FLORENCIO DEUDOR, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal by plaintiffs Florencio, Pedro, Aniana and Maria Deudor, hereinafter
referred to as appellants, from certain orders of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal dated February 28, 1957 and January 10, 1958.

Prior to March 16, 1953, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Gregorio Araneta
& Co., Inc., as alleged owners and attorneys-in-fact of Santa Mesa Heights
Subdivision, were involved in Civil Cases Nos. Q-135, Q-139, Q-174, Q-177 and
Q-187 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In Case No. Q-135, entitled
“Florencio Deudor, et al. vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et al.”,
plaintiffs therein, invoking title under an alleged “informacion posesoria”,
claimed a parcel of land of about 50 “quiñones”, or 225 hectares, located in
Tatalon, Quezon City, over which J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. asserted ownership
under the Land Registration Act, by virtue of an original certificate of title,
covering a bigger tract of land, issued way back in 1914. The title of J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. over portions of said 50 “quiñones” was, also contested
in said Civil Cases Nos. Q-139, entitled “J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
vs. Agustin de Torres”, Q-174, entitled “Apolonio Misericordia vs.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,” Q-177, entitled “Agripino Pascual vs. J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,” and Q-186, entitled “Macaria Fulgencio vs. J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc.” On March 16, 1953, these five (5) cases were settled
by a compromise agreement between J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio
Araneta & Co., Inc., on the one hand, hereinafter referred to as the
appellees, and all of the other parties in said cases, who were designated in
said agreement, and will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the
Deudors.

It appears that prior to the institution of said cases, the Deudors had
caused the aforementioned land of about 50 “quiñones” to be subdivided into lots
and that some of these lots, aggregating approximately 30 “quiñones”, were sold
to several persons, whose names are set forth in two lists attached, as Annexes
B and C, to said compromise agreement. The Duedors, including appellants herein,
acknowledged therein the title, in fee simple, of J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc.,—who is referred to in the agreement as Owners—in and to said land of 50
“quiñones”, and renounced, ceded and quit-claimed in its favor whatever right,
title or interest they (the Deudors) had over said property, and, in
consideration thereof, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. undertook to pay them
P1,201,063, from which the aggregate sum of P486,137.26 would be deducted for
certain purposes stated in the agreement, thereby leaving a balance of
P714,295.74, to be paid in the manner and under the conditions set forth in
clause 8, section d, of the Compromise Agreement, as follows:

1. The first payment shall be P100,000.00 and shall.be made within sixty (60)
days from the date the decision rendered in the foregoing cases approving this
compromise agreement becomes final; Provided, that within said period the
DEUDORS shall have effected the delivery to the OWNERS of at least 20 quiñones,
the possessory rights over which have not been sold by the DEUDORS to third
persons, out of the total area of 50 quiñones involved herein in such manner
that the OWNERS, may without interruption, proceed with the subdivision and sale
of said 20 quiñones and likewise deliver the portions so sold to the buyers
thereof, and provided further, that if the DEUDORS FAIL TO DELIVER said 20
quiñones as above, specified, then the first payment of P100,000.00 mentioned in
this paragraph shall not be made until after the delivery is effected;

“2. If the DEUDORS, within a period of 60 days from the date of decision
rendered in the foregoing cases, should be able to deliver the peaceful and
complete possession of the portion of the property occupied and possessed by the
persons listed in Annex ‘C’ and who are not willing to continue with their
contracts of purchase and such other persons who may later join the ones listed
in said Annex ‘C’, the payments subsequent to that specified in the paragraph
immediately preceding shall be made as follows:

2nd payment—1955		P99,408.79
3rd payment—1956 to be made 1 year after the
	date of the 2nd payment	99,408.79
4th payment—1957 to be made 1 year after the
	date of the 3rd payment	69,510.50
5th payment—1958 to be made 1 year after the
	date of the 4th payment	69,510.50
6th payment—1959 to be made 1 year after the
	date of the 5th payment	69,510.50
7th payment—1960 to be made 1 year after the
	date of the 6th payment	69,510.50
8th payment—1961 to be made 1 year after the
	date of the 7th payment	69,510.50
9th payment—1962 to be made 1 year after the
	date of the 8th payment	68,555.66
	TOTAL	P614,925.74

“However, in the event that the DEUDORS fail to comply with the conditions
set forth in clause 8, section d, subsection 2, the following shall be the form
of payments to be made to the DEUDORS by the OWNERS, if they make delivery as
hereinafter set forth:

If delivery is made after the 60-day period provided for above but before the
expiration of one year from the date of the first payment, the DEUDORS shall
receive as second payment the amount of P99,400.79 two years after the date of
the first payment. If delivery is made after one year from the date of the first
payment, the DEUDORS shall receive as second payment, the amount of P99,408.79
one year after the date of such delivery.

“In either case, the succeeding payments as hereinafter provided shall become
due one year from the date of the payment immediately preceding, as follows:

3rd payment	P99,408.79
4th payment	69,510.50
5th payment	69,510.50
6th payment	69,510.50
7th payment	69,510.50
8th payment	69,510.50
9th payment	68,555.66
	P515,516.95″

It was further stipulated in the agreement that “it shall be the joint and
solidary obligation of the Deudors to make the buyers of the lots purportedly
sold by them to recognize the title of the owners over the property
purportedly bought by them and to make them sign, whenever possible new
contracts of purchase for said property at the current prices and terms
specified by the owners in their sales of lots known as ‘Sta. Mesa
Heights Subdivision'”; that “the possession of the land in question shall be
turned over by the Deudors to the owners as herein provided and the former shall
guarantee that during the pendency of the sale of said property, no squatters or
unauthorized persons shall settle or take possession or continue in possession
of any portion of said property”; and that in the event of failure of the
Deudors to comply with any of the obligations and conditions of the agreement,
the owners shall have the right to suspend the payments aforementioned.

This compromise agreement was submitted for approval to the Court, which,
after assuring itself that the parties understood the contents thereof, caused
the agreement to be signed in Court, and then rendered on April 10, 1953, a
decision the last two (2) paragraphs of which read:

“The parties and their respective attorneys have petitioned this Court that
after rendition of judgment in the above-antitled cases, steps be taken, under
the supervision of this Court, to implement said ‘Compromise Agreement’, and in
the interest of justice the Court grants this last mentioned petition. It should
be understood, however, that the implementation to be taken under the
supervision of the Court will not and should not be construed and interpreted by
the parties that it shall in any way affect this decision on the merits rendered
by the Court.

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, decision is hereby rendered declaring,
as it hereby is declared, that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is the absolute
owner of the land involved in these cases, having in its name a transfer
certificate of title issued in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, said title being binding and conclusive against the whole
world. It is further ordered that the ‘Compromise Agreement’ be, as it hereby
is, approved in its entirety and all the parties to the same are hereby enjoined
to abide and comply faithfully and strictly with the terms and conditions set
forth in the said ‘Compromise Agreement’. No pronouncement as to
costs”.

The portion of 20 “quiñones”, mentioned in clause 8, section d,
subsection (1), was not delivered by the Deudors until January 14, 1956, and
this was made possible only because the appellees had agreed to and did advance
certain sums to defray the expenses necessary therefor. On April 6, 1956, the
Deudors filed a motion praying that the appellees be required to pay them the
balance of the agreed first installment—after deducting said advance—or the sum
of P79,800.00. On or about April 13, 1956, the appellees deposited this amount
in Court and at the same time filed a “motion and counter-manifestation”
inviting attention to the constructions existing on the undelivered portion of
30 “quiñones” and praying that the Deudors be ordered to remove such
constructions—regardless of whether the same existed on March 16, 1953, when the
Compromise Agreement was entered into, or were made after said date—within
fifteen (15) days, as well as “to comply strictly with their obligation to
maintain the status quo, with respect to said undelivered portion of 30
‘quiñones’ and to hold the reliable for such damage as may result from their
having granted permission to make additional constructions herein after March
16, 1953”.

Soon later, or on April 27, 1956, the appellees filed a supplemental motion
and “manifestation” praying that payment of said sum of P79,800.00 to the
Deudors “be withheld until after the additional 129 illegal constructions in the
30 ‘quiñones’ area shall have been removed”.

Subsequently, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion and
“manifestation”, dated August 8, 1956, to the effect that the number of illegal
constructions on said area had increased to 165, that, meanwhile, several
alleged purchasers from the Deudors, not mentioned in the annexes attached to
the Compromise Agreement, had instituted Civil Cases Nos. Q-1889 and Q-1890 of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, against the Deudors and the
appellees, and that, in consequence of such cases, the amounts payable to the
Deudors from the appellees may not be sufficient to satisfy the claims of the
plaintiffs in said cases, and praying, therefore, that appellees’ aforementioned
“motion and counter-manifestation” and “supplemental motion and manifestation”
of April 13 and 27, 1956, be resolved and that the sum of P79,800.00 be retained
to answer for the claims of the alleged purchasers not yet mentioned in Annexes
B and C of the Compromise Agreement.

Accordingly, on February 28, 1957, the Court issued an order, pertinent parts
of which we quote:

“The attention of this Court has been called by the J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. to the fact that the illegal constructions on
the 30 quiñones, which constructions were made from and after the date of the
Compromise Agreement, are growing in number, and that as of January 8, 1957
these constructions totalled 215. Whether these constructions were made with the
Deudor’s permission as claimed by the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. or without the Deudors’ consent as claimed by Atty. Laurel is of
no memant. What is material and pertinent now is that these houses and the
continued constructions of houses appear completely unabated, and unless this is
stopped by those who are supposed to be in possession of the land, these very
houses within the 30 quiñones will afford very formidable stumbling blocks
against further implementation of the Compromise Agreement. Under the Compromise
Agreement, and subject to its other terms and conditions, those referred to
collectively as the ‘Deudors’ are obligated, and they have so bound themselves,
to deliver the clear and peaceful possession of the entire 50 quiñones to the
OWNERS, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and/or their ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT FOR SANTA
MESA HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION, Gregorio Araneta, Inc.

“Under paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement, those referred to
collectively as the ‘Deudors’ claimed to have been in possession of the land,
and pursuant to par. 9 of the same Compromise Agreement, the ‘Deudors’ bound
themselves to deliver possession of the land in question over to the Owners. It
is, therefore, clear to this Court that unless the construction of houses is
abated in some way, the implementation of the Compromise Agreement can never be
effected. The J. M. Tuason.& Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. have asked
this Court to set a period of 15 days within which the ‘Deudors’ would deliver
the possession of the remaining 30 quiñones unto said companies. The impatience
of the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. is
understandable, considering that it is almost four years since the decision
became final and yet the ‘Deudors’ have utterly failed to deliver the 30
quiñones. The Compromise Agreement does not state any specified period within
which the ‘Deudors’ have to definitely comply with, their obligations, but in
accordance with Article 1197 of the new Civil Code this Court is authorized and
empowered to set a period within which they shall fulfill and comply with all
their obligations. This Court is of the opinion that a period of four (4) months
from date hereof is more than ample time within which the ‘Deudors’ may comply
with their obligations under the Compromise Agreement, having in mind that more
than 42 months have elapsed before the 20 quiñones were in fact delivered, and
mostly through the effort of the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. The Court has also in mind that the Compromise Agreement
contemplated 60 days from date thereof for compliance therewith by the parties,
and certainly the 60-day period so set could not reasonably be extended to four
years. The Court would like to call the attention of the parties to the fact
that in its decision dated April 10, 1953 the parties were ‘enjoined to abide by
and comply faithfully and strictly with the terms and conditions set forth in
the Compromise Agreement.’ Up to the present time, there does not appear to by
any sincere or effective steps taken by any of those referred to collectively as
the ‘Deudors’ in implementing the Compromise Agreement. The Court, therefore,
hereby sets a period of four (4) months within which the ‘Deudors’ shall deliver
possession of the entire 30 quiñones to the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. Failure of the ‘Deudors’ to so deliver will have the
effect of freeing the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and the Gregorio Araneta,
Inc. from all its obligations under the Compromise Agreement and judgment, and
the latter shall thereafter be entitled to possession of the 30 quiñones thru
this Court’s process.

“Counsel for the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. have
also called the attention of this Court to the effect that there seem to be
other persons who have allegedly bought lands from the ‘Deudors’ and who have
submitted the corresponding Deeds of Sale to this Court but whose names have not
been included in the lists submitted by the ‘Deudors’ to the attorneys of the J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and attached to the Compromise Agreement as Annexes
‘B’ and ‘C’. The Court likewise takes cognizance of the fact that there are
presently pending cases wherein persons have filed complaints praying that the
difference in the price fixed by the Gregorio Araneta, Inc. for the same land
should be charged against or deducted from whatever amount the ‘Deudors’ would
receive from the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.

“This Court believes that it cannot decide the question now, but shall do so
in cases properly brought up before it. It likewise takes cognizance of Civil
Cases Nos. Q-1732, Q-1733, Q-1746, Q-1799, and Q-1932 filed against the Deudors
and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., and other related
cases. As to those persons who had allegedly bought land from the Deudors but
whose names have not been included in the lists, Annexes ‘B’ and ‘C’ to the
Compromise Agreement, the Court cannot at the present time issue an order
without a proper motion from the proper party.

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, * * *.

“Those referred to collectively as the ‘Deudors’ in the Compromise Agreement,
namely, Florencio Deudor, Maria Deudor, Pedro Deudor, Aniana Deudor, Jesus
Gamitan, Cirilo del Rosario, Tomas de la Cruz, Rufina Guerrero. Ana Pascual,
Alberta Martinez. Ambrosio Andaya, Donato Fajardo, Eustaquio.Alquiros, Agripino
Pascual, Macaria Fulgencio, Carlos Javier, Aurea Misericordia and Feliciano
Misericordia, are hereby ordered to clear and deliver the peaceful possession of
the 30 quiñones to the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.,
within a period of four (4) months from date hereof, except such constructions
by those persons who are mentioned in the Compromise Agreement as willing to
continue in the purchase of the parcel of land which they may be occupying and
who are willing to pay the price set by the Gregorio Araneta, Inc. Failure on
the part of the persons named in this paragraph to comply with said order, the
Court shall issue such writs, orders and processes as may be necessary to place
the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. in possession of the
said 30 quiñones.”

On April 4, 1957, the Deudors filed a motion for reconsideration, stating
that their failure to make delivery of the 30 “quiñones” was not due to their
fault; that the period of four (4) months given them in the order of February
28, 1957, for the delivery of said portion, is too short; that the pendency of
the other cases mentioned in appellees’ motion and manifestation dated August 8,
1956, rendered the aforementioned order premature; and that the Deudors are
themselves entitled to an order directed to the Sheriff for the delivery to the
appellees of the litigated property, and praying that said order of February 28,
1957, be so modified as to delete therefrom all references to the four-month
period for the delivery of the 30 “quiñones” and to appellees’ discharge from
their obligations under the compromise agreement, and that the Sheriff be
ordered “to clear the premises of said 30 ‘quiñones’ of all persons unlawfully
squatting on or occupying the same or portions thereof”.

Gregorio Araneta, Inc. in turn, filed a motion, dated August 16, 1957,
alleging, inter alia, that the Deudors had not delivered the
aforementioned portion of 30 “quiñones”, despite the expiration of the period of
four (4) months, fixed in the order of February 28, 1957, and that, owing to the
failure of the Deudors to make said delivery, the construction of houses by
squatters within said area had continued so unabated that, as of August 12,
1957, there were 341 constructions therein, and praying that an order be issued
directing the Sheriff of Quezon City to place the appellees “in possession of
the 30 ‘quiñones’ subject to these cases now in the possession” of the Deudors,
who were named individually in said motion.

On January 9, 1958, appellants herein filed a “manifestation” in which they
offered to deliver to the appellees those portions of the 30 “quiñones” on which
there are no actual occupants or squatters, as well as to cooperate with the
appellees in pin-pointing the unoccupied and clear areas which they are ready to
deliver and to join the appellees in the filing of appropriate suits for the
ejectment of all persons unlawfully occupying portions of the remaining thirty
(30) “quiñones” and/or handling negotiations directed to the same end.

By an order, dated January 10, 1958, the lower court denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Deudors and granted said motion of Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
dated August 16, 1957. This order was amended by another one, dated January 21,
1958, which suspended the resolution of said motion of Gregorio Araneta, Inc.,
in compliance with a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals.

Appellants maintain that the orders of February 28, 1957 and January 10,
1958, are erroneous, upon the ground that: (1) the lower court had no authority,
either to fix a period of four (4) months for the delivery of the thirty (30)
“quiñones” in question, or to declare that the appellees would be free from
their obligations under the Compromise Agreement, should the Deudors fail to
make delivery within said period; (2) the lower court’s lack of authority to
decide in this case the issues raised in cases Q-1732, Q-1733, Q-1746, Q-1799
and Q-1932 thereof, as stated in its order of February 28, 1957, shows that the
same was premature, insofar as it fixed the aforementioned period and stated the
effect of the failure to make delivery within the same; (3) neither did the
lower court had authority, after the expiration of said period, to set aside the
Compromise Agreement, to the extent that it remained unimplemented or executory,
and to release the appellees from further obligations under said agreement; and
(4) although the lower court held the appellees entitled to a process for the
delivery of the 30 “quiñones” to them, it denied appellants’ petition for such
process in favor of the same appellees.

With respect to the period fixed by the lower court for the delivery of said
30 “quiñones” and the effect of the failure to deliver the same within said
period, it is urged that the order of February 28, 1957, amounted to an
amendment of the Compromise Agreement, without the consent of the parties
therein, and of the decision of April 10, 1953, long after the same had become
final and executory. There is no merit in this pretense. Appellants admit that
the Compromise Agreement “failed to prove for a specific period within which the
Deudors should deliver possession” of said 30 “quiñones”. Upon the other hand,
it is clear from the nature of said agreement and the circumstances surrounding
the same that a period was intended by the parties thereto. Indeed, considering
that the appellees had a Torrens title, they had no reason to agree on paying
P614,925.74 to the Deudors, except upon the expectation of delivery of said area
without unreasonable delay. Accordingly, said agreement is subject to the
principle set forth in Article 1197 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
reading:

“If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix
the duration thereof.

“The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon
the will of the debtor.

“In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the
circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the
courts, the period cannot be changed by them.”

When the authority granted by this provision is exercised by courts, the same
do not amend or modify the obligation concerned. Article 1197 in part
and parcel of all obligations contemplated therein. Hence, whenever a period
in fixed pursuant to said Article, the court merely enforces or carries
out an implied stipulation in the contract in question. In fact,
insofar as contracts not fixing a period are concerned, said legal provision
applies only if, from the nature and circumstances surrounding the contract
involved, “it can be inferred that a period was intended” by the
parties thereto. For this reason, the last paragraph of Article 1197,
ordains that “in every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under
the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties“. In
other words, in fixing said period, the court merely ascertains the
will of the parties and gives effect thereto.

Neither does the order of February 28, 1957, amount to an amendment of the
decision of April 10, 1953, for the same approved the Compromise Agreement in
toto and enjoined the parties “to abide and comply faithfully with the terms
and conditions” thereof. Thus, the agreement became, for all intents and
purposes, incorporated in the decision, and acquired the same force and effect
as the latter. And this is why appellants contend that the order of February 28,
1957 constitutes an amendment of the decision of April 10, 1953. However,
this conclusion of the appellants is legally untenable, for, as pointed out
above, Article 1197 of our Civil Code is part of the Compromise Agreement, and
consequently, of said decision, so that the application of said Article involved
merely the enforcement of an implied stipulation of the parties to said
agreement, and, accordingly, of an implied provision of the decision
itself. As a matter of fact, said decision explicitly declares that “the
parties and their respective attorneys have petitioned this Court that after
rendition of judgment * * * steps be taken * * * to implement the ‘Compromise
Agreement'” and that “in the interest of justice the Court grants this
petition”.

The Deudors insist that, as stated by the lower court in its order of
February 28, 1957, It could not decide in this case the issues rated by a number
of claimants, not named in Annexes B and C of the Compromise Agreement, who had
instituted, against the herein appellees and appellants, civil actions other
than those settled by said agreement, and that being thus aware that appellants
cannot deliver the 30 “quiñones” in question on account of said new civil
actions, the lower court still required them to make said delivery under penalty
of forfeiting the right to collect P614,925.74. Thus appellants would seem to
imply that the lower court had imposed upon them an obligation which is
impossible of compliance because of “legal obstacles” to its performance.

The obligation to deliver said 30 “quiñones” arose, however, from the fact
that appellees were owners thereof and from the promise made by the Deudors in
the Compromise Agreement, not from the order of February 28, 1957. Moreover, the
period within which delivery was to be made, sprang from the same agreement, as
implemented by the court, pursuant to said Article 1197, which, impliedly, is
part of the agreement. Again, appellants represented therein that they were in
possession of the land and in a position to make delivery thereof, Indeed,
otherwise, appellees would not have undertaken to pay P614,925.74 to the
Deudors. Appellees’ right to said delivery was not conditioned upon appellants’
actual ability to make such delivery. Hence, the existence of other parties who,
by instituting judicial proceedings, had put legal obstacles to said delivery,
did not affect appellants’ obligation to make it under the Compromise Agreement.
In fact, in clause 9 thereof, they guaranteed “that during the pendency
of the sale” of the property in question, “no squatters or unauthorized persons
shall settle or take possession of any portion of said property * * *. In other
words, appellants had assumed the risk concomitant with possible incursions, by
squatters or other unauthorized persons, into the aforementioned property.

It is next urged, that in case of appellants’ failure to comply with any of
their obligations under the Compromise Agreement, the appellees, pursuant to
clause 14 thereof, had only the right to suspend the stipulated payments. It
should be noted, however that appellees would have the obligation to pay
P614,925.74 only “if the Deudors * * * should be able to deliver the
peaceful and complete possession” of the.30 “quiñones” in question. Until
delivery thereof, appellants had no right, therefore, to said sum, and
accordingly, appellees had no obligation to pay it. Since, admittedly,
said 30 “quiñones” have not been delivered, it follows that there is no occasion
for the suspension of appellees’ obligation to pay, for they had no such
obligation as yet. The stipulation about suspension of payments referred to
non-compliance by appellants of their obligations under the agreement
other than the delivery of the 30 “quiñones”, for such delivery was a
suspensive condition upon the fulfillment of which the acquisition of the
right of the Deudors to said P614,925.74, and the effectiveness of the
obligation of the appellees to pay it, depended.

Because, the order of January 10, 1958, says:

“It will be noted that under the agreement, the ‘Deudors’ are supposed to
make delivery of the area unconditionally. In fact, in several of the
conferences preceding the execution on the final compromise agreement, the
registered owners of the land made it clear that they were agreeing to the
settlement only because they wanted to obtain early possession of the whole
property and the ‘Deudors’ through their counsels warranted that such possession
would be with J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. in a
matter of months or, at most, in a year. There is no excuse, therefore, for the
failure of the ‘Deudors’ to deliver the remaining 30 quiñones 4 years and 8
months after the execution and approval of the compromise agreement. The
equitable, if not the legal, solution of the problem is the setting aside of the
compromise agreement of March 16, 1953 so far as it still remains unimplemented
or executory. The failure to deliver and the continued mushrooming of houses in
the area, despite the compromise, justify the release of J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. from further obligations under the agreement of
March 16, 1953.”

appellants assert that it was improper for the lower court, in the
proceedings for the enforcement of its decision of April 10, 1953, to set aside
the Compromise Agreement, insofar as it still remained unimplemented or
executory, and to release the appellees from further obligations under said
agreement. The above-quoted paragraph of said order of January 10, 1958, was,
however, a mere exposition of some of the reasons why the lower court granted
appellees’ motion of August 16, 1957, and denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by appellants on April 4, 1957. In any event, said paragraph is but a
faithful statement of the law pertinent to the subject, inasmuch as the period
of four (4) months, given to the Deudors, in said decision, for the delivery of
the land of 30 “quiñones”—to which their right to collect P614,925.74 was
subject as a suspensive condition—constituted a resolutory period. When the same
expired with said suspensive condition still unfulfilled, appellants’ right to
comply with it was extinguished, and the conditional obligation of the appellees
to pay said sum was terminated (Article 1193, Civil Code of the
Philippines).

With respect to appellants’ claim to the effect that they offered to deliver
“portions” of the land of 30 “quiñones” “on which there are no actual occupants
or squatters at present,” suffice it to note that, under clause 8, section d,
subsection 2 of the Compromise Agreement, the appellees are bound to pay
P614,925.74 only “if the Deudors * * * should be able to deliver the peaceful
and complete possession” of said land of 30 “quiñones”. In short,
delivery of a portion thereof would not suffice for the acquisition by
appellants of the right to collect said sum or any part thereof. The parties
clearly contemplated a full, not partial, fulfillment of said condition.

Lastly, appellants say that they have as much right as appellees herein to
the execution of the decision herein, and yet the lower court granted the
latter’s motion for a writ of execution thereof and denied a motion of the
former to the same effect. It is not true, however, that the two (2) motions
were identical. Appellees prayed that an order be issued directing the Sheriff
of Quezon City “to place them in possession of the 30 ‘quiñones’ subject to
these cases, now in the possession of” appellants, whereas, appellant’s
motion was to the effect that an order be issued “commanding the Sheriff to
clear the premises of the 30 ‘quiñones’ from all persons unlawfully
squatting on or occupying the same or portions thereof.” It was proper for
the lower court to grant appellees’ motion, because the process therein sought
was directed against appellants who are bound by the decision of April
10, 1953. It would have been improper for the lower court to grant appellants1
aforementioned motion, since the same sought to affect squatters, who are
neither parties in this proceeding nor bound by the aforementioned decision,
and, hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of the court in this case.

Wherefore, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against
herein appellants, Florencio, Maria, Aniana and Pedro, all surnamed Deudor. It
is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.