presented a supplemental petition
alleging that Commissioner Aspillera had already decided Case No. 126537
granting respondent Tanjangco’s petition for an increase in the capacity of her
iceplant, so that our writ of preliminary injunction came too late, and praying
for another injunctive order to restrain said Commissioner from executing the
decision in said case until the final disposition of this petition. We issued
this second writ of preliminary injunction on December 8, 1959, after petitioner
had filed an additional bond of P1,000.00.

The basic issue presented by this petition is a simple one: Whether
petitioner, as the grantee of a legislative franchise to operate an ice plant in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, approved before respondent Tanjangco applied for an increase
of the capacity of her ice plant in the same municipality, should be allowed to
oppose and be heard on the latter’s application.

We think that under the circumstances, petitioner should have been given such
a right.

The criterion or test in determining whether a person has sufficient interest
or personality to intervene in any proceedings before the Public Service
Commission has been laid down as follows:

“He must show * * *, that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of
sustaining, an injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. His
interest must be of such nature as to be susceptible of valuation” (Sambrano
vs. Red Line Trans. Co., Inc., 68 Phil., 652)

We believe that petitioner, although not yet an operator of an ice plant in
the municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, has, in view of her having been granted a
legislative franchise to operate such public utility in that municipality,
sufficient interest as would satisfy the above test and entitle her either to
oppose respondent Tanjangco’s application for an increase in the capacity of her
existing plant, or to ask a joint hearing of said application and her own
application for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience in order to
operate under her franchise.

Indeed, when petitioner was granted the franchise in question by the
Legislature, we can assume that that body had already made a prima facie finding
of a public necessity for the operation of an additional ice plant service in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, and of petitioner’s possessing the necessary qualifications to
operate such service. Under this franchise, petitioner has thus acquired the
right to operate an ice plant in the aforementioned municipality, subject only
to the conditions mentioned in the franchise Act, among which is that she first
obtain a certificate of public convenience from the Public Service Commission,
fixing her plant’s capacity and the conditions of operation. . Otherwise, it
must be concluded that the franchise grant was an empty gesture on the part of
the Legislature, as the petitioner could have just as well applied to the
Commission itself.

The provisions of the franchise subjecting the grantee’s operation to the
terms and conditions imposed by the Public Service Commission presuppose that
the Commission would not arbitrarily deny petitioner’s application for a
certificate of public convenience, but would act in accord with the facts and in
the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion, with the end of accomplishing
rather than frustrating the legislative will. When, therefore, respondent
Tanjangco, an established operator, filed an application ahead of petitioner to
increase the capacity of her existing ice plant in the same municipality, the
least that the Commission should have done was to hear both applications
together or give each applicant the opportunity to be heard against the other,
to enable it to determine not only the relative merits of both applications but
the question of preference between them as well. The act of the Commission of
hearing and granting respondent Tanjangco’s application without as much as
allowing petitioner to intervene, oppose, or prove any better rights against it,
is not only a deprivation of petitioner’s rights without due process of law,
“but seems calculated to render ineffectual and nugatory the franchise granted
to her by the legislature and frustrate the legislative intent behind it. Such
act is, therefore, not only a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission, but an overstepping of the powers and jurisdiction conferred upon it
by the law.

Wherefore, the order of September 10, 1959 of the respondent Commission is
reversed; the trial and judgment in Case No. 126537 are set aside; the
opposition of petitioner in Case No. 126537 is admitted; and the respondent
Commission is ordered to try cases Nos. 126537 and 126911 jointly, after which a
new judgment shall be rendered in accordance.with the law and the evidence. .
The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court on December 3, 1959, is
rendered permanent. Costs against respondent Aurora Tanjangco.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Order of September 10, 1959, reversed.