ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC., AND RODOLFO M. REVILLA, PETITIONERS VS. OSCO WORKERS FRATERNITY LABOR UNION (OWFLU), ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On October 15, 1957, the respondent OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union
(OWFLU) filed with the respondent Court of Industrial Relations a
complaint for unfair labor practices against the petitioners, the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., a corporation organized under Philippine laws and
engaged in the business of milling sugar cane, and Rodolfo M. Revilla,
the company’s resident-manager of its mill factory at Ormoc City. In
this complaint, which was docketed as “Court of Industrial Relations
Case No. 126-ULP (Cebu)”, the union charged the company and its
aforesaid manager of having interfered with free union activities,
discriminated against union members, and dismissed, without just and
valid cause, the following union officers: Benito Porcadilla, Crispino
Gendoy, and Andres Tabudlong. In their answer, the company denied the
allegations of unfair labor practices and averred that the above named
employees were dismissed for just and valid causes.

After
due hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Judge Baltazar
M. Villanueva, entered a decision on March 23, 1959 finding the company
and its manager guilty of unfair labor practices as defined in Section
4 (a), subsections 1, 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 875. As to the
dismissal of the aforementioned unionists, the court found the
dismissal of Crispin Gendoy and Andres Tabudlong to be for just and
valid cause. With respect to Benito Porcadilla, however, the court
ruled that there was no valid cause for his dismissal and ordered the
company to reinstate him with backwages.

Not satisfied with
the portion of the decision finding that there was no valid cause for
the dismissal of Benito Porcadilla and requiring his reinstatement, the
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the court, sitting en banc,
denied said motion. The petitioners instituted the instant proceedings,
alleging that the respondent Court of Industrial Relations committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was no valid cause for
the dismissal of Benito Porcadilla and in ordering the latter’s
reinstatement with backwages.

This Court in a long line of
cases has repeatedly ruled that the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations are binding upon this Court. Before the findings,
however, of the Court of Industrial Relations can enjoy the stamp of
finality, there are certain cardinal rules which must first be
satisfied. These cardinal rules, stated in the case of “Ang Tibay vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al.,” 69 Phil., 635 are as follows:
That the parties must be given the opportunity to present evidence,
that the tribunal must consider the evidence presented, that the
tribunal must have something to support its findings, and that the
evidence supporting its findings must be substantial. The same case
defines substantial evidence as more than a mere scintilla. “It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” In the language of this Court in the case of NLU
vs. Philippine Education Co. (91 Phil., 93) :

“Findings on the weight of evidence by the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive, but findings unsupported by substantial or credible proof are not binding on the reviewing court * * *.”

In the instant case, the petitioners claimed that Porcadilla was
dismissed for sleeping during his assigned working hours on at least
two occasions, an imputation which was denied by Porcadilla. The record
shows that the petitioners presented as their witnesses two security
guards of the company and three co-workers of Porcadilla. His security
guards were Prudencio Tan and Julian Tolentin, while the three workers
were Saturnino Rollada, Catalino Necesito and Pedro Lumapas. Rodolfo
Revilla likewise testified on this point. All these witnesses for the
petitioners testified that Porcadilla was caught in flagrante delicto,
sleeping during working hours on two-occasions by Rodolfo M. Revilla,
the company’s resident manager. The first occasion was on April 22,
1957, for which Porcadilla and two other employees, who were also
caught sleeping, were fined and warned that any repetition of the same
offense would result in their dismissal. The second time that
Porcadilla was caught sleeping at his post was about one month later,
on May 17, 1957. Revilla testified that for this second dereliction of
duty on the part of Porcadilla the latter was dismissed.

The
respondents presented Porcadilla alone. He denied that he slept during
working hours. The respondents likewise placed, upon their voluntary
initiative, Rodolfo M. Revilla on the witness stand and interrogated
him on the cause for the dismissal of Porcadilla. As aforesaid,
however, Revilla testified Porcadilla was dismissed for sleeping during
working hours.

After carefully reviewing the record and the
evidence presented in this case, this Court believes that the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations erred in placing undue weight
on the self-serving and uncorroborated denial made by Porcadilla that
he did not sleep in his post; and in totally disregarding, without
giving any reason therefor, the testimonies of the five employees of
the company who corroborated the testimony of Revilla to the effect
that Porcadilla was dismissed for sleeping during working hours. As
stated by Judge Emiliano S. Tabigne, who dissented from the majority
opinion of the Court of Industrial Relations denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the company—

“* *
* The five persons who saw the employee sleeping are disinterested
witnesses; and there is no reason why testimonies of these people, plus
that of the manager, should not be given credit and weight * * *.”

This Court fully agrees with the respondent that quality and not
quantity of witnesses should be the primordial consideration in the
appraisal of evidence. As between the testimonies, however, of the
aforementioned five co-workers of Porcadilla, and the testimony of
Porcadilla himself, this Court is inclined to resolve the conflict
between the said testimonies in favor of the testimonies of the
witnesses who do not appear to have any interest in this case. They are
fellow employees of Porcadilla who worked on the same shift as
Porcadilla. No valid reason was shown why they should testify falsely
against Porcadilla. On the other hand, Porcadilla is personally
interested and involved in this case—it was his dismissal that is in
issue. He has every reason, therefore, to color his testimony. This is
not to say that the testimony of a party litigant is not admissible in
evidence. Section 25 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court is clear on this
point. Admissibility, however, is one thing, weight is another.

The very manner with which Porcadilla denied that he was caught
sleeping, casts doubt on the veracity of his denial. Thus, according to
Porcadilla, when Revilla made the inspection trip on May 17, 1957, (the
occasion when, according to the evidence of petitioners, Porcadilla was
caught sleeping) he (Porcadilla) was not asleep but was merely
reclining near a certain basket. He added that when Revilla passed by
the place where he was reclining, Revilla signalled Catalino Necesito
(one of the witnesses presented by the petitioners) to wake him
(Porcadilla) up. From this, one can gather that, assuming the truth of
this testimony of Porcadilla, Porcadilla was completely aware that
Revilla believed that he was sleeping, otherwise there would have been
no need of instructing somebody to wake him up. This notwithstanding,
Porcadilla did not explain to, nor call the attention of, Revilla that
he was not sleeping—something which he should have naturally done in
the light of, his own admission that he had been previously fined for’
sleeping and warned of dismissal for any repetition. To our mind,
Porcadilla failed to tell Revilla that he was not sleeping because he
was actually asleep.

Incidentally, the supposed lack of
confrontation of Porcadilla when caught sleeping, which was used by the
Court of Industrial Relations as an anchor for its decision, is belied
by the very testimony of Porcadilla referred to above. That Revilla
instructed somebody to wake Porcadilla up, to our mind, is enough
confrontation.

The validity of dismissals must be evaluated
in the light of its background and surrounding circumstances. (Standard
Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Katipunan Labor Union, 100 Phil., 804.) In
the case at hand, the evidence, as shown above, clearly establishes
that Porcadilla was twice apprehended in flagrante delicto
sleeping during his assigned, working hours. That this dereliction of
duty on the part of Porcadilla is a just cause for his dismissal need
not be belabored here. The existence of a valid cause for the dismissal
of Porcadilla negates the respondent’s claim that Porcadilla was
dismissed for union activities because the idea of dismissal by unfair
labor practice is incompatible with dismissal for just cause.

Wherefore, the portion of the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations finding that there is no just cause for the dismissal of
Porcadilla and requiring the petitioners to reinstate him with
backwages, is hereby set aside, and the dismissal of the said
Porcadilla is declared valid and justified. Without costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.