NATIONAL FASTENER CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL FASTENER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PTUC), RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution en banc,
dated July 17, 1959, of the Court of Industrial Relations, modifying
the decision of His Honor, Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista, by
ordering the reinstatement of Celestino Blas, a member of the
respondent union, with back wages, and finding the petitioner
corporation guilty of unfair labor practice.

In a complaint
dated November 29, 1958, herein petitioner National Fastener
Corporation of the Philippines was charged before the respondent Court
of Industrial Relations with unfair labor practice under the provisions
of Sec. 4(a), (1), (4) and (5) of Republic Act No. 875, allegedly
committed as follows:

“That respondent
corporation through its president and general manager, Hans. M. Menzi,
dismissed Celestino Blas, an employee at said corporation and
Sergeant-at-arms of the complainant union, on July 17, 1958, in order
to discourage union membership and also because of his having testified
in the Court of Industrial Relations, Case No. 1340-ULP, entitled
‘National Fastener Employees Association (PTUC) versus National
Fastener Corporation of the Philippines and Santiago Elizaga and
Enrique Mesina’, on February 10, 1958.”

Petitioner denied the charge in its answer of December 5, 1958, by
averring that it was constrained to dismiss Celestino Blas for just and
valid grounds, particularly in view of the latter’s absenteeism from
work.

On June 13, 1959, the Hon. Jose S. Bautista, Presiding
Judge, after due hearing, rendered decision, declaring therein
respondent corporation guilty of unfair labor practice as charged and
ordering the reinstatement of Celestino Blas to his work without
backpay. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by both parties, the
Court en banc promulgated the appealed resolution, sustaining
the findings of unfair labor practice, but, this time, ordering
Celestino Bias’ reinstatement with ‘back wages. Judge Bautista
dissented from this modification.

In this petition for
certiorari, petitioner corporation contends that the respondent Court
of Industrial Relations abused its discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of Celestino Blas with backpay, in finding petitioner
guilty of unfair labor practice, and in not upholding its
(petitioner’s) stand that Bias’ dismissal from the company was
justified.

We see no merit in the appeal.

It
is true that Celestino Blas committed certain irregularities during his
employment, and this fact is not denied by the respondent union. These
irregularities, however, were, except for the alleged absences without
leave on May 5 and 6, 1958, committed long before Blas’ dismissal, for
which he was already reprimanded or otherwise punished by the
petitioner. The immediate cause of discharge, it would appear, was the
fact that on July 7, 1958 to July 19, 1958, Bias absented himself from
work, allegedly without previous authority from the management. This
matter was testified to by Santiago Elizaga, the superintendent of the
corporation. According to Celestino, Blas, however, between 7:00 to
8:00 o’clock on the morning of July 7, 1958, he went to the main office
of the company at 183 Soler, Manila, purposely to see its president and
general manager, and there he was able to secure said official’s
permission to go on vacation leave, without pay. The question of whom
to believe being a matter largely dependent on the trier’s discretion,
the findings of the Industrial Court, which had the better opportunity
to examine and appraise the factual issues, certainly deserve respect.

Neither is the lower court’s finding on the commission of unfair labor
practice by the petitioner corporation so lacking in the requisite
support as to warrant a reversal thereof (see Sec. 6, Republic Act No.
875)^[1]. There is testimony
to the effect that, on several occasions, Celestino Blas was approached
and instructed by Santiago Elizaga not to affiliate with the
complainant union; that to further discourage such membership, Blas was
promised that should he comply with the request of the management, he
would be given a raise in salary; and that when the management came to
know of his affiliation with respondent union, and because he testified
in another unfair labor practice case (Case No. 1340-ULP) against
petitioner corporation and Santiago Elizaga, he was served with a stern
warning that any little infraction on his part would mean his outright
dismissal from work. Elizaga himself admitted that there were other
employees who incurred absences without leave, and yet said erring
employees were not discharged by the company. It may not be amiss to
state also that Santiago Elizaga’s report to the management (Exh. “8”),
which immediately preceded, and most likely prompted, Celestino Blas’
dismissal, made significant mention of the fact that “Bias is a member
of the P.T.U.C., with whom we (petitioner) have a pending case at the
C.I.R.”

It is contended that if it were true that the
company intended to discourage union membership, then it could have
done better by dismissing more active officials of the respondent union
than Celestino Blas, who was just its sergeant-at-arms. But that would
have made the design too obvious and, no doubt, would have been more
risky for the company to do. For the same reason, we cannot readily
accept petitioner’s proposition that had the corporation really wanted
to discriminate against Bias because of his damaging testimony in said
ULP Case No. 1340, it would have likewise dismissed the other two
employees who, like Bias, testified critically against the company and
Elizaga.

In short, as the record stands, we can not say that
the decision of the Industrial Court is not sustained by substantial
evidence. That there are circumstances militating against its
conclusions does not warrant reversing it, since in appeals of this
kind, preponderance of evidence is not the issue, but whether that
relied upon in the appealed decision is at all credible.

As
to the award of backpay, that matter rests within the sound discretion
of the Industrial Court (Sec. 5[a], Republic Act No. 875, Velez vs. PAV Watchman’s Union and the Court of Industrial Relations, 107 Phil., 689; 58 Off. Gaz., [7] 1309).

Wherefore, the resolution appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] See also United Lines, et al, vs. Ass. Watchmen & Security Union, et al., G. R. Nos. L-12208-11, May 21, 1958.