MAURICIO MIRANO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. MADRIGAL & COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is a case for the recovery of wages due to 25 persons, plaintiffs
herein, allegedly as members of the crew of three (3) ships of the defendant
company (SS Argus, SS Churruca and SS Hirondelle). The pertinent portions of the
complaint filed on April 9, 1953, before the CFI of Manila, recite—

“That in November, 1941, in the City of Manila, Philippines, defendant
herein, which was and still engaged in coastwise shipping and maritime commerce,
contracted the services of the herein plaintiffs, employed and engaged them as
complement or crew of the vessels “SS Argus”, “SS Churruca” and “SS Hirondelle”,
owned by and registered in the name of defendant as shipowner, to bring the
above-named vessels to the Port of Hongkong, British Crown Colony, for
dry-docking and repairs at the Hongkong shipyards, ***;

That pursuant to such employment, plaintiffs, on November 2, 1941, left the
Philippines aboard the above-named vessels of the defendant, arriving at
Hongkong, British Grown Colony, on November 5, and had the above-named vessels
dry-docked;

* * * * * * *

That war broke out between the United States and Japan on December 8, 1941,
and as a result thereof, plaintiffs herein, on December 15, 1941, were captured
by the Imperial Japanese Army, * * * were kept as prisoners and interred aboard
the “SS Saiyong” then tied up in Macao, which was towed to Hongkong, where
plaintiffs were taken back to the “SS Saiyong” and made to serve as slave labor;
that on October 21, 1943, they were brought to the Philippines on board the “SS
Saising Maru”, and from October 24, 1948 when they arrived in the Philippines,
to September 21, 1944, they were impressed in the service of the Japanese Navy
and assigned to various ships plying between Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, under
close and heavy guard, until they wore able to escape and join their families
when the American, forces bombed Manila on September 21, 1944;

That the plaintiffs have not been paid their salaries for the period from
November 2, 1941 to September 21, 1944, in the following amounts set out after
their respective names:

1.	Mauricio Mirano—Chief Engineer ………………………………………………….	P15,615.00
2.	Salvador Miranda—Carpenter ……………………………………………………..	1,845.97
3.	Florentino Domactoy—Fireman ……………………………………………………	1,370.51
4.	Hermogenes Camacho—Able Seaman ……………………………………………	1,127,68
5.	Amado Villanueva—Helper Fireman ……………………………………………….	1,120.67
6.	Maralitico Palomata—Mess Boy …………………………………………………..	676.65
7.	Eduardo C. Quimpo—Mayordomo …………………………………………………	3,740.00
8.	Juan Tupas—Timonel ……………………………………………………………….	1,098.00
9.	Pedro Bugallon—Watchman ……………………………………………………….	1,020.00
10.	Gerardo Gaboy—Able Seaman ……………………………………………………	1,120.67
11.	Camilo Alalin—Machinist …………………………………………………………….	1,845.97
12.	Alfonso Pavila—Storekeeper ………………………………………………………	1,197.73
13.	Juan Mutia—Mess Boy ………………………………………………………………	676.65
14.	Matias Marabe—Oiler ……………………………………………………………….	1,516.25
15.	Simon Largo—Oiler …………………………………………………………………..	1,588.00
16.	Epifanio Dumanggas—Timonel ……………………………………………………..	1,980.00
17.	Meliton Orias—Seaman …………………………………………………………….	855.00
18.	Felipe Serarania—Oiler ……………………………………………………………..	2,082.00
19.	Basilio Baybayon—Oiler …………………………………………………………….	2,082.00
20.	Espiridion Cajilig—Ordinary Seaman ………………………………………………	1,723.73
21.	Ricardo Pador—Fireman …………………………………………………………..	1,908.76
22.	Jose Monsalle—Timonel ……………………………………………………………	1,870.00
23.	Olegario Samson—Ayudante ………………………………………………………	2,550.00
24.	Luis Agrandeza—Radio Operator ………………………………………………….	4,250.00
25.	Apolonio Ondoy—Seaman ………………………………………………………..	1,700.00
		___________
	Total………………………………P56,561.24

Aside from the above claim for wages,
the plaintiffs prayed for P100,000.00 by way of damages, both material and
moral, and costs.

Defendant Madrigal and Company on May 9, 1953, moved to Dismiss the complaint
on three (3) grounds, to wit—

(1) Allegations inherently sufficient to constitute cause of action against
the defendant Madrigal Company, Inc.;

(2) Lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the claim of the nineteen
(19) plaintiffs whose claims do not exceed two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos;

(3) Prescription of action.

Plaintiffs presented an opposition to the above motion to dismiss and said
motion was denied on May 30, 1953. A motion for reconsideration filed on July 3,
1953 was denied on July 15, 1953, and on August 4, 1953, defendant answered the
complaint. Several pleadings were subsequently presented to the Court by the
parties. Defendant filed no less than four (4) more Motions to Dismiss, on
various and several grounds, alleged in the first motion and the additional
ground of non-liability for being not the proper party. Trial was had and the
parties presented their evidence, both testimonial and documentary after the
reception and consideration of which the lower court rendered judgment, the
pertinent portions of which read—

* * * * * * *

“Pursuant to the evidence of the plaintiffs and not denied by the defendant,
all of the foregoing plaintiffs that composed the crew of the vessels had signed
‘shipping articles’ before their departure for Hongkong in November, 1941. These
‘shipping articles’ by law and by custom constituted the employment contracts of
the individual seaman with employer. They contained the terms and conditions
agreed upon between them. These ‘Shipping Articles’ were not produced and
presented in the evidence by the plaintiffs claiming that they had been
destroyed or lost, by the war. For non-presentation of these important
documents, this Court is at a loss to determine the terms and conditions and who
were the parties with certainty who had signed said maritime agreements. * * *

* * * * * * *

It is to be noted in this connection that from the outset, defendant had
consistently pleaded for the outright dismissal of this case with respect to
plaintiffs Salvador Miranda, Florentino Domactoy, Hermogenes Camacho, Amado
Villanueva, Maralitico Palomata, Juan Tupas, Pedro Bugallon, Gerardo Gaboy,
Carmelo Alalin, Alfonso Pavila, Juan Mutia, Matias Marabe, Simon Largo, Epifanio
Dumangas, Meliton Orias, Espiridion Cajilig, Ricardo Pador, Jose Monsalle,
Apolonio Ondoy, for their claims for wages were only P2,000.00 and less than
that amount on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of this Court
following the provisions of our present Judiciary Act, and the Honorable Judge
Demetrio Encarnacion and subsequent rulings of this Court had denied the pleas
of the defendant believing that their claim were based on a single written
contract of ‘shipping articles’. After the complete presentation of the evidence
of the plaintiffs, it became evident that each seaman before the start of the
voyage had individually signed with alleged defendant the said contract of
‘shipping articles’.

* * * * * * *

So, it is clear that each seaman has an individual cause of action pursuant
to his individual ‘shipping articles’ that he and defendant had executed. Such
being the case, the demands for payment of wages by the preceding plaintiffs
should have been filed before the Municipal Court of Manila or before any
justice of the peace who has jurisdiction to try and sentence the defendant and
not before this Court which has no jurisdiction, based on the amounts claimed.
Consequently, this Court dismisses this case with respect to the above-mentioned
plaintiffs for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court is of the opinion and so
holds that this complaint, should be, as it is hereby, dismissed for lack of
merits with costs against the plaintiffs.”

On May 31, 1958, plaintiffs presented a pleading styled “Motion for
Reconsideration and Alternative Motion for New Trial,” which was opposed by
defendant and denied on September 6, 1958. Only the plaintiffs appealed directly
to this Court, and in their appeal they contend that the lower court erred:

1. In finding, contrary to the evidence, that Madrigal & Company was not
   the one that employed plaintiffs to man its vessels ‘Argus’, ‘Hirondelle’ and
   ‘Churruca’ for the voyage to Hongkong for dry-docking and repairs;

2. In holding that defendant-appellee did not waive its defense of
   non-liability or was not estopped from denying its liability by its admission in
   its motions to Dismiss and Answer of the existence of employer-employee
   relationship;

3. In holding that, even admitting defendant-appellee employed the
   plaintiffs-appellants as crew of its vessels to undertake the voyage to Hongkong
   for Dry-docking and repairs, its obligation to pay them their wages for the
   voyage was extinguished by the occurence of war; and

4. In holding that it has no jurisdiction over the claims of
   plaintiffs-appellants amounting to less than two thousand pesos, when the
   plaintiffs-appellants collectively signed only one shipping articles for each
   vessel.

In view of the fact that the trial court made a sweeping dismissal of the
entire complaint ov action, on the ground of jurisdiction, it seems pertinent
that one group of the plaintiffs-claimants should be given a separate
consideration from the other. From the factual findings recited in the decision,
which We are not authorized to review, because the case was appealed to Us
directly, on questions of law (the appellant is deemed to have waived the
questions of facts involved), it would seem that the trial court was correct in
dismissing the case with respect to the plaintiffs whose claims did not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, but not Mauricio Mirano (Chief
Engineer), whose claim is P15,615.00. The case of those plaintiffs having claims
not exceeding P5,000.00 should also be dismissed, in view of the amendment of
the Judicial Act of 1948 (sec. 88, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 2613, Aug. 1, 1959). It was found by the court that each seaman signed with
the defendant a contract, or shipping article; each had an individual cause of
action, and had to collect different amounts separately owned by them, depending
upon the period and length of service of each, and the way each had complied
with the terms and conditions of the shipping article and that the plaintiffs
were not all employed in one vessel but in three (3) separate vessels. This
being the case, as it is the case, their claims are not of joint nature, and
each separate claim furnishes the jurisdictional test.

“The point wherein the parties are not in agreement is whether the claim of
each plaintiff or the aggregate claims of all 18 the measure of jurisdiction.
This question has been the subject of decisions by American Courts, In Hackner
vs. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 4 Fed. Rules, Serv. 278, W. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Jan. 13, 1941; 117 F. (2nd) 95, it was
held that, ‘When two or more plaintiffs, each having a separate and distinct
demand, join an a single suit, the demand of each must be of the requisite
jurisdictional amount. Aggregation of the claims to make up the jurisdictional
amount is permitted only if the claims are of joint nature, as * * *. As
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 14, p. 413, puts it, ‘Where several claims have
separate and distinct demands against a defendant or defendants, which may
properly be joined in a single suit, the claims can not be added together to
make up the required jurisdictional amount; each separate claim furnishes the
jurisdictional test.”

* * * * * * *

‘* * * In other words, the court takes into account what one party would
recover and not what is adjudged to all the parties or some of them.

It is in effect argued that plaintiff’s could, through collusion, shift the
court’s jurisdiction if individmial demands rather than their aggregate were
used as the criterion. It is the other way around; it is the adoption of the
opposite theory, as we see it, which would open the door to manipulation.
Several plaintiffs wishing to avoid trial in the justice of the peace court
could combine their demands in one complaint so as to put the action beyond the
jurisdiction of the inferior court.” (A. Soriano y. Cia vs. Jose, et al.,
86 Phil., 523; 47 Off. Gaz. 12 Supp. p. 156).

“While some doubt had arisen in the past as to whether the jurisdiction of a
court depends, in cases where claims or causes of action between the same
parties are embodied in a single com plaint, on the amount of each single, claim
or upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, we have finally
held in the eases of Soriano vs. Omila, 97 Phil., .62; 51 Off. Gaz., No.
7, p. 3465, and Campos Rueda Corporation vs. Sta. Cruz Lumber Co., Inc.
98 Phil., 627; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 3, p. 1387, that the jurisdiction of the court
depends upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action irrespective
of whether the plural causes constituting the total claim arose out of the same
of different transaction. The only exceptions to this rule are (1) where
the claims joined under the same complaint are separably owned by, or due to,
different parties, in which case each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test (Arganza, et al. vs. International Colleges, 90
Phil., 470; Soriano y Cia vs. Jose, supra; and (2) where not all
the causes of action joined are demands or claims for money.” (Teresa Felix Vda.
de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace of Camiling, Tarlac, et al. 99 Phil.,
693; 52 Off. Gaz. 5153).

Furthermore, Section 88 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
2613, Aug. 1, 1959, heretofore cited, now provides—

“Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases.—In all civil
actions, including those mentioned in Rules fifty-mine and sixty-two of the
Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or city, and not exclusively
cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the justice of the peace and the
judge of a municipal court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
value of the subject matter or amount of the demand does not exceed five
thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs. Where there are several claims
or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined dn a
single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. * * *”

In view hereof, the judgment appealed from, in so far as the appellant
Salvador Miranda, Florentino Domactoy, Hermogenes Camacho, Amado Villanueva,
Maralitico Pa-lomata, Eduardo C. Quimpo, Juan Tupas, Pedro Bugallon, Gerardo
Gaboy, Camilo Alalin, Alfonso Pavila, Juan Mutia, Matias Marabe, Simon Largo,
Epifanio Dumanggas, Meliton Arias, Felipe Lorarania, Basilio Baybayon,
Espiridion Cajilig, Ricardo Pador,” Jose Monsalle, Olegario Samson, Luis
Agrandez and Apolonio Ondoy are concerned, is AFFIRMED. The appealed judgment
with, respect to plaintiff Mauricio Mirano (Chief Engineer), is SET ASIDE, and
the Court of origin is hereby directed to render a decision on the merits, as
the evidence and the law on the matter may warrant. With costs against the
plaintiffs-appellants.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal JJ., concur.