PASCUAL STA ANA, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. EULALIO MENLA, DEFENDANT. ARCADIO NARVADES AND DOMINGA NARVADES, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Hon.
Perfecto R. Palacio, presiding, ordering the reconstitution of the records of
the above-entitled case, and against another order for the issuance of the
decree of registration over the lands subject of this proceeding, in the name of
the oppositors Arcadio Narvades and Dominga Narvades.

On June 24, 1947, attorney for oppositor Eulalio Menla filed a petition for
reconstitution, alleging that the court records of the above-entitled case were
destroyed in or about March, 1945. Notice for the hearing of the above motion
was furnished the attorney for the applicant Pascual Sta. Ana, who thereupon
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution, on the following
ground: that the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. On
November 21, 1957, the court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the
records of the above-entitled case reconstituted upon (a) the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the trial; (b) the blue print plan, PSU 9624 and
96264 covering the land in question; and (c) the decision of the court dated
November 28, 1931. A motion to reconsider the order for reconstitution was
denied.

On March 26, 1958, counsel for the oppositors filed a motion, alleging that
the applicant had abandoned his right to the reimbursement of his expenses for
registration and praying that a decree for the registration of the land be
issued in the name of the oppositors. Opposition to this petition was again
filed by attorney for the applicant, on the ground that as the decision in the
case .became final 30 days after November 28, 1931, and the oppositors have
slept on their rights, their cause of action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations. The lower court overruled the objection and on May 14, 1958, it
ordered issuance of the decree of registration, of the parcels of land in the
name of the oppositors. A motion to reconsider the same having been denied, the
applicant has prosecuted this appeal.

In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that as the decision in
the registration case was rendered on November 28, 1931, it had become
unenforceable 15 years later, that is, at the time the petition for the
reconstitution of the records was presented on June 24, 1947. The above
contention is without merit. Act No. 3110, which governs the reconstitution of
lost or destroyed records, provides that records of judicial proceedings in the
office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance may be reconstituted
as soon as practicable, after the occurrence of any fire or other public
calamity resulting in the loss of all or part of the records of judicial
proceedings. (Sec. 1, Act 3110). The loss occurred during the Liberation of this
country in 1945, and the application for the reconstitution was made on June 24,
1947. It is apparent that the petition for reconstitution herein is not belated;
it must have taken some time before the oppositors-appellees, who asked for the
reconstitution, came to know of ,.the loss of the judicial records of the
registration case. Besides, in a resolution of this Court dated October 14,
1946, the period for the reconstitution of judicial records was extended to June
30, 1947. (42 Off. Gaz., No. 10, p. 2446) In any case such reconstitution was
also extended by the provisions of Republic Act No. 441 to June 7, 1951.

The second assignment of error is as follows:

“THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS
LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET
BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.”

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in
a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for. this theory is the provision in the Eules
of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion,
and after live years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonablo
time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceeding, the ownership by a person of
a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except
the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

The third assignment of error is as follows:

“THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF
REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES BASED ON A DECISION WHICH
HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY CASE ON A DECISION THAT HAS BEEN
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.”

We also find no merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the law
that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The
reason is what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment of error,
that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the
reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or
the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.

For the foregoing considerations the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the applicant-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J.,
Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.