PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEE VS. JUANITO SOLON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Juanito Solon, a rig driver in the City of Cebu, was prosecuted and
convicted, first in the Municipal Court and on appeal, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and sentenced to pay a fine of one Peso (P1.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for violation of a city
ordinance^[1] requiring drivers of
animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure
emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways,
streets, plazas, parks or alleys of the City.

In this appeal, as well as in the lower courts, the accused-appellant assails
the legality of the ordinance under which he was convicted, as violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution, the same being discriminatory,
partial and oppressive in the sense that it does not equally apply to all owners
and possessors of animals, but its application is limited to owners and drivers
of vehicle-drawing animals.

The principle is well-recognized that the limited application of a statute,
either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which
it is to operate, does not necessarily violate the guaranty of “equal protection
of the laws.”^[2] It is sufficient, for
purposes of complying with this constitutional mandate, that the classification
be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. And, for the classification to be
considered reasonable, the same must be based on substantial distinction which
make real differences; must be germane to the purposes of the law; must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of
the class, under similar conditions.^[3]

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the ordinance in question, seeking
to eliminate animal wastes in the city streets and other public places, is a
measure designed to promote the health and well-being of the residents. It is so
stated in the ordinance. Admittedly, the same is directed only against
vehicle-drawing animals passing through said places and thoroughfares. But it
cannot be said that the classification is without reasonable basis.

The danger to the health of the inhabitants, posed by the animal discharges
littering the city streets and other public places, cannot be minimized.
Confronted with this unhealthy and unsightly situation, the Municipal Board of
the City of Cebu-passed the questioned legislation. As stated in the resolution
of the Board, this condition was principally brought about by the presence of
about 5,000 horses drawing rigs for hire, that ply the city streets day and
night which, in the course of their occupation, naturally make the objectional
discharges. Their stay in these public places must be more or less regular that
the Board estimated the wastes discharged by these animals and deposited therein
to be around 5,000 kilos a day. Appellant’s objection, however, is against the
application of the prohibition only to these vehicle-drawing animals and in not
extending its operation to those animals that, although not so utilized,
similarly pass through the same streets. It is possible that there may he
non-vehiele-drawing animals that also traverse these roads, but their number
must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to
the rig- drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the
community. There is, likewise, no proof that in its application, the ordinance
grants favors or imposes restrictions on certain owners of vehicle-drawing
animals which are not accorded or enforced on others. In the light of the above
considerations, we are convinced that the questioned ordinance does not violate
the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.

Appellant, likewise, contests the validity of the provision of Section 4 of
the ordinance insofar as it imposes, as penalty, the suspension of the rig
owner’s license, it being- alleged that the violation having been committed by
the driver, the inclusion of the rig owner in the penalty constitutes
deprivation of his property without due process of law. The allegation is
untenable.

In the first place, there is no basis for raising this question in the
instant case. It was never shown that appellant was not fie owner of the rig he
was driving at the time the violation was committed. On the other hand, if he is
not the owner, then there is no point in his raising the issue, because he is
not affected. The question, therefore, of whether the penalty of suspension may
be imposed upon the driver without including the owner of the rig as party
defendant, if the driver is not the owner of the rig, is of no moment in this
case. In the second place, the decision appealed from, rendered by the Court of
First Instance, does not impose the suspension of the driver’s and the
rig-owner’s licenses, although the Municipal Court included the same. This issue
is, therefore, academic.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

^[1] Ordinance No. 241 of the Municipal
Board of Cebu City, dated March 6, 1958.

^[2] II Cooley’s Constitutional
Limitations, pp. 824-825.

^[3] People vs. Vera, 65 Phil.
06; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil., 872: 42 Off. Gaz., 2847; see also
Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy. 90 Phil., 83.