MARIA SALUD ANGELES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO GUEVARA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This case had its origin in the Justice of the Peace Court of Bacolor,
Pampanga, where the herein plaintiff-appellee, on March 17, 1954, filed a
complaint alleging that she is the registered owner of Lot No. 828 of the
Cadastral Survey of Bacolor, together with the house of strong materials and
other improvements standing thereon, the same having been purchased by her on
February 4, 1954; and that she and her immediate predecessor-in-interest had
requested the defendant who resides and who has been residing therein to vacate
the premises but the said defendant unreasonably and illegally refused to leave.
Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that defendant be ejected from the premises and
ordered to pay her a monthly rent of P100.00 from February 4, 1954 until he
vacates, plus costs of suit.

Instead of answering, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that it states no cause of action and the Justice of the Peace Court
lacks jurisdiction to try the case, the question of ownership being
involved.

The motion to dismiss having been denied, the defendant filed his answer to
the complaint. After trial, judgment was rendered against the defendant ordering
him to vacate the premises and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P60.00 a month
until he vacates, plus costs.

The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance. In said court,
defendant again filed a motion to dismiss pressing on his objection to the
continuation of the proceedings on the same grounds as those stated in his
motion to dismiss filed in the inferior court. Upon denial of said motion, the
defendant filed an answer with counterclaim, practically denying all the
allegations in the complaint. As affirmative defenses, he alleged that the sale
of the house and lot to plaintiff was illegal and fictitious; that he has been
in the possession of the same properties for about ten years; that the reason
for his refusal to leave was that on November 23, 1958, he had entered into a
formal agreement with Alfredo Lacdao, judicial guardian of the minors who owned
the properties, for the purchase thereof, and on said day made a down payment of
P430.00 on condition that he would pay in full the agreed price of P5,000.00
within one year; that it was likewise agreed that in the event that the guardian
failed to secure court authority to sell the properties, ttien the amount of
P430.00 would be applied as monthly rental of the premises at the rate of
P30.00; that plaintiff was aware of this agreement; and that defendant having an
option to buy the properties did not recognize the plaintiff’s and her
predecessor’s alleged ownership thereof. The answer also stated tnat the
defendant would institute a separate civil action against the plaintiff, her
predecessor-in-interest and some other parties who have participated, connived
and conspired together to frustrate the sale of the lot and house to him. By way
of counterclaim, the defendant asked that plaintiffs be condemned to pay the
amount of P7,000.00, the cost of improvements introduced on the land, and
damages in the sum of P1,000.00.

In the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, the following
facts were established: Lot No. 828 of the Bacolor Cadastre and the house
standing thereon were originally owned by Felicisima Arceo, the late wife of
Alfredo Lacdao. During their marriage, these spouses begot three children. Upon
the death of Felicisima Arceo her estate, including the properties in question,
was settled in the Court of First Instance, and in a guardianship proceedings
commenced in June, 1953, Alfredo Lacdao was appointed guardian of the persons
and estate of their minor children. On October 9, 1953, the said Lacdao filed a
petition asking for authority to sell the disputed properties at a price of not
less than P5,000.00. The petition having been granted, Lacdao sold the
properties to Cosine Sawal on January 8, 1954, for the sum of P5,000.00. In
February of the same year, Cosme Sawal in turn sold the properties to Maria
Salud Angeles, the herein plaintiff-appellee, for the same amount of P5,000.00.
On the same day the corresponding certificate of title covering the said lot was
issued in her name. After the sale of the properties to Sawal, his counsel sent
a letter to defendant asking him to vacate the premises within a month, and
after the sale of said properties to the plaintiff-appellee, the latter’s
counsel also wrote the said defendant asking him to leave the premises on or
before the end of February, 1954 and charging him a rental of P100.00 a month.
The defendant, however, ignored both letters.

On the basis of the facts thus adduced, the Court of First Instance rendered
judgment declaring the plaintiff the exclusive owner of the parcel of land and
house referred to in the complaint and entitled to immediate possession thereof;
ordering the defendant to vacate the properties in question and to pay the
plaintiff the monthly rental of P60.00 from February 4, 1954, until he shall
have vacated the same, with costs against the defendant; and dismissing the
latter’s counterclaim. Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeals but that court certified the case to us on the ground that it involves a
question of jurisdiction.

We agree with the defendant-appellant that the Justice of the Peace Court had
no jurisdiction over the action, for it clearly appears in the pleadings filed
in both that court and the Court of First Instance that the main issue raised
therein relates to the plaintiff-appellee’s ownership of the properties in
dispute and that the question as to who is entitled to the possession thereof
depends upon the result of the inquiry into the latter’s title. The Court of
First Instance, therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, could
not pass upon the merits of the case. We believe, however, that the said court
could do so, as it apparently did, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
The rule is that “a case tried by an inferior court without jurisdiction over
the subject matter shall be dismissed on appeal by the Court of .First Instance.
But instead of dismissing the case the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction may try the case on the merits if the
parties therein filed their pleadings and go to trial without any objection to
such jurisdiction.” (Section 11, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court; italics
supplied.) The party relying on this objection must urge or press on his
defense; otherwise, if he filed his pleadings and presented evidence, he shall
be considered to have waived his objection to the exercise of the Court of First
Instance of its original jurisdiction. (See Bachrach Motor Co.
vs. Lejano, 105 Phil., 6; 56 Off. Gaz. [17], 3276; and” Aureo
vs. Aureo, 105 Phil., 77; 56 Off. Gaz. 6465.) In the case at bar, no
objection was ever made to that court exercising its original jurisdiction. It
is true that the defendant-appellant, upon perfecting his appeal from the
inferior court, immediately moved for dismissal of the case, but his motion was
predicated on the theory that if the Justice of the Peace Court has no
jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance as an appellate court has likewise no
authority to try the action on the merits. It will thus be seen that his
objection was directed against the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance.

Appellant also claims that the action filed by him against the herein
plaintiff-appellee in a separate case in the same court necessarily raises the
prejudicial question of ownership over the property in dispute and the Court of
First Instance should have suspended or held in abeyance the proceedings in the
instant case until after the termination of the other case. It clearly appears
that when he filed his answer before the Court of First Instance, the said
appellant was still contemplating to institute the alleged action which he
claims raises a prejudicial question. There is reason to believe that such an
action, if any, was intended merely to delay the present proceedings.

Sustaining as we do the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, we will
now go into the correctness of the findings of that court on the merits of the
case.

It is urged by the defendant-appellant that the amount of P60.00 fixed by the
trial court as the monthly rental of the premises is devoid of factual basis and
legal support. Plaintiff-appellee declared in testimony that she had been paying
the sum of P100.00 for rentals of a building in La Union where she used to house
her school of fashion which she planned to transfer to the lot and house in
dispute. According to her, had the defendant immediately vacated the premises
upon her request, she would not have been compelled to continue paying the said
monthly rental of P100.00. She had, moreover, fixed at P100.00 the rent for the
premises in one of the letters sent to the defendant-appellant requesting him to
vacate the premises. The defendant-appellant, on the other hand, claims that he
had been paying to the former owner only the amount of P30.00 as rental. On the
basis of the evidence thus presented, the lower court found the amount of P60.00
as the reasonable monthly rental for the premises. Under the circumstances, we
see no reason to alter the finding of the trial court as to what amount is “fair
and reasonable compensation” for the use and occupation of the said
properties.

Defendant-appellant’s suggestion that the lower court should have fixed the
term of the lease in his favor because he had been occupying the premises in
question for more than ten years is an entirely new issue and cannot be raised
for the first time at this stage of the proceedings.

As to the claim that the defendant-appellant should be reimbursed of the
expenses he incurred for the repairs made on the building and fence and for the
construction of pigeon houses on the premises, the evidence shows that the
alleged repairs and improvements, which do not appear to be necessary, were made
only during the trial, that is to say, after he was informed of the new owner
thereof and requests w«re made upon him to vacate. Being thus a possessor in bad
faith, he is governed by Article 549 of the new Civil Code, which provides:

“The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those
which the legitimate possessor could have received, and shall have a right only
to the expenses mentioned in paragraph X of article 546 and in article 443. The
expenses incurred in improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be
refunded to the possessor in bad faith; but he may remove the objects for which
such expenses have been incurred, provided that the things suffer no injury
thereby, and that the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying
the value they may have at the time he enters into possession.”

Lastly, we see no legal basis to hold the plaintiff-appellee liable for the
amount of P430.00 which the defendant allegedly paid to Alfredo Lacdao on
November 23, 1953, since the said plaintiff was not party to their transaction
and had no knowledge thereof.

Wherefore, with the understanding that the rights of the parties with respect
to the repairs and improvements shall be subject to the above-quoted provision
of the new Civil Code, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs
against the appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.