G.R. Nos. L-13328-29 & L-13358. September 29, 1961
GONZALO MERCADO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. RAMON LIRA AND JUANA C. DE LIRA, RESPONDENTS. NITA LIRA, PETITIONER, VS. GONZALO MERCADO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
PAREDES, J.:
Laguna Transportation Company. In the afternoon of April 21, 1951,
while its passenger bus No. 39 was making the trip from Batangas to
Manila on the concrete highway at barrio Tulo, Calamba, Laguna, the
left front tire of the bus blew out and sent it swerving gradually
toward the left side of the road, over the shoulder and into a ravine
some 270 meters away. From the wreckage, the bodies of the passengers,
several dead, others injured, were recovered, and among the fatalities
was Ramon Lira, Jr. (24), son of Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Lira, Sr. and
injured Nita Lira. Two cases for recovery of damages were commenced
against the owners and operators in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas: No. 104 (now G.R. Nos. L-13328-29, in this Court) by the
parents of deceased Ramon Lira, Jr. and No. 107-C now G. R. No.
L-13358, in this Court by Nita Lira. After a joint trial, defendants,
Mercado and others were sentenced to pay the following sums: In Civil
Case No. 104:
For the death of Ramon Lira, Jr. including funeral and church expenses For loss of earning capacity of Ramon Lira, Jr. for ten (10) years at P1,800.00 per annum Moral damages for mental anguish For expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees Total In Civil Case No. 107: For hospitalization and medical treatment of Nita Lira For the impairment of earning capacity Moral damages for her physical and mental suf- fering For expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees Total
Defendants appealed in both cases and plaintiff Nita Lira appealed
in No. 107, (being cases C.A. G.R. No. 15422 and C.A. G.R. No.
15423-R). The Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
“As far as the other items are concerned, we find them to be reasonable and fully supported by the evidence.
Wherefore,
the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the amount
awarded for the death of Ramon Lira, Jr. including funeral and church
services from P10,000.00 to P5,062.50; reducing the amount awarded for
loss of earning capacity from P18,000.00 to P12,000.00 and increasing
the amount awarded to plaintiff-appellant Nita Lira for moral damages
from P2,000.00 to P5,000.00. In Civil Case No. 104 (CA.G.R.No.
15422-R), therefore, defendant should pay a total of P25,032.56; and in
civil case No. 107 (CA.G.R. No. 15423-R), they should pay a total of
P7,970.20. In all other respects the said judgment is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs this instance.”
On December 19, 1957, and in pursuance of a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals issued the following resolution:
“In view of the foregoing considerations, the
judgment heretofore rendered is hereby modified by eliminating
therefrom the award of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages to plaintiff
Nita Lira in case CA-G.R.No. 15422-R, maintaining said judgment in all
other respects.”
In other words, in the case CA-G.R.No. 15422-R, involving the death
of Ramon Lira, Jr., the Court of Appeals granted moral damages, and in
the case of CA-G.R.No. 15423-R, involving physical injuries caused upon
Nita Lira, moral damages of P5,000.00 awarded her, were eliminated.
Hence, a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals was filed by Gonzalo Mercado, et al., petitioners, against
Ramon Lira, et al., (G.R.No. L-13328-29), and another similar petition
was filed by Nita Lira, petitioner vs. Gonzalo Mercado, et al.,
respondents (G.R.No. L-13358).
Counsel for the Mercados, defined their position as follows:
“Article 2206 of the Civil Code fixes the amount of
damages for death at only P3,000.00. The heirs of the deceased may also
claim for moral damages, although awarding it is not obligatory like
the damages for loss of earning capacity. Paragraph 3 of Art. 2206
states that the heirs may demand for moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased. The amount of moral damages,
therefore, should be made only nominal if the heirs have already been
compensated very substantially for the death of the deceased, which in
this case has been set by the Court of Appeals at P5,052.50 and loss of
earning at P12,000.00 and the attorney’s fees at P4,000.00 which
already amount to P21,052.50. We respectfully submit, therefore, that
even if granting that the respondents are entitled to moral damages,
yet the same should not be fixed in such an amount as to kill the
entire business of the respondents who are public service operators, by
the enormous amounts they have to pay on account of the negligence of
one driver. In this case, we respectfully submit that the amount of
P500.00 is a reasonable moral damage considering that the other damages
already awarded are excessive. In the same way that the attorney’s fees
should also be reduced to only P1,500.00.”
and ended with a prayer that “the decision of the Court of Appeals
be modified so that the respondents should pay only the sum of P500.00
as moral damages and P1,500.00 for attorney’s fees.”
The pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code state:—
“ART. 1764.—Damages in cases comprised in this
Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book,
concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a
passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.ART. 2206.—The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: * * *.
(3)
The spouses, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.”
It is thus seen that Article 2206 of the new Civil Code expressly
provides that the amount of damages for death shall be “at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances.” In other words, the amount of damages to be awarded for
the death of a passenger may be more than P3,000.00. It is argued that
the award for moral damages for mental anguish caused by the death of a
passenger is not obligatory, and that the amount should only be nominal
if the heirs have already been compensated substantially for the death
of the deceased. Article 2206 states further that “In addition” to the
amount of at least P3,000.00 to be awarded for the death of a
passenger, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages as a consequence of
the death of their deceased kin, which simply means that once the
above-mentioned heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral
damages and are able to prove that they are entitled to such award, it
becomes the duty of the court to award moral damages to the claimant in
an amount commensurate with the mental anguish suffered by them. In the
Civil Code, nominal damages are treated separately from moral damages.
Any amount that should be awarded as nominal damages, should not be
confused or interlinked with moral damages which, by itself, is a
distinct class of damages. Of course, the amount of moral damages to be
awarded, should be such as may be reasonable and just under the
circumstances in a given case. Petitioners’ claim that as the other damages
awarded to said respondents are already excessive, the award for moral
damages should be reduced to P500.00. But the Court of Appeals found
the other damages not to be excessive, and as far as this factual
finding is concerned, We are not authorized to rule otherwise.
Moreover, petitioners never assailed in their motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 11,
1957, as well as in their instant petition for certiorari, the
reasonableness of the amount of the other damages awarded to
herein respondents. In fact, the petition limits the issues only to the
reasonableness of the P4,000.00 awarded by the Court of Appeals as
moral damages and the other amount of P4,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Considering the mental anguish and sorrow that must accompany and
overwhelm the parents upon the tragic death of a son, and considering
the nature and extent of the services rendered by counsel for
respondents and other circumstances of the case, We believe the awards
given by the Court of Appeals to respondents in the sum of P4,000.00 as
moral damages for the death of Ramon Lira, Jr. and the amount of P
4,000.00 for attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation, fair and
reasonable (par. 11, Art. 2208, N.C.C.).
With respect to G.R. No. L-13358, it is alleged that the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in its resolution dated December 19, 1957, in
not awarding moral damages to petitioner Nita Lira for physical
injuries and mental suffering sustained by her, resulting from breach
of the special contract of carriage caused by the negligence of the
respondents, contending that her case is analogous to cases of “quasi delicts
causing physical injuries” for which the new Civil Code authorizes
indemnification for moral damages in favor of the injured party (par.
2, Art. 2219 N.C.C.).
Petitioner contends that in the case of Cachero vs. Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., (101 Phil, 523 54 Off. Gaz., No. 26, p 6599), this Court
had not expressly declared or impliedly stated that the award of moral
damages to a passenger who has sustained physical injuries is not an
“analogous case.” And Cachero in said case, did not invoke the
analogous applicability of said provision of law, (par. 2, Art. 2219)
to his case. Much space was alloted by petitioner in her brief, in
support of her theme, stating that the issue raised by her was of first
impression. Since the submission of her brief on February 21, 1958,
however, several cases have reached this court raising the same
question, among them is the case of Paz Fores vs. Irene
Miranda, 105 Phil., 266; 57 Off. Gaz., (44) 7938—the facts of which are
identical to those of the present one. This Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, said—
“* * *. Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid
to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled
(Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil; 523; 54 Off. Gaz. [26] 6599; Necesito, et al. vs.
Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz. [23] 4023; that moral damages are
not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the
contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the
new Civil Code, which provide as follows:‘ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
* * * * * * *
‘ART.
2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.’By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a)
In cases of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof
of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton, or deliberately injurious
conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and(b)
That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the
descriptive term ‘analogous cases’ used in Art. 2219; not only because
Art, 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by
contractual; breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a ‘pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.’‘Art.
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.’The
exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a
mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Art. 1764
makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206,
that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased
passenger to ‘demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased’ (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 84.
Resolution on motion to reconsider, Sept. 11, 1958). But the
exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where
the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable
unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith.
We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier’s driver
does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice
or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there
is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral
damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of
contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part
of the defendant, as required by Act 2220, would be to violate the
clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial
legislation.The Court of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Aero Taxicab Co. 82 Phil., 359; 46 Off. Gaz., 2023 and Layda vs.
Court of Appeals 90 Phil., 724; but these doctrines were predicted upon
our former law of damages, before judicial discretion in fixing them
became limited by the express provisions of the new Civil Code
(previously quoted). Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now inapplicable.Upon
the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier
for breach of the contract of transportation explains, to some extent,
the limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery.
The action for the breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier
a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger;
the latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the
carrier or of his employees; and the burden is placed on the carrier to
prove that it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict,
may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees (Art. 1759, new Civ.
Code; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra; Prado vs. Manila Elec. Co., 51 Phil., 900).The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra-contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between actions ex contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto,
and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as
simultaneously embodying an action on tort. Neither can this action be
taken as one to enforce on employer’s liability under Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, since the responsibility is not alleged to be
subsidiary, nor is there on record any averment or proof that the
driver of appellant was insolvent. In fact, he is not even made a party
to the suit.It is also suggested that a carrier’s violation
of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breach
of the passenger’s confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a
breach of contract in bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages
Tinder Art. 2220. This theory is untenable, for under it the carrier
would always be deemed in bad faith, in every case its obligation to
the passenger is infringed, and it would be never accountable for
simple negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756), the presumption is
that common carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously), and Art. 1702 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.* * * * * * *
‘ART.
1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
articles 1733 and 1755.’‘ART. 1762. The contributory
negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his
death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of
the common carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably
reduced.’The distinction between fraud, bad
faith or malice (in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrongdoing) and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be
ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly
differentiated by the Code.‘ART. 2201. In
contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who
acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.In case of fraud, bad faith,
malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of
the obligation.’It is to be presumed, in
the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this
difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they
limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith.
It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to
malice; but that fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier’s bad
faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the carrier’s employees.”
(See also Tamayo vs. Aquino, 105 Phil., 949; 56 Off. Gaz. No. 36, p. 5617; Cariaga vs. L.T. Bus, L-11037, Dec. 29, 1960; Versoza vs. Baytan, 107 Phil., 1010; Rex Taxicab Inc. vs. Bautista, 109 Phil., 712; 60 Off. Gaz., 8460.
We gleaned, therefore, from the above mentioned decisions, (1) that
the case of a passenger of a carrier who suffered physical injuries
“because of the carrier’s negligence (culpa contractual),
cannot be considered in the descriptive expression ‘analogous cases’,
used in Art. 2219″; and (2) that in cases of breach of contract
(including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus)
i.e., wanton or deliberate injurious conduct is essential to justify an
award of moral damages. There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad
faith, contemplated by law, on the part of the respondents, because the
cause of the accident was merely the bursting of a tire while the bus
was over speeding, the cause of petitioner Nita Lira should fail, as
far as moral damages is concerned. Moral damages was, therefore,
correctly eliminated by the Court of Appeals.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court
of Appeals in G.R. Nos. L-13328-29 and L-13358 (Court of Appeals
resolution dated December 19, 1957), hereby is affirmed, without costs
in this instance.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
De Leon, J., did not take part.