THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. JUDGE JULIO VILLAMOR, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to enjoin respondent
court from allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 40865 to present
evidence on the existence or execution of certain document of sale on
the ground that the same presents a prejudicial question which must
first be decided in a civil case then pending before the Court of
Appeals.

On October 30, 1956, Eduardo S. Puzon filed a complaint against
Petra A. Querubin before the Court of First Instance of Manila to
declare as inexistent and null and void certain document allegedly
executed by Puzon in favor of Querubin, which was later amended on
December 4, 1956. After issues were joined, trial was held and on May
10, 1957 the trial court rendered decision holding that the deed of
sale alleged in the complaint was indeed fictitious, inexistent and
null and void, and condemning Petra Querubin to pay the sum of
P10,000.00, with corresponding interest thereon, and the further sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees, with costs. In due time, Querubin took
the case to the Court of Appeals wherein it was docketed as CA-G. R.
No. 21018-R.

While said case was pending appeal, the City Fiscal of Manila filed
an information for false testimony against Petra Querubin on the
strength of a complaint filed by Eduardo S. Puzon alleging therein that
she falsely testified that Puzon executed a document of sale of certain
mineral claim and later filed and recorded the same with the office of
the Mining Recorder of Naga City knowing that said allegations were not
true. This charge having been given due course, the Court of First
Instance of Manila set the case for trial during which the people,
represented by a private prosecutor, started to present its evidence.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense started to
present its evidence to disprove some of the points covered by the
prosecution among which was the issue relative to the existence or
nonexistence of the alleged document of sale involved in the civil
case. And it was in the course of the presentation of said evidence
that the private prosecutor filed a motion to suspend the trial on the
ground that the issue on which the defense was presenting evidence
partakes of the nature of prejudicial question which cannot be done
inasmuch as the same is one of the issues involved in the civil case
pending between the same parties which was appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Counsel for the defense objected to this motion contending
that such issue cannot be considered prejudicial since the two cases
cover different questions and issues or do not overlap and that even if
they cover the same issues the defense cannot be prevented from
presenting evidence relative to the matter because the same constitutes
an indispensable element that is necessary to establish the innocence
of defendant. After counsel for both parties had argued orally and
submitted memoranda in support of their contentions, the court on
December 3, 1957 issued an order denying the motion and setting a new
date for the continuation of the hearing. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the private prosecutor interposed
the present petition for certiorari.

We find no merit in the contention that the issue relative to the
execution or non-existence of the alleged deed of sale of certain
mineral claim is a prejudicial question that is involved in the civil
case pending between the same parties before the Court of Appeals which
was at the time still pending determination, and that for that reason
the continuation of the hearing of the criminal case for false
testimony should be suspended until said case shall have been finally
terminated. It should be observed that the criminal case of false
testimony preferred against respondent Querubin on the strength of a
complaint filed by petitioner Eduardo S. Puzon imputes to the accused,
among other things, that she testified falsely that Puzon executed the
alleged document of sale knowing it to be false and that she later
filed and registered the same with the office of the Mining Recorder of
Naga City when the truth was that such document never existed and no
such document was ever filed and registered by said accused with the
office of said mining recorder thereby having committed the crime of
false testimony. And in order to substantiate said imputation the
prosecution presented evidence tending to show that it was not true
that Puzon ever executed the alleged deed of sale covering the mineral
claim in question, or that if said document ever existed it is
fictitious or null and void. As a matter of fact, during the hearing
held in connection with this incident, the private prosecutor has
admitted in open court that he really presented evidence to show the
non-existence or non-execution of the document in question as may be
seen from the following portion of the record:

“COURT:
	You have presented evidence to show that those were not really the truth—no document and no registration . . .
ATTY. FALQUI:
	Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
	How can they prove their side of the case if we don’t allow them to prove that there was such a document? If we put a stop to all their evidence, then they cannot prove their innocence. Nonetheless, since you don’t agree, I will give you a chance. How long do you want? (Tsn. p. 24, 10/23/57)”

Even therefore if we concede that the issue relative to the
existence or validity of the deed of sale in question is also involved
in the civil case pending before the Court of Appeals, the same cannot
be considered prejudicial in the sense that the trial of the criminal
case should be suspended until the civil case has been finally
terminated, considering that the prosecution has presented evidence
thereon and the defendant has evinced a desire to disprove it by
presenting her own evidence, it being her constitutional prerogative to
have her case terminated with the least possible delay. As the trial
court has observed: “How can they prove their side of the case if you
don’t allow them to prove that there was such a document? If we put a
stop to all their evidence, then they cannot prove their innocence.”
Indeed, after the prosecution had presented evidence tending to prove
the imputation contained in the charge preferred against the accused,
it would be most unfair if the latter should be deprived of an
opportunity to disprove it and establish her innocence. In any event,
we find it improper for the prosecution to ask for the suspension of
the trial after having lodged the alleged imputation against the
accused and presented its evidence, for if in its opinion the issue
which is now raised is prejudicial in character it should not have
filed the charge in the first place but should have waited for such a
time until the Court of Appeals shall have finally disposed of the
civil case. The attitude of complainant Puzon in filing this charge
against Petra Querubin immediately after the civil case between them
has been taken to the Court of Appeals cannot be taken in any other
light than to cause her harassment or prejudice.

Wherefore, petition is denied. The case is remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings. Costs against petitioner Eduardo S.
Puzon.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., concurs in the result.