CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. DR. MANUEL SINGSON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino
and Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a
residential lot located at Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an
area of approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements existing
thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that
Singson owned one half proindiviso of said property and that
Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions
of the duly probated last will of Dona Leona Singson, the original
owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Special Proceeding No. 453;
that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property,
but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring
action.

Defendant’s defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere
usufructuary of, and not owner of one half proindiviso of the property
in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand
partition thereof.

After trial upon the issue thus posed, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

“1. Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner
pro-indiviso with the defendant of the house and lot described in the
complaint to the extent each of an undivided 1/2 portion thereof;

“2.
Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to execute an agreement of partition
of the said property within 30 days from receipt of this judgment
unless it be shown that the division thereof may render it
unserviceable, in which case the provisions of Art. 498 of the New
Civil Code may be applied;

“3. That in the event the said
parties shall fail to do so, this Court will appoint the corresponding
commissioners to make the partition in accordance with law; and

“4. Without special pronouncement as to costs.”

From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.

It is admitted that Doña Leona Singson, who died single on January
13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her
death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted
to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G. R. No. 3605-R. At
the time of the execution of the will her nearest living relatives were
her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, and her nieces
Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolacion, all
surnamed Florentino.

Clause IX of her last will reads as follows:

“NOVENO.—Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por parte de mi
hermana mia y que al mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo
mi proteccion, y es la CONSOLACION FLORENTINO:—

“(A). La
mitad de mi casa de materiales fuertes con techo de hierro galvanizado,
incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, Calle Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los hermanos
Fortunato, Teofilo y Pedro del apellido Kairuz. Pero si falleciere
antes o despues que yo mi citada nieta, esta propiedad se dara por
partes iguales entre mis tres hermanos Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio, o a
sus herederos forzosos en el caso de que alguno de ellos muriere antes.
* * *. (Exhibit F).”

The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.
This issue is, we believe, controlled by the pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code in force in the Philippines prior to the effectivity of
the New Civil Code, in view of the fact that the testatrix died on
January 13, 1948. They are the following:

“ART. 774. The testator may designate one or more
persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or
heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should be unable to
accept the inheritance.

“A simple substitution, without a
statement of the cases to which it is to apply, shall include the three
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, unless the testator has
otherwise provided.”

“ART. 781. Fidei-comissary substitutions
by virtue of which the heir is charged to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or part of the inheritance shall be valid and
effective, provided they do not go beyond the second degree, or that
they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the death of
the testator.”

“ART. 785. The following shall be inoperative:

1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving them
this name or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation of
delivering the property to a second heir.” * * *.

In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the
testator may not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his
death, but also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do
not accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance or legacies,
or die ahead of him.

The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person
with the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to
another person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a
particular event (6 Manresa, p. 1112).

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under
consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in
this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino—whether this
occurs before or after that of the testatrix—the property bequeathed to
her shall be delivered (“se dara”) or shall belong in equal parts to
the testatrix’s three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their
forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion
Florentino. If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar,
the necessary result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the
death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the
property, but if it provided for a sustitucion fideicomisaria,
she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over the
same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to
partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa says, if the fiduciary did
not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will, but mere
usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said
property to the fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude
ownership over the property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to
and was acquired by another person, and that person cannot be other
than the fideicomisario. (6 Manresa, p. 145)

It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that
an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and
transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him,
upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this
reason Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary
substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly (“de una
manera expresa”) either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the
first heir the absolute obligation (“obligacion terminante”) to deliver
the inheritance to a substitute or second heir. In this connection
Manresa says:

“Para que la sustitueion sea fideicomisaria, es
preciso segun el art. 781, que se ordene o encargue al primer heredero,
cuando sea tal, que conserve y transmita a una tercera persona o
entidad el todo o parte de la herencia. O lo que es lo mismo, la
sustitueion fideicomisaria, como declaran las resoluciones de 25 de
Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de 1899 y 19 de Julio de 1909, exige tres
requisitos:

“1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los bienes prefereritemente.

“2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo de conservar y transmitir a un tercero el todo o parte del caudal.

“3.o Un segundo heredero.

“A
estos requisitos anade la sentencia de 18 de Noviembre de 1918, otro
mas, el del que el fideicomisario tenga derecho a los bienes de la
herencia desde el momento de la muerte del testador, puesto que ha de
suceder a este y no al fiduciario.

“Por tanto, cuando el
causante se limita a instituir dos herederos, y por fallecimiento de
ambos o de cualquiera de ellos, asigna la parte del fallecido o
fallecidos, a los herederos legitimos o a otras personas, solo existe
una sustitucion vulgar, porque falta el requisito de haberse impuesto a
los primeros herederos la obligacion de conservar y transmitir los
bienes, y el articulo 789, en su parrafo primero, exige que la
sustitucion sea expresa, ya dandole el testador el nombre de
sustitucion fideicomisaria, ya imponiendo al sustituido la obligacion
terminante de conservar y transmitir los bienes a un segundo heredero.”

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration
shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not
expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear
statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only
enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As
already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee’s death—whether
this happens before or after that of the testatrix—her share shall
belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the
last will of the deceased Dña. Leon a Singson established a mere subtitucion vulgar,
the substitution of Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the
testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the
former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.