PAULINO BUGAY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Paulino Bugay filed against the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa
Manila Railroad Company before the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for moral damages arising out of an unfair labor practice
alledgedly committed by said union which was the subject of a decision
rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations finding said union guilty
as charged. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The action
for moral damages is based upon the allegation that “having become the
victim of an unfair labor practice act by the officers of the defendant
under Republic Act 875 as found by the Court of Industrial Relations
and the Supreme Court, plaintiff has suffered moral damages, “for
mental anguish, anxiety, social humiliation and besmirched reputation
specially among the thousands of employees of the Manila Railroad
Company, amounting to P20,000.00.” Consequently, it is prayed that
judgment be rendered against defendant awarding plaintiff damages in
the aforesaid amount.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in that
neither the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations nor that of
the Supreme Court contain any statement that the unfair labor practice
are imputed to the defendant was false or fabricated as in fact the
decision of the Supreme Court ordering plaintiff’s reinstatement was
merely based on “the regularity and validity of the proceedings and the
means adopted by the, union and its officers in effecting (his)
expulsion.” This contention having been sustained, the lower court
dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiff. Hence the present
appeal.

If appears that appellant was formerly an auditor of the defendant
union. He was at the same time payroll clerk of the Manila Railroad
Company. Sometime in March, 1953, he was requested by the
secretary-treasurer of the company to deliver certain documents which
were in his possession belonging to the union and in compliance
therewith he delivered them without consulting the officers of the
union, Making use of these documents, the management of the company
filed with the City Fiscal of Manila against Vicente K. Olazo,
president of the union, a charge for falsification of commercial
document. The city fiscal after proper investigation dismissed the
charge.

Subsequently, charges for disloyalty and conduct unbecoming a union
member were preferred against appellant, and after the corresponding
investigation, appellant was expelled from the union. As a result,
appellant filed a charge for unfair labor practice against the union
before the Court of Industrial Relations which, after due hearing,
rendered decision holding that appellant’s expulsion was illegal it
appearing that the same has not been approved by the majority of the
chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws.
Hence, the court ordered the reinstatement of appellant as union member
and the restoration to him of all his rights and privileges. This
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

In finding that defendant union was guilty of the unfair labor
practice preferred against it by plaintiff, the Court of Industrial
Relations made the following comment:

“It is to be noted that both in the investigation
held by the investigation committee of the Kapisanan and in the board
meeting of June 14, 1953, where the committee’s report recommending
expulsion was approved, Bugay was not present. As has been pointed out
earlier, the reason for Bugay’s failure to attend the investigation
does not appear of record. On the other hand, during the board meeting,
the committee of three board members assigned to summon Bugay failed to
serve notice upon him because he was then in Lucena, Quezon. Why all
these proceedings were continued by the respondents inspite of Bugay’s
absence remain unexplained in the record. But one thing, is certain,
whatever might be the merits of the charge filed by respondent Olazo
against him, Bugay did not have sufficient opportunity to defend
himself. Such proceedings, being violative of the elementary rule of
justice and fair play, can not give validity to any act done pursuant
thereto.

“Besides, the contention that majority of the
chapters voted in favor of Bugay’s expulsion is not borne by the
evidence. An examination of the chapters to the Kapisanan board of
directors (Exhs. 7 to 28) shows that all of the votes, except those of
the Hondagua Chapters and Engineering Manila Yard Chapter (Exhs. 14 and
17) were not validly cast. Under the Kapisanan’s constitution and
by-laws, relied upon by the parties, before a resolution of general
application may be enforced, and a resolution terminating union
membership is one, it must receive the sanction of majority of the
chapters within ten (10) days (Section 4, Art. VII, Kapisanan’s
Saligang Batas). In other words, action thereon, whether favorable or
otherwise, must be taken by the chapters within a period of ten days
from the time they receive the resolution. According to respondent
Olazo’s testimony, the resolution passed on June 14, 1953, was
transmitted to the chapters on June 17, 1953. To make it effective, the
resolution had to be affirmed by the chapters on July 1, 1953, at the
latest. The additional time of four days is allowed for transmittals
made by mail. Only the two abovenamed chapters, however, acted on the
resolution within the prescribed period. For this reason, even under
the assumption that the proceedings against Bugay were not irregular,
the resolution in question never had any valid effect on his union
membership. In short, his affiliation with the Kapisanan was never
terminated. That being the case, Bugay is entitled to all the rights
and obligations appertaining to every member of the Kapisanan.
Considering that he has been unduly and discriminatorily deprived of
such rights and obligations, the Court finds, and so holds, that the
respondents, by their act and conduct, have engaged in and are engaging
in unfair labor practice in violation of Section 4(b) (2) of the Act.”

The above findings were affirmed by the Supreme Court though with some modification.

It is now contended that because the decisions of both the Court of
Industrial Relations and the Supreme Court do not contain any
intimation nor statement to the effect that the charges filed against
Paulino Bugay which resulted in his separation from the union were
“trumped up” or fabricated but were solely based on procedural defects
in the matter of his expulsion appellant cannot ask for moral damages
inasmuch as there is no showing that to effect his expulsion the
officers of the union have acted in bad faith. As a matter of fact, it
is contended, he did not lose his employment as payroll clerk in the
Manila Railroad Company as a result of his expulsion, nor did he suffer
any change in his status as a consequence thereof. In effect, he was
not awarded any damages by the industrial court.

It should, however, be observed that the main basis of appellant’s
action is his claim that because of the unfair labor practice committed
by the officers of defendant union as found by the Court of Industrial
Relations and the Supreme Court he has suffered moral damages because
of the mental anguish, anxiety, social humiliation and besmirched
reputation he has been subjected among the thousands of employees of
the Manila Railroad Company, which claim finds support in our new Civil
Code. Thus, Article 2217 of said Code provides as follows:

“ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.”

It is true that the decisions both of the Court of Industrial
Relations and the Supreme Court do not contain any statement that the
charges preferred by the officers of the union against him which
resulted in his expulsion were “trumped up” or fabricated, or that said
officers acted maliciously or in, bad faith, but the fact remains that
the two courts have found that his expulsion was illegal because of the
irregularities committed in his investigation. In effect, it was found
that not only has he not been given an opportunity to defend himself
but his expulsion was not submitted to the different chapters of the
union as required by its constitution and by-laws. The result was that
because of his expulsion he was subjected to humiliation and mental
anguish with the consequent lose of his good name and reputation. This
is especially so considering that the members of the union from which
he was expelled amounted to around 20,000 more or less. It is,
therefore, an error for the lower court to hold, that the complaint
does not state sufficient cause of action for the relief claimed by
appellant.

With regard to the contention that this claim for moral damages
should have been included by appellant in his charge for unfair labor
practice filed against the union with the Court of Industrial
Relations, suffice it to state that the same does not come within the
jurisdiction of that court. This is a matter that has to be looked into
by the regular courts.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against
defendant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.