AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., PETITIONER VS. RICHARD A. KLEPPER, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Richard A. Klepper brought this action before the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover the sum of P6,729.50 as damages allegedly sustained by his
goods contained in a lift van which fell to the ground while being unloaded from
a ship owned and operated by the American President Lines, Ltd. to the pier,
plus the sum of P2,000.00 as sentimental value of the damaged goods and
attorney’s fees.

It appears that on February 17, 1955, Klepper shipped on board the S. S.
President Cleveland at Yokohama, Japan one lift van under bill of lading No. 82,
containing personal and household effects. The ship arrived in the port of
Manila on February 22, 1955 and while the lift van was being unloaded by the
Gantry crane operated by Delgado Brothers, Inc., it fell on the pier and its
contents were spilled and scattered. A survey was made and the result was that
Klepper suffered damages totalling P6,729.50 arising out of the breakage,
denting and smashing of the goods.

The trial court, on November 5, 1957, rendered decision ordering the shipping
company to pay plaintiff the sum of P6,729.50, value of the goods damaged, plus
P500.00 as their sentimental, value, with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint, and the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The court ordered that,
once the judgment is satisfied, co-defendant DeJgado Brothers, Inc. should pay
the shipping company the same amounts by way of reimbursement. Both defendants
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. The shipping company interposed the present petition for
review.

Anent the liability of petitioner relative to the damage caused to the goods
in question, the Court of Appeals made the following comment: “At the outset, it
may be well to state that the party primarily liable to plaintiff ia appellant
American President Lines, Ltd., the carrier whose,duty it, was to deliver the
cargo in good order to the consignee. Articles 1734, 1736, Civil Code; Articles
355, 363, Code of Commerce. This appellant does not question the finding below
that the damage to plaintiff’s goods was due to negligence.”

To this we agree. And we may add that, regardless of its negligence, the
shipping company’s liability would attach because being a common carrier its
responsibility is extra-ordinary and lasts from the time the goods are placed in
its possession until they are delivered, actually or constructively, to the
consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them (Article 1736, Idem.)
It can only be exempt therefrom for causes enumerated in Article 1734.

But, while petitioner does not dispute its liability as common carrier, it
however contends that the same cannot exceed $500.00 invoking in its favor the
bill of lading Exhibit A and Section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 65).

The pertinent provision of the bill of lading alluded to is clause 17 which
in part provides:

“17. In case of any loss or damage to or in connection with goorls exceeding
in actual value $500 lawful money of the United State, per package. * * * the
value of the goods shall be deemed to be SoOil per package * * * on which basis
the freight is adjusted and the Carrier’s liability, if any, shall be determined
on the basis of a valuta of $500 per package * * * or pro rata in case of
partial” loss or damage, unless the nature of the goods and a valuation higher
tlian $500 shall have been declared in writing by the shipper upon delivery to
the Carrier and inserted in this bill of lading and extra freight paid if
required and in such case if the actual value of the goods per package * * *
shall exceed such declared value, the value shall nevertheless be deemed to be
the declared value and the Carrier’s liability, if any, shall not exceed the
declared value and any partia loss or damage shall be adjusted pro rata on the
basis of such declared valued.”

While it is apparent from the above that the carrier has expressly agreed
that in case of any loss or damage to the goods in question exceeding the sum of
$500.00 per package the extent of its liability shall be deemed to be merely
$500.00 per package, and not more, the Court of Appeals ruled out the above
stipulation, holding that the same is not binding upon the shipper. Its
reasoning follows: “Neither plaintiff nor any agent of his signed the bill of
lading; neither has agreed to the two clauses just recited. In fact, plaintiff
received the bill of lading only after, he had arrived at Manila. In this
posture and lifting from the decision of the Supreme Court in Mirasol
vs. Robert Dollar Co., 53 Phil., 124, 128, we hold that plaintiff ‘was
not legally bound by the clause which purports to limit defendants’ liability’
“. Petitioner now assigns this finding as an error.

We are inclined to agree to this contention. Firstly, we cannot but take note
of the following clause printed in red ink that appears on the very face of the
bill of lading: “in accepting this bill of lading the shipper, consignee and
owner of the goods agree to be bound by all its stipulations, exceptions, and
conditions whether written, printed, or stamped on the front or back hereof, any
local customs or privileges to the contrary notwithstanding.” This clause is
very revealing. It says that a shipper or consignee who accepts the bill of
lading becomes bound by all stipulations contained therein whether on the front
or back thereof. Respondent cannot elude its provisions simply because they
prejudice him and take advantage of those that are beneficial. Secondly, the
fact that respondent shipped his goods on board the ship of petitioner and paid
the corresponding freight thereon shows that he im-pliedly accepted the bill of
ladingwhich was issued in connection with the shipment in question, and so it
may be said that the same is binding upon him as if it has been actually signed
by him or by any other person in his behalf. This is more so where respondent is
both the shipper and the consignee of the goods in question. These circumstances
take this case out of our ruling in the Mirasol case (invoked by the Court of
Appeals) and places it within our doctrine in the case of Mendoza vs.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., (90 Phil., 836), where we said:

“* * * Later, as already said, he says that he was never a party to he
contract of transportation and was a complete stranger to it, that he is now
suing on a tort or a violation of his rights as stranger (culpa aquiliana). If
he does not invoke the contract of carriage entered into with the defendant
company, then he would ftsrdly have any leg to stand on. His right to prompt
delivery of the can of film at the Pili Air Port stems and is derived from the
contract of carriage under which contract, the PAL undertook to carry the can of
film safely and to deliver it to him promptly. Take away or ignore that contract
and the obligation to carry and to deliver the right to prompt delivery
disappear. Common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver
merchandise, and persons are not vested with the Tight to prompt delivery,
unless such common carriers previously assume the1′ obligation. Said rights and
obligations are created by a specific contract entered into by the parties.

* * * * * * *

“Here, the contract of carriage between the LVN Pictures Inc. and the
defendant carrier contains the stipulations of delivery to Mendoza as consignee.
His demand for the delivery of the can of film to him at the Pili Air Port may
be regarded as a notice of his acceptance of the stipulation of the delivery in
his favor contained in the contract of carriage, such demand being one for the
fulfillment of the contract of carriage and delivery. In this case he also made
himself a party to the contract, or at least has come to court to enforce it.
His cause of action must necessarily be founded on its breach.”

With regard to the contention tKat the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act should
also control this case, the same is of no moment. Article 1753^[1] provides that the law of the country to
which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common
carrier in case of loss, destruction or deterioration. This means the law of the
Philippines, or our new Civil Code. Under Article 1766, “In all matters not
regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be
governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws,” and here we have
provisions that govern said rights and obligations (Articles 1736, 1737, and
1738). Therefore, although Section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
states that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $ 500.00 pet
package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and
inserted in the bill of lading, said section is merely Wppletory to the
provisions of the Civil Code. In this respect, we agree to the opinion of the
Court of Appeals.

On the strength of the opinion we have above expressed, ¦sve are constrained
to rule that the liability of the carrier with regard to the damage of the goods
should only be limited to $500.00 contrary to the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals.

Wherefore, with the modification that petitioner shipping company should only
pay to respondent the sum of $500.00 as value of the goods damaged, the decision
appealed from should be affirmed in all other respects, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] New Civil Code.

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REYES, J.B.L., J.,

I concur specifically in view of the difference in requisites between Article
1744 and Article 1749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Judgment affirmed with modification.