G.R. No. 13899. September 29, 1961
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PABLO BLAZA AND FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, DEFENDANTS. FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
PADILLA, J.:
Ellen were charged with the crime of kidnapping Dorotea Fernandez, Fe
Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez on 23 April 1953, for the purpose
of extorting ransom from them, defined and penalized under the
provisions of article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 18 (crim. case No. SC-161). Their alleged confederates
are those named defendants in crim. case No. SC-120 of the same court,
to wit: Lope Cunanan alias Perla, Ruperto Esquillo aliases Sergio and Alex, Reymundo Abesamis aliases Rading, Reddy, Mike, Manding, Uto, Ben, Pepe and North.[1] Upon arraignment the defendants Blaza and Mangulabnan, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
On 5 November 1957 the defendant Mangulabnan by counsel de parte,
attorney Emilia C. Saturnino, filed a motion to quash the information
against him, claiming that he is one of the defendants in crim. case
No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, People vs.
Guillermo Paguinto et al., for “the complex crime of Rebellion with
Multiple Murders, Robberies, Arsons and Kidnappings, ” on 27 counts of
atrocities allegedly committed on different dates in the provinces of
Pampanga, Pangasinan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Laguna (Exhibits
1 & 1-A); that in criminal case No. 15909 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, People vs. Apolinar Oracion et al., for
rebellion complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, rape and
kidnapping, the kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and
Buenaventura Fernandez on 25 April 1957 (for which the defendant
Mangulabnan was separately charged in crim. case No. SC-161) was for
the purpose of raising funds for the HMB organization and a necessary
means of committing the crime of rebellion (Annex B to motion to
quash); that on 17 December 1956 the said court, rendering judgment in
the latter case, held that “such act was in furtherance and a mere
ingredient of the offense of rebellion” and “cannot be punished
separately from the latter (rebellion) or complexed with it” (Annex C
to motion to quash); and that the Supreme Court in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, 52 Off. Gaz. 5506, People vs. Geronimo, G. R. No. L-8936, 23 October 1956 and People vs.
Togonon, G. R. No. L-8926, 29 June 1957, has held that “the crimes of
murders, arsons, kidnappings, etc., when committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate
crime;” and contending that the defendant Mangulabnan having been
charged with the principal offense of rebellion in crim. case No. 1940
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is twice put in jeopardy of
being punished for the same offense in crim. case No. SC-161 of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, prayed that the information in the
latter case be quashed. After hearing, during which counsel de parte
for the defendant Mangulabnan and the Provincial Fiscal appeared and
orally argued in support of their motion and objection, on 5 November
1957 the Court denied the motion to quash and set the case for trial on
29 November 1957 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning. However, the Court
cancelled the trial set for 29 November 1957 and reset it for trial on
12 December 1957 at the same time. On 11 December 1957 the defendant
Mangulabnan filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his
motion to quash and 12 December 1957 the Provincial Fiscal, an
objection thereto. On the same day, 12 December 1957, the Court denied
the motion for reconsideration and set the case for trial on 27 January
1958 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning.
On 16 January 1958 the defendant Mangulabnan by counsel de parte
filed a petition praying that the case be reset for trial on 25
February 1958 on the ground that a petition for certiorari testing the
legality of the denial of the defendant’s motion to quash would be
filed in the Supreme Court after the needed amount for filing and
attorney’s fees shall have been raised by the defendant.
On 22 January 1958 the defendant Blaza filed a motion praying for
separate trial in view of the delay in the trial of the case due to
several postponements at the behest of his co-defendant.
On 23 January 1958 the Court denied Blaza’s motion and reset the case for trial on 25 February 1958.
On the day set for trial, 25 February 1958, the assistant provincial fiscal and counsel de oficio for the defendant Blaza, attorney Ariston Oblena, appeared but counsel de parte
for the defendant Mangulabnan, attorney Emilia C. Saturnino, did not
appear despite previous notice. In view thereof the Court entered an
order imposing upon the absent counsel a fine of P25, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, appointing attorney Tirso Caballero
as counsel de oficio for the defendant Mangulabnan, who
prayed that he be relieved from his appointment because he is related
to the offended parties, setting the case for trial on 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
March 1958 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning, and appointing attorneys
Celso Cablones, Leandro Rebong, Benjamin Agarao and Enrique Villanueva
as counsel de oficio for the defendant Mangulabnan, should counsel de parte fail to appear on the first day of the trial.
On 28 February 1958 counsel de parte for the defendant
Mangulabnan filed a petition in the trial court explaining that her
failure to attend the trial of the case on 25 February 1958 was due to
a sudden indispositon that she felt of which there was no material time
to notify the Court and prayed that she be excused for failure to
attend the trial of the case on that date, and alleging that a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction to be filed against her
client in criminal case No. SC-161 and that she had received subpoenas
from the City Attorney of Quezon City, Courts of First Instance of San
Pablo and Cabanatuan Cities and the City Fiscal of Manila to appear
before them as counsel on 3, 4, 5, and 7 March 1958, prayed that the
trial of the case be postponed indefinitely until the Supreme Court
shall have decided her client’s petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction. On 1 March 1958 the same counsel filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order entered by the Court on 35 February
1958 imposing upon her a fine of P25, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, reiterating the same reasons stated in her petition
filed on 28 February 1958.
On the date set for trial, 3 March 1958, counsel de parte
for the defendant Mangulabnan did not appear. Whereupon the Court
denied her motion for indefinite postponement of the trial of the case
in behalf of her client and proceeded with the trial of the case, the
defendants being assisted by their respective counsel de oficio.
On the second day of the trial, 4 March 1958, counsel de parte
for the defendant Mangulabnan appeared and prayed for indefinite
suspension of the trial of the case against her client and
reconsideration of the order imposing upon her a fine of P25. The Court
denied the first part but granted the second part of her prayer and
proceeded with the trial of the case. After hearing the testimony of
the defendant Blaza and his witness Solverio Lintak, the Court entered
an order setting the continuation of the trial of the case for 10 March
1958 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning.
After trial, on 14 March 1958 the Court rendered judgment, which was
promulgated on 26 March 1958, finding the defendants guilty of the
crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.
On 26 March 1958 the defendant Mangulabnan filed a notice of appeal.
On 2 April the defendant Blaza filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 8 April the Court denied his motion for reconsideration. On 10 April
the defendant Blaza file a notice of appeal. On 14 May his counsel de oficio filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal. On 16 May 1958 the trial court approved the withdrawal of his appeal.
This appeal is by the defendant Francisco Mangulabnan only.
Dr. Zosimo Fernandez, his wife Dorotea, daughter Fe and cousin
Buenaventura Fernandez, who was also the chauffeur of the family, lived
in the town of Pagsanjan, province of Laguna. At dinner time, about
7:00 o’clock in the evening of 23 April 1953, the Fernandez spouses
heard a commotion and the barking of dogs in their yard and somebody
knocking at the front door of the house. Dr. Fernandez asked
Buenaventura to see what the commotion and barking of dogs were all
about while Mrs. Fernandez peeped through an opening and saw people in
army uniform. Buenaventura told the spouses that somebody who was
trying to gain admission to the house wanted to see Dr. Fernandez at
the behest of Captain Sebastian and that the house was surrounded by
people in army uniform. Afterwards, they heard somebody knocking at the
back door. Dr. Fernandez stood up, looked outside the window and asked
what the man wanted. The latter answered that Captain Sebastian was
sending for the doctor. The man’s answer aroused Dr. Fernandez’s
suspicion that the visitor did not mean well because Captain Sebastian
was residing in Cavinti. Dr. Fernandez slipped out of the house to ask
aid and protection from the chief of police, who lived nearby, leaving
behind his wife, daughter, cousin, and maids. After Dr. Fernandez had
left, the inmates of the house heard somebody persistently knocking at
the door and trying to force it open. Mrs. Fernandez and her daughter
Fe opened the kitchen door to escape but Lope Cunanan alias
Captain Mendoza grabbed Fe by the hand. Cunanan went up the house and
ordered Mrs. Fernandez, Fe and Buenaventura to go down with him.
Downstairs, Mrs. Fernandez saw the companions of Lope Cunanan who were
about 17 in number, armed with guns and revolvers, at the stairs of the
house, in the backyard and surrounding area. The band forcibly took
them along and made them wade through a knee-deep river and walk
through coconut groves until they reached the outpost of the band in
the mountains at about 3:00 o’clock the following morning. There the
three victims were confined for two days guarded by the appellant,
Pablo Blaza and their companions. After two days in the outpost of the
band they were transferred to the inner part of the mountains where
they stayed until they were released on 8 May 1953 after paying to
their kidnappers a ransom of P40,000.
Turning back to the night of the incident, 23 April 1953, when Dr.
Fernandez returned to his house with some soldiers and policemen and
found his wife, daughter and cousin gone, he went to the army
headquarters but as he found nobody there, repaired to the old
municipal building, to telephone and report on the incident to the army
authorities in Camp Nazareth, Pila, Laguna, under the command of
Colonel Friedlander. After searching the house, D. Fernandez’s uncle
found on a table inside the doctor’s room a letter signed by Captain
Mendoza stating that his wife, daughter and cousin were taken for the
purpose of asking ransom from him. Days after Dr. Fernandez received
about five or six letter signed by the same person asking for P100,000
ransom, for the release of the three victims, which amount was reduced
to P50,000, P60,000 and finally to P40,000 through negotiations with
the kidnappers.
On 8 May 1953, after the ransom was finally reduced to P40.000, Dr.
Fernandez asked Dionisio Almario, his son Dionisio, Jr., Juan Abaño,
Conrado Velasco and one Ruperto to proceed to barrio Anibong. There, as
agreed upon, Ceferino Llamas and Eliseo Zafra delivered the money to
Dionisio Almario and his companions which they divided and strapped on
their respective bodies. At that juncture Ruperto, whom Dionisio
Almario had earlier dispatched together with Juan Abano to the place
where the kidnap victims had been confined, arrived and reported to him
that he had been assured by the kidnappers that the victims were in
safe hands. Ruperto led them to where the victims were. About half an
hour after arrival in the mountains, the three victims were produced to
Dionisio Almario and his companions by Lope Cunanan and his band
numbering about twenty. Among those in the band was the appellant.
Dionisio gave the money to Mrs. Fernandez which was counted by some of
the members of the band of Lope Cunanan in his presence. After
counting, Cunanan took P10,000, gave P6,000 each to Pablo Blaza and one
Pepe and distributed P1,000 each to the remaining members of the band.
The balance of P4,000 was set aside for expenses of the band. After
waiting for 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Cunanan allowed them to
leave. The victims and the rescue party arrived in town at about 6:30
o’clock in the evening.
The appellant denies complicity in the commission of the crime
imputed to him. He claims that he joined the Huk organization sometime
in 1948 and was with Basilio Balbos alias Commander Maning
now dead; that later on he joined the unit of Tomas Calma as his
security guard; that from 1950 to 1951 Calma’s unit operated in the
Sierra Madre Mountains; that thereafter his unit was transferred to the
mountains of Bulacan and Arayat; that during the entire year 1953 his
unit operated in the vicinity of San Luis, Candaba and Arayat and never
left the jurisdiction of Pampanga; that his unit never operated in the
province of Laguna, particularly in Pagsanjan; that he was a member of
the unit of Tomas Calma until 1954; that he knows Lope Cunanan alias
Commander Perla even before he joined the Huk organization because they
lived in the same barrio but that he was never associated with him; and
that he came to know Apolinar Oracion only in 1956 when he was brought
by the army authorities to Canlubang and confined in the stockade in
connection with the Fernandez kidnapping case.
The appellant’s denial of complicity in the commission of the crime
of kidnapping imputed to him and the members of the band of Lope
Cunanan alias Captain Mendoza is ineffective in the face of
the clear, direct and positive testimony of Mrs. Dorotea Fernandez, one
of the victims, that he and his co-defendant Pablo Blaza were among
those who stood guard over her, her daughter and cousin-in-law; that
she saw him with the band of kidnappers on the 23rd and 24th days of
April 1955; and that he was present while the ransom money was being
counted by the members of the band; and of Dionisio Almario that he saw
the appellant with the band of kidnappers when the three victims were
being led out from the mountains by the band on 8 May 1953 and that he
was present when the ransom money was being counted by the band.
The appellant assails the act of the trial court in proceeding with the trial of the case in the absence of his counsel de parte after appointing a counsel de oficio to assist him. Reviewing the various motions filed by his counsel de parte
and the orders entered by the trial court thereon, we find that the
appellant has no valid reason toe complain. The motions for indefinite
postponement of the trial of the case filed by his counsel de parte,
on the ground that a petition for certiorari to test the legality of
the denial of his motion to quash would be filed in the Supreme Court,
but which was never filed, were plainly to delay the trial and
disposition of the case. Despite receipt of notice his counsel de parte
failed to appear on the first day of the trial (3 March 1958). On the
second day (4 March 1958) she appeared but all that she did for her
client was to reiterate and state that she “will just corroborate for
the defense.” On the third and last day (10 March 1958) she actively
took part in the defense of the appellant, she herself conducting the
direct examination of the appellant. The defendant was under detention
and it is his constitutional right and the duty of the Court to have a
speedy trial and disposition of the case. Moreover, it cannot be said
that counsel de oficio who assisted the appellant in the absence of counsel de parte
on the first day of the trial was remiss in the performance of his
duties. As shown in the transcript of stenographic notes, he had
endeavored to safeguard the appellant’s rights as a defendant on trial.
As regards the appellant’s complaint that he had not been afforded
sufficient time to present other witnesses in his defense, it appears
in the transcript of stenographic notes that after the appellant had
finished testifying in his behalf, counsel de parte stated
that she could not close the evidence for the defense because she
wanted to secure the appearance of Apolinar Oracion as a witness. Asked
by the Court what his testimony would be about. She answered “that
kidnapping for ransom was to secure funds for the functions of the
organization.” The Court denied the constitution of the trial of the
case and ordered the trial closed because the testimony of Oracion
would not be of any help to the appellant in view of his denial of
complicity in the kidnapping of the victims. Hence, the appellant
cannot validly complain and the Court did not err in its last mentioned
order. Furthermore, the appellant claims to have known Apolinar Oracion
only in 1956 or 1957 when he was brought to the stockade of the Second
Military Area in Canlubang. The crime imputed to the appellant was
committed on 23 April 1953. Therefore, whatever testimony Apolinar
Oracion would give in evidence would not be of much value to the
appellant’s defense.
The appellant raises the question of double jeopardy. He points out
the fact that he had been charged with the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping in criminal case
No. 1940 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes A and A-1,
motion to quash); that on 8 January 1959, after pleading guilty to the
crime of simple rebellion, the said Court sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of one year and five months of prision correccional
and to pay his proportionate share of the costs (Annex B to petition to
withdraw as counsel); that in criminal case No. 15909 of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, People vs. Apolinar Oracion et al.,
for rebellion complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, rape and
kidnapping, the kidnapping of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and
Buenaventura Fernandez on 23 April 1957 was alleged to be for the
purpose of raising funds for the HMB organization and a necessary means
of committing the crime of rebellion (Annex B, motion to quash); and
that on 17 December 1956, the said Court held that “such act was in
furtherance and a mere ingredient of the offense of rebellion” and
“cannot be punished separately from the latter (rebellion) or complexed
with it” (Annex C, motion to quash). He now contends that the crime of
kidnapping imputed to him being a necessary means of committing and in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion, the said crime is absorbed by
rebellion and that, having been convicted of simple rebellion, he is
now put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The
appellant’s contention is untenable. A reading of the information filed
in criminal case No. 1940 of the Curt of First Instance of Pampanga
(Annexes A and A-1; motion to quash) shows that the kidnapping of
Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez and Buenaventura Fernandez had never
been mentioned as an over act of rebellion and a scrutiny of the
information filed in criminal case No. 15909 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and the judgment rendered therein discloses no
mention of the appellant as a defendant therein. The appellant,
therefore, had never been put in jeopardy of punishment for the crime
of rebellion and cannot maintain that he is being twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense.
In the instant case, the amended information filed in court against
the appellant and his co-defendant was for “kidnapping with ransom”
under the provisions of article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 18. The information filed in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna against Lope Cunanan et al. (SC No. 120) was
also for the same offense. On appeal by Raymundo Abesamis, this Court
found “that the kidnapping was made by Huks under the command of ‘Capt.
Mendoza’, or Lope Cunanan, and Abesamis admittedly belonged to the Huk
detachment under such command.” Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the
judgment of the Court of First Instance finding Raymundo Abesamis
guilty of the crime of kidnapping of the purpose of extorting ransom
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The herein appellant cannot be entitled to a penalty lighter than that imposed upon his confederates.
The pronouncement of this Court in the case of People vs.
Raymundo Abesamis et al., G. R. No. L-13007, 23 December 1960, that the
head of the band, Lope Cunanan, having been sentenced only to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same penalty should be
meted out to the appellant therein, despite the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, with the assistance of armed
men, and band, is equally applicable to the herein appellant.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Bengzon C. J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and De Leon JJ., concur.
Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
[1] On 30 August 1957 the
Court of First Instance of Laguna found them guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
the accessory penalties, to indemnify jointly and severally the spouses
Zosimo Fernandez and Dorotea Fernandez in the sum of P40,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs
proportionately. Only the defendant Abesamis appealed. On 23 December
1960 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court (G. R.
No. L-13007).