[WITH RESOLUTION OF JULY 14, 1960]

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming that of the Court of First Instance, which ordered defendant
Mapua Institute of Technology to reinstate plaintiff Marcelino S.
Manalo to his position as professor in said school to pay him the sum
of P6,000 for every school year from the school year 1955-1956 until he
shall have been finally reinstated; to pay him attorney’s fees in the
sum of P1,800, and pay him his costs.

The record discloses
that plaintiff Marcelino S. Manalo was taken in as instructor in
College Physics in the Mapua Institute of Technology on August 1, 1947,
without any definite period and without any written contract of
employment. He taught continuously until the school year 1955-1956, at
which year his annual salary had reached P6,000. However, before the
opening of classes in June, 1956, the registrar of the school, upon
orders of the President, informed him that his services were no longer
needed. Plaintiff appealed to the school authorities to intercede for
him, but to no avail, so he sought redress in court. The Court of First
Instance found that plaintiff was dismissed without any justifiable
cause, and rendered the judgment mentioned above. Not satisfied with
said judgment, defendant entity appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals found that plaintiff, upon noticing that his name
was not included in the list of faculty members in the school
prospectus for the year 1956-1957, approached Mr. Tomas Mapua, the
school president, to find out the reason for such omission. Mr. Mapua
then called his attention to the charges brought against the school
librarian, Mrs. Constancia de Jesus, by plaintiff’s aunt-in-law, Mrs.
Esperanza Llanes-Santos, and intimated to plaintiff that the latter
suggest to his aunt that she withdraw the charges. Plaintiff said he
knew nothing about said charges, but promised to take steps to comply
with the request of Mr. Tomas Mapua. However, plaintiff’s mission was
unsuccessful, and for this reason he was dropped from the faculty of
the Mapua Institute of Technology.

Defendant entity claims
that the reason for plaintiff’s dismissal is its having lost confidence
in him for having committed a serious breach of professional ethics, in
that instead of returning the library card of a student of the school,
which had come into his possession, he furnished it to the committee
that was investigating the charges against the school librarian; and
for having furnished a copy of the prospectus of the school to said
committee and the name of one of defendant’s employees who was later on
subpoenaed to testify by the committee.

Plaintiff denied the
above charges. He admits having given the name of a member of the
library staff of Mapua, but claims that he did not know the purpose of
the person who had asked it of him. As regards his having furnished the
committee with a copy of the school’s prospectus for the year
1956-1957, it is of common knowledge that school prospectus are for
distribution to the public, and therefore, as the Court of Appeals
rightly observed, his act may not be considered as a breach of
professional ethics.

So the Court of Appeals found that the
real cause for plaintiff’s dismissal was his failure to convince his
aunt to drop the charges against the school librarian. Said Court
considered the dismissal without any justifiable cause and without
notice, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
Defendant now petitions this Court to review the ruling of the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioner assigns only one error, which is:

“The
Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reinstatement of the
respondent-appellee Marcelino S. Manalo and the payment of his back
wages on the ground that he was dismissed without justifiable cause and
without notice, in violation of Republic Act No. 1052.”

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1052, as well as the case of Yu Ki Lam,
et al. vs. Micaller, et al., 99 Phil., 902; 52 Off. Gaz. (14)
6146. Petitioner does not dispute the finding of the Court of Appeals
that respondent was dismissed without justifiable cause, but claims
that under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052, he should only have
been made to pay respondent one month’s salary in lieu of lack of
notice to terminate his services, instead of being ordered to reinstate
him to his former teaching position with back wages. He further
contends that in the Micaller case, the petitioners therein were
required to reinstate respondent because the former were found guilty
of unfair labor practice, whereas the case at bar does not involve any
unfair practice, but is a dismissal with failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 1052.

Respondent, on the
other hand, claims that Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1787, does not apply, because the Mapua Institute of Technology
is not a commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise, and that,
besides, Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes the employer, under some
conditions, to terminate relationship with his employees, when the
dismissal is not prohibited by law. In this case, respondent argues,
petitioner has committed an act constituting unfair labor practice, and
he may not, therefore, invoke the said legal provision. We find both
contentions to be without merit.

Without deciding whether a
college or university, like the petitioner Mapua Institute of
Technology, is an industry which falls under the provisions of the
Industrial Peace Act (Rep. Act No. 875), we hold that the act of the
petitioner in discharging the respondent, even if made without just
cause, cannot be considered as an unfair labor practice. Unfair labor
practices on the part of employers are defined in Section 4 (a) of
Republic Act No. 875, and refer particularly to interference with,
restraint or coercion of employees, in the exercise of the right to
organize into labor organizations, or to prevent them from joining
labor organizations, to discriminate against them in regard to hire or
tenure of employment, to discourage membership in any labor
organizations, etc.

The next and more important issue is
whether the dismissal of the respondent by the petitioner may be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1787. Respondent claims that the said act does not
apply in the case at bar because the petitioner is not a commercial,
industrial or agricultural enterprise, whereas the petitioner argues
that the said law should apply. It must be remembered that cases
decided by our courts requiring the reinstatement of dismissed
employees, have occurred in the government service where the Philippine
Civil Service guarantees a tenure of office or permanency of
employment. But no such tenure or permanency in office can be claimed
on behalf of professors or teachers of private schools, colleges or
universities. Their employment is not an official or governmental one
and must be .subject to the ordinary rules of contract. So the question
to be resolved is reduced to this: When there is no specific contract
between a school, college or university and a teacher or professor
therein as to the period of employment, what law or rule should apply?

Under the Civil Code, there is no provision governing the relative
rights of a teacher or professor, and those of the school, college or
university that wants to dispense with the services of the former.
There was a provision in the Code of Commerce (Art. 302) which grants
employees dismissed from their positions a salary for a period of one
month, or separation pay known as “mesada.” But upon the repeal of this
provision by the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Congress of the
Philippines sought to fill the void created by such repeal by the
enactment of Republic No. 1052, which has been superseded by Republic
Act No. 1787, and which reads as follows:

“Section
1. In. cases of employment, without a definite period, in a commercial,
industrial, or agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer
or the employee may terminate at any time the employment with just
cause; or without just cause in the case of an employee by serving
written notice on the employer at least one month in advance or
one-half month for every year of service of the employee, whichever is
longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole
year.

“The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in
case of termination of employment without just cause may hold the
employer liable for damages.

“The employee, upon whom no
such notice was served in case of termination of employment without
just cause shall be entitled to compensation from the date of
termination of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries
or wages corresponding to the required period of notice.”

Without declaring that a private college or university like the Mapua
Institute of Technology is a commercial, industrial, or agricultural
establishment, we believe that there being no special law governing the
dismissal or separation of professors from colleges and universities,
the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act No.
1787, should be made to apply. Authority for such a course of action is
78 Corpus Juris Secundum 617, which says:

“Contracts
between private schools and teachers or other instructors are governed,
in general, by the rules applicable to other contracts of employment.”

An additional reason for applying Republic Act No. 1052, as amended, is
the fact that the petitioner herein is not a non-profit institution, so
that we presume that the element of gain may have been at least a
secondary, although not the principal purpose of the institution. We
are supported in this belief and conclusion by the fact that the
petitioner itself has invoked in its favor the provisions of said
Republic Act No. 1052, perhaps considering itself to be a commercial
establishment.

Respondent’s counsel cites in the latter’s favor the case of Yu Ki Lam, et al., vs.
Micaller, et al., 99 Phil., 902; 52 Off. Gaz. (14) 6146. We have,
however, revoked the principle contained in that case in the cases of
Gutierrez vs. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 105 Phil., 9 and in the case of Monteverde vs. Casino Español, 103 Phil., 377; 55 Off. Gaz. (16) 2888, wherein we said:

“But
we agree with the trial court that, even if there were no cause for
separation, defendant can still separate appellant from the service
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052. Section 1 of this Act
provides that ‘In case of employment, without a definite period, in a
commercial, industrial or agricultural establishment or enterprise,
neither the employer nor the employee shall terminate the employment
without serving notice on the other at least one month in advance.’ In
other words, as long as that notice is given, the relation may be
terminated. In the present case defendant has complied with this
requirement when, in lieu of that notice, it paid an amount equivalent
to one month salary to appellant.”

The
other cases cited by counsel for respondent are clearly beyond the
issue and have no bearing to the case at bar.

We, therefore,
come to the conclusion that the provisions of Republic Act No. 1052, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1787, should govern the case at bar. In
accordance therewith, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed, and respondent considered separated from the service.
However, he should be given a separation pay in an amount equivalent to
his salaries or wages corresponding to the required period of notice.
Respondent having been employed by petitioner for a period of nine
years, he is entitled to five months notice before his services in the
school may be terminated. As the evidence submitted in the trial court
shows that when respondent’s services were actually dispensed with, he
was receiving an annual salary of P6,000, or a monthly salary of P500,
lie should be given a compensation of P2,500. Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.

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R E S O L U T I O N

July 14, 1960

LABRADOR, J.:

Counsel for petitioner has filed a motion to reconsider the decision on
the ground that the respondent was separated from the service of the
petitioner in April, 1956, for which reason Republic Act No. 1052,
before its amendment by Republic Act No. 1787, should be applied and
respondent declared entitled only to one month’s pay. Republic Act No.
1052 is substantially the same as the amendatory act, so our decision
still holds, except as to the amount of the mesada. We find that the motion is well founded and we hereby modify the dispositive part of the decision to read as follows:

“We,
therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1052 should govern the case. In accordance therewith the decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and respondent considered
legally separated from the service as of the end of April, 1956. He is
hereby declared entitled to receive one month’s pay or P500, and
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the said sum to respondent. Without
costs.” So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.