MARCELINO BUYCO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO BRANCH, ILOILO CITY, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Mandamus case filed by petitioner Marcelino Buyco praying that the Respondent
Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept his backpay acknowledgment
certificate No. 4801, as payment of his obligation with said respondent.

The case was submitted on an agreed stipulation of facts, with the pertinent
documents as annexes.

On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in
the amount of P5,102.90 plus interest thereon, which represented petitioner’s
deficit on his 1952-53 crop loan with respondent bank. The said loan was secured
by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment
Certificate No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955 , under Rep. Act No. 897 in the amount
of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years. On April 24, 1956, petitioner
offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan for the above
mentioned crop year 1952-53 with his said backpay acknowledgment certificate,
but on July 18, 1956, respondent answered petitioner that since respondent’s
motion for reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B. Florentino vs.
Philippine National Bank (98 Phil., 959; 52 Off. Gaz., [5] 2522) was still under
consideration by this Court (S. C.), respondent “cannot yet grant” petitioner’s
request (Annex A, amended petition). On February 15, 1957 , and after this Court
has denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration in said case No. L-8782,
petitioner, again wrote respondent, reiterating his request to pay the
obligation with said certificate (Annex B). On February 19, 1957 , respondent
answered petitioner that in view of the amendment of its charter on June 16,
1956 by R. A. No. 1576, it could not accept petitioners’ certificate (Annex C).
Petitioner requested respondent to reconsider its decision, in a letter dated
March 26, 1957 (Annex D), which was referred to the respondent’s Legal
Department. In an opinion rendered on April 23, 1957 , said department expressed
the view that notwithstanding the decision of this Court, the respondent could
not accept the certificate because of the amendment of its Charter heretofore
mentioned.

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on July 24, 1958, granted the petition
and ordered the respondent bank “to give due course of the vested right of the
petitioner acquired previous to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1576 by
accepting his backpay acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of
the petitioner with respondent Bank with costs of the proceedings against
respondent”. Hence, this appeal by the respondent Bank.

In spousing the cause of the petitioner-appellee, the trial court made the
following findings and conclusions:

(1) That in the letter Annex A, dated July 18, 1956, the respondent has
impliedly admitted the right of petitioner to apply or offer his
certificate in payment of his obligation to respondent.

(2) That the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Florentino
case filed by respondent-appellant, did not affect the petitioner’s vested right
already created and acquired at the time he offered to pay his obligation with
his certificate on April 24, 1956, and before the passage of Rep. Act No.
1576.

(3) That Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of the petitioner to
pay his obligation with his backpay certificate.

(4) That the writ of mandamus would lie against the
appellant.

The above findings and conclusions are assigned as errors, alleged to have
been committed by the trial court.

In the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Florentino case, the
respondent Philippine National Bank therein, was declared authorized to accept
backpay acknowledgement certificate as payment of the obligation of any holder
thereof. Although the Florentino case was promulgated on April 28, 1956, four
(4) days after April 24, 1956, the date the appellee offered to pay with his
backpay acknowledgment certificate, it is nevertheless obvious that on or before
said April 24, 1956, the right to have his certificate applied for the payment
of his obligation with the appellant already existed by virtue of Republic Act
No. 897, which was merely construed and clarified by this Court in the said
Florentino case. So that when the appellant in its letter of July 18, 1956,
replied that “in the meantime that our motion for reconsideration of the said
decision is still pending the resolution of the Supreme Court, we regret to
advise that we cannot yet grant your request”, the said appellant already knew
or should have known that a right was vested, only that its enforcement had to
wait the resolution of this Court which it handed on February 15,1957, by
maintaining its decision; A vested right or a vested interest may be held to
mean some right or interest fn property that has become fixed or established,
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham vs. Great Falls
Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808, 810, citing Evan-Snider-Buel
Co. vs. Mc Fadden, 10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L. R. A. 900). Considering
the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case, we agree with the lower court
that the appellant herein had impliedly admitted the right of the petitioner to
apply his backpay certificate in payment of his obligation. This
notwithstanding, whether implied or expressed, the admission by the appellant of
appellee’s right, has already lost momentum or importance, because the law on
the matter on April 24, 1956, when the offer to pay the obligation with the
certificate was made, or the law before the amendatory Act of June 16, 1956, was
the PNB was compelled to receive petitioner’s backpay certificate.

Section 9-A of Republic Act No. 1576, passed on June 16, 1956, amending the
Charter of the respondent-appellant bank, provides:

“The Board of Directors shall have the power and authority:

“* * * (d) In its discretion, to accept assignment of payments,
certificates of indebtedness of the government or other such similar securities:
Provided, however, that the authority herein granted shall not be used as
regards backpay certificates.”

What would be the effect of this law upon the case at bar? “Laws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided” (Art. 4, New Civil
Code). It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive
effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions (Lopez, et al. vs. Crow. 40 Phil., 997, 1007); that all
statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the
purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that
every case of doubt must be resolved against retroactive effect (Montilla
vs. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil., 220). These principles also apply to
amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision
regarding its retroactive nor such may be implied from its language. It simply
states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore has no
retroactive effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the
time the offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is
amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights
that had accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild vs. U. S. 91 Fed.
297; Hathaway vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 99 F. 534).

It is true that “acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity” (Art 5, New Civil Code). It should be recalled, however, that since
the prohibitive amendment of the appellant’s charter should not be given
retroactive effect; and that the law, at the time appellee made his offer,
allowed, in fact compelled, the respondent bank to accept the appellee’s
certificate, the above provision finds no application herein.

In view hereof, mandamus is the proper remedy (Florentino case,
supra, and the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs
against the respondent-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.