MATILDE GAERLAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. THE CITY COUNCIL OF BAGUIO AND HON. ALFONSO TABORA, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS, MAGDALENA…

This is an appeal^[1] from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Baguio (in Civil Case No. 667) declaring
Resolution No. 323 of the City Council, dated November 29, 1956, null and
void.

In a petition filed in said court, Matilde Gaerlan and 15 others, allegedly
the only persons considered by the Market Committee of Baguio City to
participate in the drawing of lots relative to the adjudication of 16 stalls in
the City’s new market building, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 323
of the City Council awarding, before and without the drawing of lots, Stalls
Nos. 16, 20, and 24 in the said new market building to Magdalena Caluza, Manuela
Petilla and Magdalena Caccam, respectively, claiming that said resolution was
enacted in violation of Republic Act No. 37 and Department of Finance Order No.
32.

After respondents City Council and City Mayor, as well as awardees Caluza,
Petilla and Caccam, who were allowed to intervene in the case, had filed their
separate answers, denying the allegations of the petition, the case was duly
heard.

On April 5, 1957, the court rendered judgment holding that the adjudication
of Stalls Nos. 16, 20, and 24 to in-tervenors, by means of the resolution in
question, violated Department Order No. 32, specifically section 10 thereof,
which makes mandatory the drawing of lots before market stalls may be
adjudicated to applicants. Consequently, Resolution No. 323 was declared null
and void and the Market Committee of Baguio ordered to hold a drawing of lots
for the said 3 stalls. Hence, the instant appeal by the respondent City Council
and the intervenors.

It is not controverted that from 1947 to 1954, inter-venors-appellants were
cloth-vendors occupying makeshift stalls in the “two old buildings behind
Alpatublan Building (Store Market building)”; and that they had to vacate the
premises to give way to the construction of the new market building, upon
requirements of the city authorities who, however, assured them that
preferential rights would be given to them in the awarding of stalls in the new
market building. (Exh. 1-Intervenors, dated May 14, 1954.) More than two years
later, or on November 8, 1956, and when the new building was about to be
completed, intervenors wrote the City authorities (Exh. 2-Intervenors) reminding
them of the assurance that the new stalls occupying the place of their old
“puestos” will be given to them (intervenors). And so, upon completion of the
new building, but before, the drawing of lots^[2] actually took place, the City Council of
Baguio passed a resolution which reads:

“RESOLUTION NUMBERED 323

“On motion of Vice-Mayor Bienvenido R. Yandoc, seconded by Mayor Alfonso
Tabora, it was

“Resolved: That in pursuance of the commitment of the City Mayor in his
letter of May 16, 1954, Mesdames Magdalena Caluza, Manuela Pctilla and Magdalena
Caccam be, as they are hereby allocated Stalls Nos. 16, 20 and 24, respectively,
in the new market building (Miscellaneous Souvenir Section), behind the Stone
Market Bldg., they being the former stall holders in the same area wow
occupied by the new building.

“Unanimously adopted.” (Italics supplied.)

This resolution was declared null and void by the court below as running
counter to the rules and regulations governing the lease of public market
stalls,^[3] specifically Section 10
thereof which provides:

“Sec. 10. Market Committee.-There is hereby created a Committee in
each city and municipality, to be designated as Market Committee, whose duty it
shall be to conduct the drawing of lots and opening of bids in connection with
the adjudication of vacant or newly created stalls or booths in the city or
municipal markets as prescribed in this Order, and to certify to the city
treasurer or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, the result thereof. * *
*.”

* * * * * * *.”

It is to be noted, however, that the aforementioned procedure, prescribed by
Department of Finance Order No 32, is observed only “in connection with the
adjudication of vacant or newly created stalls or booths“. Stalls Nos.
16, 20, and 24, on the other hand, can not be considered either as newly created
or vacant. They are not newly created because they merely replace the old
“puestos” as a result of the construction of the new market building in place of
the old. They are not vacant because, as stated before, intervenors-appellants
had, for several years, conducted their business in the same place, in makeshift
stalls in the “old buildings” replaced by the new edifice. The old or makeshift
stalls were disoccupied only to give way to the construction of the new
building, but not without their occupants first obtaining an assurance from the
city authorities that they would have preferential right to occupy the new
stalls. Hence, with the enactment of Resolution No. 323 alloting said stalls to
intervenors, the City Council did not actually make an award, in the sense that
said awardees received something new after losing their former privilege. They
were deprived of their old stalls not for any reason attributable to them, but
at the instance of the City. And neither could they be considered to have
abandoned their privilege because said occupants even made representations with
the City Council, before and after the termination of the work, to re-occupy
their old places. The resolution involved herein in effect merely allowed
intervenors to continue their enjoyment of such privilege which was momentarily
interrupted by the construction of the new building. Such action of the City
Council, which is not repugnant to any law, not even Department of Finance Order
No. 32^[4] invoked by appellees, is
certainly a valid exercise of its authority to regulate the use of city markets
(Sec. 2552-v, Revised Administrative Code).

We note in the Statement of Facts contained in appellants’ brief (p. 8), an
uncontradicted reference that herein appellees took part in the drawing
of lots of the remaining jnew vacant stalls (excepting those involved in this
case) subsequently held on March 11, 1957, and that since then, appellees
actually occupied the stalls respectively drawn in their favor. If this is so,
then no prejudice has been ! caused appellees by the adoption of the disputed
resolution.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed.

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^[1] Originally filed in the Court of
Appeals, the case was elevated to us, the questions raised in the appeal being
purely of law.

^[2] To determine which of the new
stalls would be awarded to each of the various applicants.

^[3] Department of Finance Order No.
32, dated Noveinber 29, 1946.

^[4] This Order is even of doubtful
applicability to the facts of the case at bar, there being no alien involved, in
view of the specific and sole purpose of Republic Act 37 (under which the Order
was issued)-,-ta grant preference of Filipino citizens in the lease of public
market stalls.