SANCHO B. DE LEON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ESTANISLAO FAUSTINO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On March 2, 1957, plaintiff Sancho B. de Leon through counsel filed a
complaint against Estanislao Faustino to vindicate title and to recover
possession of real property, plus damages. The complaint in substance alleges
that the property in question was acquired by plaintiff by virtue of a deed of
sale dated April 21, 1953 executed in his favor by Alberto Jimenez, its former
registered owner; that on or about June 12, 1953, plaintiff demanded possession
of the land from defendant, but the latter refused and instead instituted Civil
Case No. 588 against him and two others in the same court, asking for the
cancellation of his (plaintiff’s) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4368; that
on November 29, 1955, the Court of First nstance of Isabela rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint, sustaining in effect plaintiff’s title to the
land; and that sometime after the said decision was promulgated, plaintiff again
demanded possession of the land from the defendant but the latter refused and
still refuses causing plaintiff to suffer damages.

In his answer, the defendant admits and denies certain facts pleaded in the
complaint. He claims that he was the registered owner of the land in question
and by way of affirmative defenses alleges that he has not sold, conveyed or
ceded the land to any person; that if he has executed any deed of sale, the same
has been secured by means of fraud and therefore null and void; that when
Alberto Jimenez bought the land (from one Margarita A. de Peralta) and
plaintiff, in turn, purchased it from Jimenez, both of them knew fully well that
defendant was the legal owner thereof; that since 1933 up to the present time,
defendant has been in the open, continuous and adverse possession of the land;
and that plaintiff’s cause of action is already barred by prescription or
laches.

On August 29, 1957, alleging that there are no genuine issues as to the
material facts alleged in the complaint and that judgment could be rendered
forthwith on the pleadings already filed, plaintiff moved for summary judgment,
attaching to his motion in support thereof his affidavit and that of his
overseer.

After hearing on the motion for summary judgment was postponed, plaintiff was
allowed by the court below in its order dated September 13, 1957 to file within
5 days a certified true copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 588, entitled
‘Estanislao Faustino vs. Sancho B. de Leon, et al.” and a certificate
of the clerk of court to the effect that the said decision has already become
final.

On October 9, 1957, the defendant filed an opposition to the motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the case is not an action “to recover
upon a claim”; (2) that there are genuine issues of fact; (3) that plaintiff’s
cause of action is barred by prescription or laches; (4) that defendant has
acquired ownership and title over the land by acquisitive prescription; and (5)
that the decision in Case No. 588 does not constitute res judicata. In support
of the opposition, the joint affidavit of defendant and his wife was presented
in court.

Overruling the opposition, the court below granted plaintiff’s motion and on
January 15, 1958 rendered a summary judgment, declaring him the absolute owner
of the land described in the complaint and in his Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-4368, and ordering the defendant to vacate the same and to pay the costs.
From this judgment, defendant appealed. The appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals but that court has certified the case to us on the ground that the
questions involved are purely legal.

The appeal is without merit.

The material averments of the complaint that plaintiff acquired the land in
question from its former registered owner Alberto Jimenez by virtue of a
contract of sale and that the Torrens title to the land is now in the name of
plaintiff, the validity of which had been confirmed in a prior civil case filed
by defendant against plaintiff and two others are not disputed. The only issues
of fact which served as biasis for opposition to the summary judgment are those
raised in the affirmative defenses wherein defendant claimed that the sale of
the land to plaintiff was tainted with fraud; that defendant has been in
continuous, open and adverse possession of the land since 1933; and that
plaintiff’s cause of action is already barred by prescription or laches. An
examination, however, of the pleadings together with the affidavits presented by
the parties and the documents on file show the non-existence of defendant’s
claims or defenses. Thus, without mentioning the fact that defendant, in
alleging fraud, failed to state the circumstances constituting the fraud, as
required by section 12 of Rule 15, it is on record that in Civil Case No. 588
wherein defendant prayed, among other things, for the annulment of plaintiff’s
certificate of title, no fraud or bad faith was alleged as against said
plaintiff, in his acquisition of the land and for that reason the complaint was
dismissed as against him. With respect to the claim that defendent has acquired
the land by prescription, it is also on record that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1519 covering the land in question was issued in the name of Margarita
A. de Peralta on July 5, 1939; that this title was subsequently cancelled and a
new one, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2359, was issued in the name of
Alberto Jimenez on February 11, 1946; and that on June 3, 1953 Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 4368 was issued in plaintiff’s name. These
circumstances negative defendant’s claim that he has acquired the land thru
acquisitive prescription.

“When a title is registered in the first instance, or under a transfer from
the last registered owner, the statute declares the certificate to be evidence
of an indefeasible title to the interest or estate registered, and the effect of
this is that the issue of the certificate ipso facto divests any interest or
estate which may exist in any other person and vest it in the person registered
as owner * * *.” (Niblack, Analysis of Torrens System, Sec. 4, p.
6.)

Finally, as to the allegation that plaintiff’s cause of action is already
barred by prescription or laches, it is not disputed that plaintiff acquired the
land in question on April 21, 1953, demanded possession on June 12, 1953 and
filed the present case to recover ownership and possession on March 2, 1957. The
length of time from the date of acquisition to the date of the filing the action
not being more than 4 years, it cannot validly be claimed that plaintiff’s
complaint is already barred by prescription or laches. Under the circumstances
of the case, we hold that the lower court committed no error in rendering a
summary judgment on the merits of the case.

It is contended that the procedure of summary judgment is not warranted in
the instant case since it is not an action “to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim”. It is argued that section 1 of Rule 36 providing
for the remedy of summary judgment for the claimant contemplates action or cases
which are in the nature of money claims. The contention cannot be sustained.
Summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions in
which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Under this definition
and from the provision of section 1 of Rule 36, there would seem to be no
limitation as to the type of action in which the remedy is available, except, of
course, where the material facts alleged in the complaint’are required to be
proved. As observed in the note of the Advisory Committee of the United States
Supreme Court, quoted by former Chief Justice Moran in his comments on the Rules
of Court (Vol. I, 1957 ed., p. 487) —

“This rule (on summary judgment procedure) is applicable to all actions,
including those against the United States or an officer or agency thereof.

* * * * * * *

“In England it was first employed only in cases of liquidated claims, but
there has been a steady enlargement of the scope of the remedy until it is now
used in actions to recover land or chattels and in all other actions at law, for
liquidated or unliquidated claims, except for a few designated torts and breach
of promise or marriage * * *.”

The case of Roque vs. Encarnacion (95 Phil., 643; 50 Off. Gaz., [9]
4193) cited by defendant as an authority to support his theory that a summary
judgment could be rendered only in actions involving; money claims, is not
applicable to the case at bar. That case refers to an action for annulment of
marriage where the material facts alleged in the complaint are required to be
proved at .the trial (Sec. 10, Rule 35) in order to prevent collusion between
the parties.

It is also argued by defendant that while res judicata may be a
ground for dismissal, it cannot be the legal basis for a summary judgment.
Without questioning the correctness of this argument, it will be noted that the
lower court did not base its summary judgment upon the doctrine of res
judicata but on its finding that there was no genuine triable issue of
fact. The doctrine of res judicata was considered by the court below
merely in support of that finding, the defendant having tried to raise issues
which have already been decided and settled in a previous case involving the
same parties.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against defendant-appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bauttsta Angela, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.