G.R. No. L-16093. November 29, 1960
LOCAL 7, PRESS & PRINTING FREE WORKERS (PFW), CONCHA SIBAL, DOLORES SISON, OLIMPIA ARCILLA, ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. HON. JUDGES EMILIANO TABIGNE, ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, GUSTAVO VI…
BARRERA, J.:
instituted by CIR Acting Prosecutor Julio R. Logarta in behalf of petitioners
Concha Sibal, Olimpia Arcilla, Maria Bulatre, Magdalena Sigua, Alfonso Lopez,
Marieta Cabangal, Remedios Lumabas, and Estela Dublada, members of the Local 7,
Press and Printing Free Workers (FFW), alleging that petitioners were dismissed
by their employer respondent United Cardboard Box Factory upon request of the
latter’s co-respondent, Democratic Labor Union, with which respondent Company
has a collective bargaining agreement with a close shop clause; that
petitioners, upon hearing of the close shop agreement, applied for membership
with the respondent Union but were not accepted, and instead, were dismissed by
Tan Tiong So, manager of respondent Company; and that said acts of respondents
Union and Company are in violation of Section 4 (a) (4) and 4(b) (2)[1] of Republic Act No. 875. It is prayed,
among others, that respondents Union and Company be declared guilty of unfair
labor practice as charged; that respondent Union be directed to accept said
petitioners as its members; and (3) that respondent Company be ordered to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions with back wages from the time of
their dismissal to the date of their actual reinstatement.
Although both respondents filed their respective answers, neither appeared at
the hearing at which petitioners were allowed to present their evidence. The
court, on January 29,1959, rendered, judgment, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
“Issues having been joined, this case was heard on August 15, 1958 with
complainants presenting as their first witness Benjamin Umali who testified that
complainant union is duly registered and that individual complainants are its
members who were formerly employed in respondent company; that individual
complainants were dismissed on or about May 27, 1957, because they were
discriminated against in regard to their union membership; that despite repeated
requests, both respondents refused to furnish complainant union copy of the
collective bargaining agreement embodying the closed-shop provision; that
individual complainants wanted to see the closed-shop agreement to verify its
existence before joining the respondent union, and that he (Umali) was able to
see the same in the Department of Labor only on May 29, 1957; that upon
verification, he (Umali) immediately told complainant union members to join
respondent union pursuant to said closed-shop provision, that is, as a condition
of their continued employment; that on May 30, 1957, complainant union members
applied for membership in respondent union which refused them, and that for this
sole reason, respondent company likewise did not accept them for work.“On cross-examination, Umali declared that he was informed of the existence
of the closed-shop agreement when he received & letter from one Alegria B.
Jose, but he was not shown copy of the collective bargaining contract containing
the closed-shop in question; that individual complainants, although informed of
the closed-shop agreement, have never seen copy of the same which they have been
requesting from respondents; and that they (individual complainants) saw the
agreement in question only on May 29, 1957 when he (Umali) went to the Labor
Department to copy the same upon Suggestion of respondent company manager. “When
asked by the Hearing Examiner, Umali stated that he had been dismissed at the
time he saw the collective bargaining contract.“Another witness for complainants, Mrs. Concha Sibal, was presented,
testifying that she has been employed in respondent company since 1946 and that
her co-complainants have likewise been working there for a long time; that
complainant union was organized in November, 1953, much ahead of respondent
union; that individual complainants were refused membership in respondent union
and were not allowed to work anymore in respondent company. And in all other
respects, Mrs. Sibal practically and substantially corroborated the testimony of
witness Umali. She was not cross-examined,“With the testimony “of the above Witnesses, the complainants rested their
case. After several “notices of hearing duly sent to and received by the
parties, respondents failed to appear and adduce their evidence. For this
reason, this Court, in a hearing conducted on January 21, 1059, considered this
case submitted for decision.“From the evidence on record, it can be readily seen that complainant union
members, have expressed their willingness to join respondent union upon
verifying the existence of the collective bargaining: agreement embodying the
closed-shop provision when they proceeded to the Department of Labor on May 29,
1957, to copy said agreement. In fact, the following day, May 30, 1957, said
complainants applied for membership in respondent union, but the latter refused
them, for which reason, respondent company justified its stand for not accepting
them for re-employment. It is therefore evident that individual complainants
have shown their sincere desire to abide by the closed-shop contract entered
into by respondent company and respondent union. The fact that they were not
able to join respondent union within the period prescribed in the agreement,
assuming there is such time limit, should not militate ggainst them for they
were not furnished copy of the contract, notwithstanding their persistent
requests from botfe respondents. Vigilant and zealous perhaps as they were, the
individual complainants merely exercised the necessary diligen&e and
prudence as- union members before entering into the folds of another labor
organization by requiring the respondents to prove the existence of the
closed-shop provision in question. This, the respondents could have easily done
by the simple expediency of showing to the complainants a copy of the collective
bargaining contract which the former are supposed to possess.“Closed-shop contract is the most prized achievement of unionism, as it adds
membership and’ compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise of
employment in the closed-shop, it wields group solidarity. la keeping with this
doctrine and with the protection to labor policy envisioned in our Constitution,
this Court will liberally construe the closed-shop provision in question in
favor of the increased membership, of the certified union and of the security’
of tenure of the workers concerned. Respondent company even admitted in its
answer that in spite of the length of period of absence of complainants, it will
not refuse complainants’ employment anytime, if the Court believes it will not
violate closed-shop agreement. This Court holds there is no such intended
violation.“Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby orders
the respondent union to accept as additional members all the above-named
individual complainants; namely,. Concha Sibal, Dolores Sison, Olimpia Arcilla,
Maria Dulatre, Magdalena Sigua, Alfonso Lopez, Marieta Cabangal, Remedios
Lumabas and Estela Dublada, directs the respondent Company to reinstate the said
individual .complainants with full back wages from the time of their respective
dismissals to their actual reinstatement; and requires the Court Examiner to
examine the books and records of accounts and services at respondent company in
order to compute the back wages of the individual complainants.“So ORDERED.
“Manila, Philippines, January 29, 1959.
“(Sgd.) Jose S. Bautista
Presiding
Judge.”
It would seem that respondents Company and Union filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of said decision, although these pleadings do not
appear in the record. On February 26, 1959, the court en banc issued a
resolution denying respondent Company’s motion for reconsideration (nothing was
said about the Union’s motion) for failure to file arguments in support of its
motion within the 10-day reglementary period prescribed by the rules of the
court. No appeal was taken from this order.
On August 5, 1959, petitioners filed a motion for execution of the judgment,
which was granted by the court, in its order of September 24, 1959.
However, on September 26, 1959, the court en banc, in considering
respondent Union’s motion for reconsideration (of the order of January 29, 1959)
re-opened the entire case in a resolution[2] the dispositive part of which states:
“Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby granted; and this case
is, therefore, remanded to the Trial Court to reopen this case, allow the
respondents to crose-examine the witnesses already presented by. the
petitioners, and permit them to submit their evidence in support of their
respective defenses, “So Ordered.”
Against this resolution, petitioners have filed the present petition for
certiorari.
The resolution in question can not be sustained, insofar as it directs the
reopening of the case as to respondent Company. In the answer filed in behalf of
the Company, it admitted that it dismissed the herein petitioners, but alleged
that it did so upon demand of the respondent Union on the strength of the
closed-shop clause of its collective bargaining agreement. The record shows that
it did not appear in any of the dates on which,the case was set for trial. The
records further show that the Company’s motion for reconsideration of the order
(dated January 29, 1959) of the lower court directing the Company to reinstate
the petitioners to their positions with back wages, was denied by the lower
court, in its resolution en banc of February 26, 1959. Respondent
Company did not appeal from said order or resolution; and the same, having
become final and executory, petitioners, on August 5, 1959, filed a
motion for execution of said order (of January 29), which the lower court
granted, in its order of September 24, 1959. In the circumstances, the. lower
court committed a grave error in reopening the case as to respondent
Company.
At this juncture, it may be stated that petitioners’ dismissal by respondents
Company is unjustified, considering that the closed-shop clause contained in the
collective bargaining agreement it entered into with respondent Union is
inapplicable to petitioners who were already in the Company’s service at the
time of its execution (I Francisco, Labor Laws [3rd Ed.] 374-375, citing
Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., NLRB No. 76 [1989], cited in II Teller Labor
Disputes and Collective Bargaining, 867-868).
Respondent Company’s claim that the order of January 29, 1959 is not a final
order and, therefore, is unappealable is correct, only insofar as it directs the
CIR Examiner to examine its (the Company’s) books and records of accounts and
services, in order to compute the back wages of petitioners, but not as the
portion of said order directing petitioners’ reinstatement with full back wages
from the time of their respective dismissals to their1 actual reinstatement. To
our mind; an order of reinstatement, unlike an award, becomes final, upon the
expiration of the time of appeal, as-it finally disposes of the pending action
(for reinstatement), so that nothing more can be done with it in the . trial
court (Mejia vs. Alimurong, 4 PhiK, 572; Olsen & Olsen Co.
vs. Olsen, 48 Phil., 238; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court
[1952] Ed. 894-895).
The aforementioned resolution’ should, however, be upheld, insofar as it
orders the case reopened with respect to the respondent Union, and allows It to
cross-examine petitioners’ witnesses and submit evidence for its defense.
Respondent Union’s motion for reconsideration, it will be noted, was filed in
due time, before the resolution became final. The records disclose Borne
justification for’ the Union’s failure to appear at the hearing of the case oh
January 21,1959, which would indicate that the lower court committed no grave
abuse of discretion as to constitute a reversible error. It appears that the
previous hearings of the case were had before the CIR Hearing Examiner. Prior to
the last date of hearing on January 21, however, the case was, without due
notice to respondent union, withdrawn from the Examiner and assigned to CIR
judge Jose S. Bautista. it is claimed for the union that due to the absence of
said notice of the transfer of the hearing to the trial judge, respondent union
failed to appear before the latter on said date.
Moreover, there is reason to reopen the case as’ to respondent Union, to
afford’it the opportunity to present evidence for its refusal or failure to
admit petitioners as members thereof, considering that, as a rule, no laborer or
employee has an abstract or absolute right to union membership (I Francisco,
op. cit.,68-69, citing 31 Am. Jur. 861; 4 Am. Jur. 462; 97 ALR
594).
For all the foregoing, the resolution appealed from is reversed, insofar as
it directs the .reopening of the case as to respondent Company, but affirmed,
insofar as it orders its reopening with respect to respondent Union. As to the
latter, we hereby order the case remanded to the court a quo, for
further proceedings consistent herewith. Without costs. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Resolution affirmed in part and reversed in part.
[1] “Sec- 4. Unfair Labor
Practices.
“a It shall be unfair labor practice for employer:
* * * * * * *
”4 To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act or in any other Act or statute
of the Republic of the Philippines shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in section twelve;
* * * * * * *
“(b) It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents:
* * * * * * *
“(2) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (4) or to discriminate against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than the usual terms and conditions tinder which
membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members.”
[2] A 3 against 2 resolutions, with
Judges Tabigne Martinez and Victoriano, concurring and Judges Bautista and
Villanueva, dissenting.