THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROGER PERETE Y MANLAPAS, ET AL., ACCUSED. ROGER PERETE Y MANLAPAS, ACCUSED AND APPELLANT.

Roger Perete y Manlapas and Victorio Sajorda y Campus, for having killed a
co-prisoner in the Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, were charged with murder in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in an information as follows:

“That on or about the 25th day of March 1959, in the New Bilibid Prisons,
municipality of Muntinlupa, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with deadly
weapons to wit: sharp-pointed instruments, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Receval Langlangan, thereby
inflicting upon, the latter stab wounds on the different parts of his body which
caused his death instantaneously.

“The accused are quasi-recidivists having committed the abovementioned felony
while serving their respective sentences after having been convicted of final
judgment by competent courts.”

Arraigned on June 2, 1959, and assisted by counsel de oficio, Roger
Perete pleaded guilty while the other accused, Sajorda, entered a plea of mot
guilty. On the same day, the trial court rendered judgment as to appellant
Perete, convicting him of the crime as charged, the dispositive part of which
reads:

“Wherefore, the Court finds the accused Roger Perete y Manlapas guilty of
murder, penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and it appearing
that said accused is a quasi-recidivist, the Court, pursuant to Art. 160 of said
Code, hereby sentences him to the death penalty, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) with no subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-half of the
costs.”

The case is now before this Court on automatic review due to the penalty
imposed. Atty. Jose Hernando, counsel de oficio for this appeal, assigns
seven (7) errors, the salient burdens.of which are: (1) that the trial court
should have examined the evidence and/or heard witnesses, after which appellant
Perete should have been acquitted on reasonable doubt; (2) that there was no
treachery or evident premeditation, so that the crime was only homicide,
granting that appellant killed the victim; (3) that plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender should have been considered mitigating to homicide; (4) that the trial
court should have required evidence on the quasi-recidivism before appreciating
it.

It is well-settled that a plea of guilt, when formally entered on
arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even for a capital offense
without the introduction of further evidence, and that such plea admits all the
material allegations of the information, including the attendant circumstances
qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Yamson, et al., 109
Phil., 795; People vs. Ala, 109 Phil., 390; People vs. Salazar,
105 Phil., 1058; People vs. Santos, et al., 105 Phil., 40; People
vs. Acosta, 98 Phil., 642; 52 Off. Gaz., 1930). While.it may be the
better practice in serious cases, as the one at bar, to receive such additional
evidence as would sustain the conviction independently of the plea of guilt,
this depends on the sound discretion of the trial court, according1 to whether
it was satisfied that the plea of guilt was made with knowledge of its import
(People vs. Yamson, et al., supra; People vs. Acosta,
supra.) The record does not show that the trial court committed any abuse
of discretion in not requiring additional evidence. When appellant Perete was
arraigned on June 2, 1959, he was assisted by counsel de oficio. The
presumption is that said counsel regularly and faithfully discharged his
official functions, which included the duty of advising the accused as to the
meaning of his plea of guilt (People vs. Yamson, et al., supra. In
any case, accused or his counsel were never heard to complain, at the
arraignment, or in any time thereafter, in fact, not even after the death
sentence was imposed, that the plea of guilt was improvidently given without
understanding its significance. Indeed, the trial judge must have fully
satisfied himself that appellant Perete entered his plea of guilt with full
knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act, for the information was
read and a copy thereof delivered to said accused and his counsel before the
plea was entered. According to the trial judge appellant entered his plea
“spontaneously and voluntarily”. Nothing in the record justifies us to conclude
otherwise.

The record itself amply demonstrates that the plea of guilt was taken as a
calculated risk, to invite the mercy of the trial court in the face of what
portended to be overwhelming evidence for the prosecution. Both appellant Perete
and his co-accused, Sajorda, in their respective affidavits executed on the very
morning when prisoner Receval Lanlangan was found sprawled and dying in the
toilet of Dormitory-A, confessed to the macabre details of their heinous crime
(pp. 7-10, Record). According to their own version, they silently pounced on
Langlangan and stabbed him many times with their sharp-pointed instruments
inside the toilet of Dormitory-A. Their victim sustained no less than about 41
stabs on different parts of the body (Autopsy Report, pp. 3-4, Record). A few
minutes after, prison guard Deogracias Salvador and his companions, responding
to a call to bring out two prisoners, came upon appellant Perete and accused
Sajorda, holding sharp-pointed weapons, and who readily admitted having just
killed a prisoner (p. 6, Record). Perete and Sajorda were immediately brought to
the Officer of the Day, before whom they executed the affidavits already
mentioned.

Even viewing the case in the most favorable light, the death penalty cannot
be avoided. The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery, with the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and quasi-recidivism (Art.
160, Revised Penal Code), all alleged in the information which the accused
admitted by his plea. Conceding arguendo that not only plea of guilt but
voluntary surrender as well are present, these cannot alter the penalty of
death, since even without evident premeditation, quasi-recividisim, as a special
aggravating circumstance, raises the penalty to the maximum period of that
prescribed by law for the new crime committed. And we find the allegations in
the information pertaining to quasi-recidivisim sufficient, its essence being
that a person shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment for another crime before beginning the service of such sentence or
while serving the same. We find it unnecessary to discuss the other points
raised in counsel de oficio’s brief, which are clearly without merit.

Finding no error in the decision under review, the same is hereby affirmed.
With costs de oficio.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur.