REMEDIOS QUIOQUE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. JACINTO BAUTISTA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an action to foreclose two deeds of mortgage executed to
secure the payment of two loans, one for P2,000.00 and another for
P6,000.00, covering two parcels of land situated in the City of Manila.
The first deed was executed on May 9, 1944 and the second on October
11, 1944 and it was stipulated therein as a common provision that the
two loans cannot be repaid within one year from the date of the
termination of the last world war.

The defendants set up the defense that the present action is already
barred by Civil Case No. 11969 filed in the same court between the same
parties, and that if there is any amount recoverable from them the same
shall be computed in accordance with the Ballantyne schedule. They also
set up a counterclaim for moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00.

On August 27, 1957, the trial court rendered decision in favor of
plaintiffs sentencing defendants to pay the sum of P12, 829.81, with
interest at the rate of 6% and 3% per annum on the amounts of P8,000.00
and P4,829.81, respectively, from July 21, 1957, plus costs, and in
default of payment, it was ordered that the properties mortgaged be
sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the payment
of the judgment.

Defendants have appealed to this Court on purely questions of law.

It appears that prior to the filing of the present complaint
plaintiffs had instituted before the Court of First Instance of Manila
an action to foreclose a first mortgage on the same properties and that
on the date said action was filed the two loans covered by the second
and third mortgages which are herein foreclosed had already matured
(Civil Case No. 11969). It likewise appears that judgment was duly
entered in the first case and when a writ of execution was issued to
enforce it was fully satisfied by defendants on August 18, 1952 by
paying to the sheriff the sum of P9,000.00.

It is now contended that the trial court erred (1) in not dismissing
this case as premature; (2) in not finding that this case is barred by
the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 11969; and (3) in not
converting the amounts recoverable under the Ballantyne scale of values.

With regard to the first contention, the lower court said:

“Considering that the Japanese Peace Treaty
terminating the Second World War between Japan and the Allied Powers,
of which the Philippines was a signatory, was signed on September 8,
1951 at San Francisco, U.S.A., the interpretation of counsel for the
defendants that the war did not terminate for the Philippines until
July 23, 1956 is not tenable.

“Wherefore, defendants’ motion to set aside the decision rendered in this case and to order a new trial is hereby denied.”

Counsel for defendants argues that the trial court erred in not
dismissing this case as premature because since it was agreed that the
loan cannot be paid within one year from the termination of the last
world war and according to the treaty between Japan and the Allied
Powers the same should come into force for each State only after its
ratification and from date of the deposit of its instrument of
ratification, it cannot be said that the war has terminated when this
action was brought on June 23, 1956, it appearing that the instrument
of ratification was deposited only on July 23, 1956.

This contention is untenable. In Navarre vs. Barredo, (99
Phil., 164; 53 Off. Gaz., [21] 7696) we said that “in the legal sense,
war formally ended in the Philippines the moment President Harry S.
Truman officially issued a proclamation of peace on December 31, 1946 *
* *. And if counsel meant that there should be a formal treaty of
peace, we may say that this purpose has also been accomplished when the
treaty of peace with Japan had been signed in San Francisco, California
on September 8, 1951 by the United States and the Allied Powers,
including the Philippines.” At any rate, even granting that the date of
the deposit of the instrument of ratification of the treaty should be
reckoned with to determine when the last world war should be deemed
legally terminated, this point is now moot since said instrument was
deposited on July 23, 1956.

The contention that this action is already barred by the filing of
Civil Case No. 11969 for the simple reason that the two loans herein
involved could have been included in said action because at the time it
was filed they had already matured, is likewise untenable, considering
that the first case refers to a transaction different from those
covered in the present case. Section 3, Rule 2, of our Rules of Court,
invoked by appellants, which provides that a single cause of action
cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject
of different complaints, does not apply, for here there is not a single
cause of action that was split up, but several causes that refer to
different transactions. And it was held that a contract embraces only
one cause of action because it may be violated only once even if it
contains several stipulations.^[1]
Thus, non-payment of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes a single
cause of action. The creditor cannot split up this single cause of
action into two separate complaints, one for payment of the debt and
another for the foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing
of the first complaint will bar the second complaint. In other words,
the complaint filed for the payment of certain debt shall be considered
as a waiver of the right to foreclose the mortgage executed thereon. ^[2] The lower court, therefore, did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on this ground.

The third contention that the recoverable amounts should be
converted into money according to the Ballantyne scale of values cannot
also be sustained it having been agreed between the parties that said
loans shall be payable after the termination of the last world war. The
rule is well-settled “that where the obligation incurred during the
Japanese occupation was made payable after a fixed period, the maturity
falling after liberation, the promissor must pay in Philippine currency
the same amount stated in the obligation, that is, the obligation must
be settled peso for peso in Philippine currency. He cannot discharge
his debt by paying only the equivalent in Philippine currency of the
value of the military notes he had received.” ^[3]

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C. J., Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.

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^[1] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., p. 17, citing Sutherland, Code Pleading, Practice and Forms, p, 143.

^[2] Baehrach Motor Co., vs. Icarañgal, 68 Phil., 287.

^[3] Aguilar vs. Miranda, L-16510, November 29, 1961; See also Garcia vs. De los Santos, 93 Phil., 683; 49 Off. Gaz., [11] 4830; Roño vs. Gomez, 83 Phil., 890; Gomez vs. Tabia, 84 Phil., 269.