G.R. No. 14457. June 30, 1961
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. OTIAK OMAL (ACCUSED). LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC., SURETY AND APPELLEE.
DIZON, J.:
Justice of the Peace Court of Datu Piang, Cotabato (Criminal Case 2175). The
preliminary investigation having been waived, the case was elevated to the Court
of First Instance of Cotabato where the bail bond fixed for Omal’s provisional
liberty was reduced from P24,000 to P10,000. Upon the filing by appellee Luzon
Surety Company, Inc. of the bail bond in this amount and its approval by the
court, Omal was released.
On August 10, 1956 Omal was arrested anew because he was charged with rape in
Criminal Case No. 2627 of the same court. On August 23 of the same year he was
placed “under the custody of the governor * * * pending a proposal of amicable
settlement, the case being private” according to an entry appearing on page 71
of the Provincial Jail Blotter.
On December 12, 1956 Datu Udtog, the Governor of the province, ordered one of
his men named Candado and the Chief of Police of Cotabato to bring Omal home
because he was reported causing trouble in a certain place. Omal was last seen
walking towards the Governor’s place with the Iatter’s emissaries, and
thereafter he disappeared. It was only on December 20, 1957 that appellee filed
an ex-parte motion for the withdrawal of the bail bond mentioned
heretofore and it further prayed that it be relieved of responsibility in
connection, therewith, alleging, as ground, therefor, that it had exerted
efforts to find Omal but was unable to locate and apprehend him; that
considering the gravity of the charges Omal was facing, appellee had “reasons to
believe that (our) efforts to find him will eventually prove fruitless; that had
the Provincial Warden and Provincial Governor performed their duties well in
connection with the custody of Omal, appellee would not have any difficulty in
surrendering him to the court”.
The State opposed the motion on the ground that appellee did not ask for the
cancellation of the bond when Omal was rearrested in connection with the charge
for rape filed against him, but did so only after he had disappeared on December
12, 1956. It was, therefor, argued that appellee had chosen to continue with its
liability under the bond and should be held accountable for the accused who
escaped after his rearrest.
After appellee had presented evidence in support of its motion, the lower
court issued the appealed order cancelling the bail bond. Hence this appeal by
the State.
In People vs. De la Cruz, 93 Phil., 487; 49 Off. Gaz., [8] 3389, we
held, among other things, that the surety’s right, duties and liabilities after
the prisoner is, for another offense, arrested and then escapes and/or absconds,
must be controlled by statutory provisions other than those of section 16, Rule
110, Rules of Court, or by the General principles of contract. In consonance
with this principle it was held in U.S. vs. Bunuan, 22 Phil., 1: U. S.
vs. Sunico, 40 Phil., 826, 832, that bail will be exonerated where the
performance of its condition is rendered impossible by act of God, the act of
the obligee, or the act of law.
In ordering the cancellation of the bail bond in question the lower court
apparently was of the opinion that appellees’ inability to produce the person of
Omal was due to the negligence or irregular conduct of the Provincial Warden and
of the Provincial Governor of Cotabato, which facilitated the escape of the
prisoner. While this may be true, we do not believe it is sufficient to justify
the cancellation of the bail bond.
It is well settled that a surety is the jailer of the accused and is
responsible for the letter’s custody. Therefore, it is not merely his right but
his obligation to keep the accused at all times under his surveillance,
considering that his authority emanating from his character as surety is no more
nor less than the Government’s authority to hold the accused under preventive
imprisonment (People vs. Tuising, 61 Phil., 404). The surety being in
legal contemplation the jailer of the accused, appellee in this case should not
have allowed the irregular conduct of the Warden and the Provincial Governor to
go on for a considerable time until it ended in the escape of the prisoner. It
is, therefore, equally chargeable with negligence in this connection.
Even when a surety’s performance of the bond is rendered impossible by the
act of God, or of the obligee, or of the law, it is the surety’s duty to inform
the court of the happening of the event so that it may take action or decree the
discharge of the surety. In the present case the surely took no such steps when
Omal was rearrested, nor did it ask for the cancellation of the bail bond until
after Omal’s escape or disappearance. In a case quite similar to the present we
held:
“The only question to be determined is whether, while the accused was out on
bail, was picked up by the constabulary authorities in the province for
questioning in connection with subversive activities, and thereafter escaped
from their custody, will excuse the surety, the Rizal Surety & Insurance
Company, from the non-performance of its obligation under the bond.“It is a well-settled doctrine that a surety is the jailer of the accused.
‘He takes charge of, and absolutely becomes responsible for. the latter’s
custody, and under such circumstance, it is incumbent upon him, or rather, it is
his inevitable obligation, not merely a right, to keep the accused at all times
under his surveillance inasmuch as the authority emanating from his character as
surety is no more nor less than the Government’s authority to hold the said
accused under preventive imprisonment.” (People vs. Tuising, 61 Phil.
404).“When the surety in this case put up the bond for the provisional liberty of
the accused it became his jailer and as such was at all times charged with the
duly to keep him under its surveillance. This duty continues until the bond is
cancelled, or the surety is discharged. The procedure for the discharge of a
surety is clear in the Rules of Court. Thus, it is there provided that the bail
bond shall be cancelled and the sureties discharged of liability (a) where the
sureties so request upon surrender of the defendant to the court; (b) where the
defendant is re-arrested or ordered into custody on the same charge or for the
same offense; (c) where the defendant is discharged by the court at any stage of
the proceedings, or acquitted, or is convicted and surrendered to serve the
sentence; and (d) where the defendant dies during the pendency of the action.
(Section 16, Rule 110)“It is true that a surety may also be discharged from the non-performance of
the bond when its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the act
of the obligee, or the act of the law (U.S. vs. Sunico, 40 Phil.
826-832), but even in these cases there still remains the duty of the surety to
inform the court of the happening of the event so that it may take appropriate
action and decree the discharge of the surety (Sec. 16, Rule 110). Here no such
step was taken by the surety when the accused was re-arrested by the
constabulary authorities. The surety kept silent since it did not take any of
the steps pointed out by law if it wanted to be relieved from its liability
under the bond. It only gave notice to the court of that fact when the court
ordered the appearance of the accused either for arraignment or for trial. It
was only then that it informed the court that the accused was re-arrested and
that while he was detained, he made good his escape. Since at that time his bond
was still valid and binding, and notwithstanding the re-arrest of the accused
the surety kept silent, it must be presumed that the surety chose to continue
with its liability under the bond and should be held accountable for what may
later happen to the accused. It has been held that “The subsequent arrest of the
principal on another charge, or in other proceedings, while he is out on bail
does not operate ipso facto as a discharge of his bail * * *. Thus, if,
while in custody on another charge, he escape, or is again discharged on bail,
and is a free man when called upon his recognizance to appear, his, bail are
bound to produce him. (6 C. J. p. 1026.)“This case should be distinguished from the recent case of people
vs. Mamerto de la Cruz, 93 Phil., 487., 49; Off. Gaz., 3389, wherein
this Court said: ‘It has been seen that if the sureties did not bring the person
of the accused to court, which they were powerless to do due to causes brought
about by the Government itself, they did the next best thing by informing the
court of the prisoner’s arrest and confinement in another province and impliedly
asking that they be discharged. On its part, the court, by keeping quiet, and
indeed, issuing notices of the hearings direct to the prisoner through the
Sheriff of Camarines Norte and ignoring the surety, impliedly acquiesced in the
latter’s request and appeared to have regarded the accused surrendered. No such
step was taken by the surety in this particular case for it failed to inform the
court of the apprehension made of the accused by the constabulary authorities.”
(People vs. Lee Diet, 94 Phil., 31).
Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show that appellee
had exerted all possible efforts in the premises to arrest or cause the arrest
of Omal. That it was not impossible to rearrest him is, in fact, shown by the
circumstance that on November 28, 1958 , he surrendered to the Provincial
Government of Cotabato and was forthwith committed to and confined at the
provincial jail of said province (see appellee’s petition for the dismissal of
this appeal, dated February 2, 1959 ). While the petition just referred to was
denied by this Court, the denial should be understood as without prejudice to
appellee filing with the lower court, after the remanding of this case below, a
motion for the cancellation of its bail bond if at that time Omal is still in
custody of the proper authorities.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, with
costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.