FRANCISCO, PATRICIO AND ROMAN, ALL SURNAMED MARTIR, REPRESENTED BY THEIR GUARDIAN, GERTRUDES A. MARTIR, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. AMADO P. JALANDONI AND PAZ RAMOS, DEFENDAN…

This action was instituted by plaintiffs praying that they be
declared owners and possessors of the undivided one-half of three lots
of the Murcia Cadastre and two lots of the Bago Cadastre and that said
lands be reconveyed to them by the defendants. The complaint is signed
by the guardian of the minor plaintiffs. Upon defendants’ being
summoned, their attorneys filed a motion to dismiss, which was opposed
by the attorney for plaintiffs, Jose Y. Torres of Roxas City. The
motion to dismiss was heard and thereafter denied, and thereupon
defendants presented their answer.

In their answer, defendants deny that the predecessor-in-interest of
the plaintiffs, from whom they claimed to have inherited the undivided
one-half portion of the properties, had been in possession of said
lands, or that he was the owner of said lands because he had sold them
on September 4, 1940 and on April 5, 1941 to the defendants. They also
alleged that the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs himself had
filed a motion, jointly with the defendants, for the issuance of a
certificate of title in the name of the defendant spouses over the
Murcia properties, etc. Copies of the deeds of sale executed by
Hermogenes Martir in favor of the defendants were registered with the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and are attached to the answer.
Also attached is the joint motion of said Hermogenes Martir and Amado
P. Jalandoni declaring themselves owners share and share alike of the
three parcels of land. The order of the court approving the subdivision
plan of the lots and the giving of numbers for each lot is also
attached to the answer.

On August 3, 1956, when the case was called for hearing defendants
and their counsel appeared, but neither plaintiffs nor their attorney
on record appeared, so the court dismissed the case for failure of
plaintiffs to prosecute. Upon motion of Atty. Medel, another counsel
for the plaintiffs, the order of dismissal was reconsidered. The court
warned counsel that the case will be dismissed again if plaintiffs and
their attorneys would not appear when the case is called.

In accordance with said order the case was scheduled for hearing on
September 15, 1956, but when the day came, for the trial Atty. Medel
again asked for postponement, alleging that the principal witness for
the plaintiffs was sick. The court again granted the motion for
postponement. The case having been called for hearing on October 29,
only Atty. Medel appeared, and he again moved for continuance because
Atty. Torres was in Capiz. Objection to this motion for continuance was
interposed by counsel for defendants. The court found there was no
reason for postponing the trial because Gertrudes A. Martir was in
court. A motion to reconsider the order of dismissal issued by the
court was presented by Atty. Medel, claiming that he could not proceed
with the case because all his efforts were concentrated in the study
and preparation of a criminal case. This motion for reconsideration
was, however, denied. Hence this appeal.

Counsel for plaintiffs-appellants argue that the court a quo
erred in denying the motion for postponement of the hearing on October
29, 1956 and in dismissing the case. It is a rule continuously adhered
to by us that matters of postponement are addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and that we will not interfere with such
discretion unless it has been abused. We do not find that there was
abuse of discretion by the trial court in dismissing the case, such as
would authorize us to reverse the order of dismissal in this case.
Plaintiffs have been guilty of neglect, because if Atty. Medel was not
ready for the trial of the case as he was then engaged in another case,
he should have advised the court thereof by presenting a motion for
postponement at least three days before the trial and should have
stated therein that Atty. Torres would not be available during the
hearing. Without going further into the discussion of the merits of
this appeal, we are satisfied from the above proceedings that have
taken place in the lower court, that said court has not abused its
discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the ease.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with coats against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.