CONCEPCION NAVAL, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. DOLORES JONSAY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This appeal stemmed from a decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
September 30, 1954, the pertinent portion of which reads:—

“In view of the foregoing, we are with the trial court in holding that the
land in question belongs to the second conjugal partnership, so that one-half of
it should pertain to Elias Naval’s second wife, while the other half, which
corresponds to the deceased Elias Naval,should be divided equally among his
surviving children; Francisco, Concepcion, Serafin and Jose, all surnamed Naval.
And it being understood that the shares of the children shall be subject to the
usufruct of the surviving spouse as provided by law, the judgment appealed from
is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.”

The surviving spouse is Dolores Jonsay, defendant-appellant. In order to
execute the judgment, the trial court on September 26, 1956, appointed Pantaleon
Panelo as Commissioner to partition the property in question. Panelo, a duly
certified Surveyor, made a survey of the property litigated, and submitted a
report containing three “positions” (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 3-12), from which the
parties and/or the Court might choose for the usufruct in favor of Dolores
Jonsay. On March 8, 1957, after the Commissioner had rendered the report, the
defendant Dolores Jonsay thru counsel, filed the following manifestation:—

1. That these portions chosen by the widow is in accordance with the concept
   and purpose of usufruct intended by law.

2. That portions designated on the first and second positions of the
   Commissioner’s Sketch are without any improvements and are unproductive, hence
   to give any of these portions to the widow as her usufruct would not serve the
   purpose intended by law in giving usufruct to the widow a portion of the
   property of her deceased husband, where she could maintain or support herself
   during widowhood.

3. That out of about 120 or more fruit-bearing coconuts found on the portions
   selected by the widow, only 80 trees are inside her portion and 40 trees are
   within the portions designated for the plaintiffs.

4. That since the 120 fruit-bearing coconut trees were planted by the widow
   during her conjugal life with the father of the plaintiffs, it is but just that
   the portions where the 80 trees are found be given to her in usufruct.”

The plaintiffs presented a counter-manifestation of the following tenor:—

1. That if the portion to be given to the widow in usufruct be that which is
   indicated in the first position, it will be to the best advantage of the parties
   and will be just to both of them;

2. That in accordance with this first position, the portion to be given to the
   widow in usufruct adjoins the portion adjudicated to her in ownership;

3. That on the contrary, if the third position is followed, plaintiffs will be
   sandwiched between the portion adjudicated to the widow in ownership and that to
   be adjudicated to her in usufruct; and this is very disadvantageous to the
   plaintiffs aside from the fact that it may be a source of friction between
   them;

4. That the portion which is being adjudicated to the widow in ownership is
   already the best portion of the whole parcel of land and to give her in usufruct
   that portion which is indicated in the third position, will be giving her double
   advantage over the plaintiffs;

5. That in fact, if the plaintiffs previously agreed to give to the widow the
   portion adjudicated to her in ownership, it was premised on a condition that the
   widow would renounce her usufruct, taking into consideration that the said
   portion adjudicated to her in ownership is, as we have already mentioned, the
   best and the most productive portion;

6. That it is not true that the portion being adjudicated in usufruct to the
   widow in accordance with the first position is unproductive because while there
   are no coconut trees thereon, the same is being dedicated to the planting of
   palay and in fact, the widow has, since the death of her husband until at
   present, been planting there and benefiting by the products thereof.”

In her manifestation, it would appear that the defendant Dolores Jonsay
preferred and chose the portions appearing in the Commissioner’s report,
designated as “third position”, reasoning out that it was more in keeping with
the concept and purpose of usufruct intended by law and it would be more
beneficial to her. It would also appear that the plaintiffs in their
counter-manifestation, claimed that the portions designated as first position in
the Commissioner’s report would be advantageous, beneficial and just to both
parties.

On March 14, 1957, the lower court, without giving reasons
therefor, promulgated an Order, giving as usufruct to Dolores Jonsay the
portions of the land in question, marked as first position in the
Commissioner’s report. A motion for reconsideration was duly filed by Jonsay,
pointing therein that the portions awarded to her are unproductive and at the
same time intimated that she would present evidence in support of her contention
anent the unproductiveness of the said portions. On March 28, 1957, this motion
was denied, and an appeal was taken by defendant Jonsay to the Court of Appeals,
which certified the same to this Court.

Appellant Dolores Jonsay alleges
that the trial court erred: (1) In disregarding the choice made by her of the
portion designated as third position in the Commissioner’s report, as her
usufruct; (2) in decreeing to her as her usufruct the portion designated on the
sketch of the Commissioner as first position in the said report; and (3) in not
giving her the opportunity to present evidence to prove that the portion decreed
to her as her usufruct was unproductive and not beneficial to her.

In a
nutshell the alleged errors converge on only one issue, that is, the legality of
the trial court’s order awarding to appellant Jonsay that which the appellees
wanted, and not what she (appellant) had chosen.

The case was conducted
solely on the plane of pleadings, motions and manifestations. No formal hearing
was held; and no testimonial or documentary proofs were produced or presented by
the parties, except the Commissioner’s report. It is thus seen that before the
trial court could properly determine which portion should be given or awarded to
the appellant widow as her usufruct, the parties should have been given
opportunity to present evidence, to support their respective contentions,
specially on the allegation of appellant Jonsay that the portion designated as
first position given to her was not advantageous, beneficial and just, because
it was unproductive and it violates the concept and purpose of usufruct intended
by law for her, more so when the said defendant-appellant had asked for an
opportunity to do so.

Considering, therefore, that the decision of the
trial court should be based upon facts proven therein, and not upon conflicting
manifestations, the truth of which can not be ascertained without the adduction
of proofs, the Orders dated March 14, 1957, and March 28, 1957, respectively,
are hereby reversed, and another entered, remanding the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. With costs to the
plaintiffs-appellees.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad,
JJ., concur.