ESPERIDION ADORABLE, ET AL., CLAIMANTS AND APPELLEES, VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, MOVANT AND APPELLANT.

In Cadastral Case No. 88 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Esperidion Adorable, in his own behalf and that of his brothers and
sisters, presented a claim over Lot No. 3249 situated in barrio Madong,
Janiuay, Iloilo. After hearing before the Justice of the Peace of
Janiuay, who was duly authorized to hear, the cadastral case in that
municipality, judgment was rendered awarding the aforementioned lot to
claimants Esperidion Adorable, et. al. Copy of the decision was
received by the Director of Forestry on January 14, 1956; and on
January 31, before the finality of the decision, said Director, through
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo, filed a motion for reconsideration and
new trial, claiming that he was not notified of the hearing, that his
office had a claim over a portion of the lot in question for river bank
protection or as permanent timberland, and that he was unduly denied
the opportunity to appear and present evidence in behalf of his office.
The motion was denied by the court upon the ground that it was not
obliged to notify the Director of the hearing because the latter did
not file any claim over the land in question; and that at any rate,
said official should be deemed to have notice of the proceedings
because an employee of his Bureau was present at the hearing and had
with him a map of the cadastre. From the denial of his motion, the
Director of Forestry appealed to the Court of Appeals, urging that the
court below erred in holding that it was not necessary to serve him
notice of the hearing and in denying his motion for reconsideration and
new trial. These questions being purely of law, the Court of Appeals
certified the appeal to this Court.

The claim of the appellant Director of Forestry that he is entitled
to a personal notice of the hearing in this case seems to have been
based on the provisions of section 32, Act No. 496 (as amended by
section 2, Republic Act 96), that:

“* * * If the land borders on a river, navigable
stream, or shore, or an arm of the sea where a river or harbor line has
been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise appears from the
application or the proceedings that the National Government may have a
claim adverse to that of the applicant, notice shall be given in the
same manner to the Solicitor General, the Director of Public Works, the
Director of Lands, and the Director of Forestry. * * *”

Since the description of the land here in question does not show
that it borders, on a river, stream,, sea, or lake, and considering the
fact mentioned by the court that an employee of the Bureau of Forestry
was present all throughout the hearing with a map of the cadastre but
did not make any claim in behalf of said Bureau, the omission to send
personal notice of the hearing to appellant can not be considered a
violation of section 32 of Act 496.

But while the lower court was not legally bound to send personal
notice of the hearing to appellant, it does not mean, however, that it
acted correctly and within legal bounds in summarily dismissing
appellant’s motion for reconsideration and new trial without any
inquiry as to the truth of the facts alleged therein. Appellant based
his motion on the claim that a portion of the land in question either
is needed for river bank protection or forms-part of permanent
timberland. If this claim that any portion of the land in question
still forms part of the public forests is true, then possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert it, into private property (Vaño vs.
Government of the Philippines, 41 Phil., 161), and such portion would
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the torrens system (Nicolas vs. Jose, 5 Phil., 589; Vaño vs. Government of the Philippines, supra).
Hence, the lower court should have set appellant’s motion for hearing
to receive evidence on his allegations, in order that any portion or
portions of the land in question that should form part of the forest or
timber zone may be excluded and segregated from the decree of
registration in favor of appellees.

The order appealed from is, therefore, set aside, and the records
are remanded to the court of origin for a hearing on the motion for
reconsideration and new trial of the appellant Director of Forestry,
after which a new judgment shall be rendered with respect to Lot No.
3249. No costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.