EPIFANIO J. ALANO AND CECILIA PADING DE ALANO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS VS. CLARO CORTES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On April 6, 1953, the spouses Epifanio J. Alano and Cecilia Pading de Alano
executed a promissory note in! consideration of a loan of P65,000.00 they
obtained from Claro Cortes. As security for said loan, they mortgaged several
parcels of land owned by them situated in Bulacan empowering the mortgagee to
extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage. On January 29, 1954, Cortes foreclosed
the mortgage and the properties were sold to him at an auction, sale for the sum
of P15,000.00. Subsequently, Cortes filed ‘ a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the collection of the balance.

To avoid embarrassment caused by the filing of the complaint, the Alanos
requested Cortes to withdraw the same and increase the loan to P74,000.00. The
latter having acceded to said request, the former drew a new promissory note
wherein they promised to pay the above amount plus 12% interest on or before
July 21, 1954, and executed att the same time a deed of mortgage over the same
properties to secure payment of their indebtedness.

On January 5, 1955, Cortes obtained from the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan a
deed of sale of the lands mortgaged to him after consolidating his ownership
over the same, and registered the document with the register of deeds causing
the latter to issue new certificates of title in his name. This act prompted the
Alanos to institute a complaint on February 4, 1958 before the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Case No. 1652) praying, among others, for the cancellation
of the certificates of title issued to Cortes and the issuance of another in
their names. Before trial, however, the parties filed with the court a motion
for amicable settlement, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:

“The parties, assisted by their respective counsel, most respectfully
manifest that they agree to an amicable settlement of this case, subject to
approval by this Hon. Court, in accordance with the stipulations agreed upon at
the resumption of pretrial this morning, as follows:

“1. That plaintiffs shall pay unto defendant the total sum of One Hundred
Thirty One Thousand (P131,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, in full settlement
of any and all claims which defendant has or may have against plaintiffs under
the mortgages dated April 6, 1953 and March 22, 1954, mentioned in the
complaint;

“2. That for and in consideration of such settlement, defendant shall
reconvey unto plaintiffs the properties subject of the complaint, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-14492, T-14493, T-14494, T-14495, and
T-14496 (formerly Nos. T-8666, T-9763, T-8807, T-9610, and T-9637, respectively)
of the land records of Bulacan, free from any and all liens and encumbrances of
whatsoever kind and nature, and with warranty against adverse claims of third
parties howsoever arising;

“3.That the amount of P131,000.00 to be paid by plaintiffs as hereinabove
mentioned is understood to absorb and include payment of attorney’s fees for
defendant’s counsel, Atty. Jose C. Colayco, as well as payment of a claim of
Lina S. Cortes against plaintiffs for the sum of P4,500.00, representing value
of jewelries, so that defendant shall assume payment of these two minor items
for his own account;

Wherefore, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in
accordance with the foregoing stipulations, without pronouncement as to
costs.”

In conformity with the above amicable settlement, the trial court on July 29,
1958 rendered decision ordering “the parties to comply with the terms and
conditions therein set forth, without costs.” Plaintiffs having failed to pay
the above amount on September 2, 1958, defendant filed a motion asking the court
to fix a date on which they shall settle the same oh condition that upon their
failure to do so the complaint shall be considered dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs filed their opposition and the court, treating defendant’s motion as,
a motion for execution, issued a writ of execution on September 13, 1958. But
before receipt by plaintiffs of a copy of said order, defendant on September 15,
1958, filed a motion praying that an order be issued directing the sale at
public auction of the right of plaintiffs to pay the sum of P131,000.00 awarded
to him, but the court deferred consideration of said motion in order to give the
parties an opportunity to settle their differences.

On October 7,1958, defendant filed a second motion reiterating the prayer in
his motion of September 15, 1958. On October 13, 1958, the court issued an order
directing plaintiffs either to pay defendant or to deposit with the clerk of
court the amount of P131,000.00 within a period of 30 days from receipt of a
copy of the order failing in which their right over the properties will be
deemed forfeited thereby relieving defendant of his obligation to execute the
deed of reconveyance as ordered in the decision of July 29, 1958. Their motion
for reconsideration having been denied, plaintiffs appealed to this Court
contending that (1) the court a quo erred in amending the judgment
dated July 29, 1958, by fixing a term for the payment of plaintiffs’ obligation
and adding a forfeiture clause in favor of defendant; (2) the court a
quo erred in not requiring defendant to comply first with the judgment
before demanding plaintiffs’ performance; and (3) the court a quo erred
in not enforcing the judgment as it is without amendment.

There is no dispute that in the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties which was submitted to the trial court appellants bound themselves to
pay appellee the sum of P131,000.00 in full settlement of the dispute existing
between them and that the latter agreed to reconvey the lands in question.. It
is also clear that conformably with such agreement the court rendered decision
enjoining the parties to comply with its terms and conditions but because
neither the compromise agreement nor the court specified the time within which
they should make good their commitments, upon motion of appellee the court fixed
a period of 30 days within which appellants should pay the amount of P131,000.00
awarded to defendant. This we believe the court has power to do, firstly,
because the judgment being based on a compromise is immediately executory,^[1] and the obligations of the parties
demandable at once, »o that what the court did was merely to implement its
decision. Secondly, wttile no period was fixed in the amicable settlement it
does not follow that no period was intended by the parties, for it,is
preposterous to presume that when they entered into such agreement they intended
to leave the performance of their undertaking to the whim of either party
thereby frustrating the very purpose of the agreement. The court, therefore, was
justified in issuing the order in question, it being- a sjtep necessary to give
force and effect to¦ its decision (Section 6, Rule 124, Rules of Court; Article
1197, liew Civil Code; Barretto vs. The City of Manila,. 7 Phil., 416;
Concepcion vs. People, 74 Phil., 63; Yacapin vs. Neri, 40
Phil., 61, 67.)

As regards the forfeiture clause, we also believe that the same is justified.
It should be noted that appellants obliged themselves to pay appellee the sum of
P131,000.00 as a condition for the latter to reconvey the properties to them,
This is a reciprocal obligation which can only be enforced if one party is
willing- to do its share in the undertaking (Article 1169; Civil Code), and in
order that appellants may be induced to do their share which apparently they are
reluctant to undertake, the court found it necessary to include the forfeiture
clause in its decision. This the court can do under our rules (Section 6, Rule
in view of the supervening circumstances.

“Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a of execution
of the final judgment obtained by him within five years from its entry (section
443 of the Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been repeatedly held, and it is
now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been
rendered and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may
ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice
and the facts.” (De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil., 686; Ocampo
vs. Sanchez, 97 Phil., 472; 51 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 4542, 4548. Italics
supplied.)

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur, .

Paras, C.J., Conception and Reyes, JJ., concur in the
result.

Order affirmed.

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^[1] De los Reyes vs. De
Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505.