PURA M. DE LA TORRE, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. VENANCIO TRINIDAD, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, dismissing appellant’s petition for mandamus to compel
respondents-appellees to “reinstate” her to her temporary position as
teacher-librarian of the Camarines Sur School of Arts and Trades, with
prayer for back salary and damages. The appeal was taken to the Court
of Appeals, but that court has certified the case to us on the ground
that the questions involved are purely legal.

The record
shows that appellant, a substitute teacher in the Camarines Sur School
of Arts and Trades since 1952, was, on January 27, 1955, appointed
temporary teacher-librarian in the same school, with salary at
P1,920.00 per annum.

Having been found to be suffering from
moderately advanced pulmonary tuberculosis, she was forced to go on
sick leave effective January 5, 1955. On December 15, 1955, the
terminal date of her leave, she applied for “reinstatement” and
submitted a statement from the provincial health officer of the
Camarines Sur that she could be allowed to resume her work in the
school. Upon receipt of her application, the superintendent of the
school, Manuel T. Espinosa, referred it to the Director of Public
Schools, with the statement that he is not in favor of appellant’s
reinstatement as she had been found “to be very inefficient and
negligent” in her duties, thereby causing “losses of library properties
amounting to about P1,000.00.” The Acting Second Assistant Director of
the Bureau of Public Schools, in turn, informed the superintendent that
appellant is “eligible for reinstatement on December 15, 1955, the date
on which she applied for reinstatement,” but at the same time advised
that in connection with the loss of library properties, “she be
required to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary
action should be taken against her.” Complying with the directive, but
taking no action on the matter of the reinstatement, Superintendent
Espinosa required appellant to explain within 72 hours from receipt of
his letter why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken
against her for the loss of library properties under her
responsibility. In her letter dated April 5, 1955, appellant denied
having been inefficient or negligent and disclaimed “knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the loss of
more than P1,000.00 worth of books as reported by the Audit Clerk of
that school.” The matter was then referred to the Audit Clerk, who,
after conducting an investigation and physical inventory of the losses,
submitted a written report to the superintendent, certifying to the
aggregate shortage of library books amounting to P1,994.36. This
report, together with all the papers pertinent to the case, was
forwarded by the superintendent to the Director of Public Schools, with
the recommendation that appellant be required to pay all the losses and
that she be dealt with administratively for her negligence and
inefficiency. Superintendent Espinosa also reiterated his
recommendation that appellant be not allowed to return to the service.

In the meantime, appellant was pressing for her re-admission. She went
to see Superintendent Espinosa in his office three times, and failing
to secure favorable action from him, she appealed directly to the
Director of Public Schools in a communication dated May 17, 1956. Not
having received any answer, she again wrote to Superintendent Espinosa
on June 5, 1956, requesting information on the status of her
application. In a letter dated June 14, 1956, the said superintendent
replied that action could not yet be taken on her application because
of the administrative charge against her and, moreover, the final
decision has to be made not by him but by the Director of Public
Schools.

Alleging that she has been unlawfully excluded from
the use and enjoyment of an office to which she is legally entitled,
appellant, on June 12, 1956, filed the present petition for mandamus
against Superintendent Espinosa and the Director of Public Schools to
compel them to reinstate her, with prayer for payment of her salary
from December 15, 1955 until actual reinstatement, plus moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

Answering the
petition, the respondents allege that appellant’s appointment being
temporary in character the same conferred no permanent civil service
status as would entitle her to invoke the provisions of law on security
of tenure, and that their refusal to readmit her is justified because
of her poor health and inefficiency and negligence.

After
trial, the lower court, holding that under Sec. 682 of the Revised
Administrative Code, appellant’s appointment had already expired at the
end of the first semester of the school year 1954-55, rendered a
decision dated January 30, 1957, dismissing the petition. From that
decision, appellant took the present appeal.

The appeal is without merit.

Appellant’s appointment as temporary teacher-librarian was made “in the
absence of Teacher Civil Service eligibles” as authorized by section
682 of the Revised Administrative Code. That section, insofar as
pertinent to this case, reads:

“Sec. 682. Temporary and emergency employees.—Temporary
appointment without examination and certification by the Commissioner
of Civil Service or his local representative shall not be made to a
competitive position in any case, except when the public interests so
require, and then only upon the prior authorization of the Commissioner
of Civil Service; * * * Provided, that in the case of teachers such
temporary appointment may toe authorized to continue for a period not
exceeding one school semester, or until eligibles who meet the desired
qualifications are certified for employment, but not sooner than the
beginning of a school semester. * * *.”

It
is appellant’s contention that under her appointment and by virtue of
the above provisions she is entitled to continue in the service until
eligibles are certified for employment by the Commissioner of Civil
Service.

In the light of the view we have taken of the case,
we do not think it necessary to pass upon the above question raised by
appellant. It is not disputed that appellant’s appointment is temporary
in nature and, therefore, can be terminated at pleasure by the
appointing power (in this case the Director of Public Schools). Well
settled is the rule that one who holds a temporary appointment has no
fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the
pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the
termination is for cause. (U.P. et al., vs. CIR et al., 107 Phil., 848; 58 Off. Gaz. (8) 1536 and cases cited therein; see also Quitiquit vs.
Villacorta 107 Phil., 1060; 58 Off. Gaz. (10) 1967. Even assuming,
therefore, that appellant is authorized, to hold her temporary position
until replaced by an eligible in disregard of the time limitation of
one school semester, it is apparent that she has no clear and valid.
claim to the office to which she seeks to be readmitted, especially
since an administrative case against her is still pending action by the
Director of Public Schools. Consequently, mandamus will not lie to
compel the respondents-appellees to readmit her.

Moreover,
it does not appear that appellant has exhausted all administrative
remedies before filing her present petition for mandamus. She could
have waited for the action on her letter by the respondent Director of
Public Schools and if the latter’s action had been unfavorable, she
could still have appealed to the Secretary of Education. No recourse to
courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been,
exhausted and special civil actions against administrative officers
should not be entertained if superior administrative officers could
grant relief.

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the
court below dismissing appellant’s petition for mandamus is hereby
affirmed, with costs against said appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Barrera, JJ., concur.