FLORENTINA UMENGAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ATTY. REMIGIO BUTUCAN, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE, MANUEL G. MANZANO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Plaintiff Florentina Umengan and defendant Angeles Umengan were sisters of
the half-blood. Their common father, Severino Umengan, applied for two
homesteads in his lifetime. One parcel was finally adjudicated after his death
and the corresponding original, certificate of title (No. 1047) was issued to
the “Heirs of Severino Umengan.” The other parcel was adjudicated to him
personally and original certificate of title No. 265 was issued in his name.
Subsequently Angeles Umengan filed an action for partition against Florentina in
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan (Civil Case No. 389-A). Judgment was
rendered there and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dividing the two
parcels between the sisters thus: 3.8014 hectares of the first and 0.75 hectares
of the second for Angeles; and 3.8014 hectares of the first and 2.25 hectares of
the second for Florentina. In the same judgment Florentina, who had had
exclusive possession of the properties, was adjudged to pay to Angeles the sum
of P1,600.00 as damages.

The said amount not having been paid, a writ of execution was issued. The
shares and interests of Florentina were levied upon and sold at public auction
on February 22, 1958, wherein Angeles was the sole bidder. On June 3, 1958,
Angeles in turn sold those shares and interests acquired by her to Ramona S.
Pablo for the sum of P2,800.00 Florentina’s right to redeem on or before
February 22, 1959 was expressly reserved in the document of sale.

On June 11, 1958 Angeles likewise sold her own shares in the two homestead
properties to Mario S. Pablo for the sum of P4,500.00.

On February 21, 1959 Florentina Umengan commenced the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Cagayan against the provincial sheriff, to enjoin him
from issuing a final deed of sale of the properties subject of the auction;
Attorney Manuel Manzano as attorney-in-fact of Angeles Umengan, who was then in
the United States; Ramona S. Pablo as vendee of Florentina’s acquired by
Angeles; and Mario S. Pablo as vendee of the shares of Angeles herself. The
prayer in the complaint against these last two defendants was “that an order be
issued declaring the right of the herein petitioner (plaintiff) as legal heir of
Severino Umengan to repurchase within five years, from June 3, 1958 and June 11,
1958 (or from February 22, 1958), whichever property is affected the properties
(sic) sold by Angeles Umengan her half-sister to the vendee—respondents
(defendants), the period to redeem the auction sale against her, also within a
period of five years, as provided for under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
141.”

On April 15, 1959 the court a quo rendered judgment:

(a) Ordering the defendant Ramona S. Pablo to resell the two portions
of land in question which were sold at public auction in Civil Case No. 389 for
P2,800.00;

(b) Dismissing the complaint with respect to the defendant Attys.
Remigio Bulacan and Manuel G. Manzano and Dr. Mario Pablo; and

(c) Without pronouncement as to costs.
In the event that the
defendant Ramona S. Pablo fails to execute the deed of resale within the period
of 20 days from the time this decision becomes final, the Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to execute it pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.

So ordered.

The case is now before us on appeal by plaintiff and by defendants Manuel
Manzano and Ramona S. Pablo. The first question is whether, with respect to the
shares of Florentina Umengan in the two parcels of land which were sold at
public auction to Angeles Umengan on February 22, 1958 and in turn sold by the
latter to Ramona S. Pablo on the following June 3, the period of redemption is
one year pursuant to section, 26 of Rule 39, or five years under section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Defendant Ramona S. Pablo contends that the cited
provision of the Public Land Act does not apply despite the fact that the lands
in question were originally acquired as homesteads, because the right of
redemption within five years given to the homesteader himself, his widow or
legal heirs, refers exclusively to voluntary conveyances and not to involuntary
ones, such as the sale on execution of Florentina’s shares to satisfy the
judgment against her. The contention is without merit. The law does not
distinguish between the two kinds of conveyances. The reason for allowing
redemption within five years, which cannot even be waived by the party entitled
thereto, obtains with equal force in both. Those who are permitted to acquire
public lands by working them as homesteads, being hardly in a position to become
property-owners otherwise, are afforded the additional protection that in case
their acquisition are sold they or their heirs shall have enough time to
effectuate the repurchase. A question more or less similar to that here
presented was decided by us in case of Cassion vs. Philippine National
Bank, 89 Phil., 560. The plaintiffs there mortgaged two parcels of homestead
land to the bank to secure a promissory note. Upon default; the mortgage was
foreclosed; the bank bought the lands at public auction and later on sold them
to the other defendants. Applying the provisions of Public Land Act, we held
that the plaintiffs had a right to repurchase within five years.

The foregoing considerations lead us to the next point at issue. It will be
noted that in her complaint the plaintiff does not seek to enforce her right to
repurchase, but rather to obtain a declaration from the court that she has a
right to do so within five years under section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141. What
is prayed for is in the nature of declaratory relief under Rule 66. Whether the
remedy is proper or not m the light of facts of this case is not among the
issues raised by the parties, But as pointed out by plaintiff in her brief, the
trial court erred in ordering defendant Ramona S. Pablo to resell to her the
properties (which were sold at public auctions on February 22, 1958) within a
period of twenty (20) days from the time the judgment becomes final, in effect
reducing the five-year period granted by the Public Land Act. While the relief
thus granted is not really in accordance with the relief asked for, it should
not be noted that the five-year period is due to expire very shortly (February
22, 1963), which may possibly be even before this decision is promulgated, and
consequently no such, reduction of the five year period will actually result by
reserving to plaintiff her right of redemption within twenty (20) days from the
time judgment becomes final. This, it should be repeated, concerns the
plaintiff’s shares in the two parcels of land in question which were sold at
public auction to Angeles Umengan.

With respect to the shares of Angeles herself in the same properties, which
she sold absolutely to defendent Mario S. Pablo on June 11, 1958, the trial
court did not err in dismissing the complaint. Such sale does not come, within
the purview of section 119 of the Public Land Act. Angeles Umengan is still
living and consequently it is she and, not Florentina Umengan who has the right
of repurchase. Florentina cannot claim that right as an heir of her deceased
father, Severino Umengan, because the properties had already been partitioned
between the two sisters and it “was Angeles—not Severino—who executed the sale.
Plaintiff invokes Articles 1088 and 1620 of the Civil Code regarding the right
of redemption given to a co-heir or co-owner in case any one of the other
co-heirs or co-owners sells his share to a third person. In the fast place, as
already noted, the properties here involved had already been partitioned when
Angeles Umengan sold her shares; and secondly, even assuming that they were
still common properties, the right of redemption may be exercised only within a
period of thirty days.

Insofaras the judgment appealed from orders defendant Ramona S. Pablo to
execute a deed of resale in favor of plaintiff within a period of twenty (20)
days from the time the decision becomes final, the said judgment is here by
affirmed, with the modification that such deed of resale shall be executed upon
payment by the plaintiff of the redemption price. The judgment is also affirmed
in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes J.
B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.