RAMON E. SAURA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ESTELA P. SINDICO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Appeal on issues of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for damages.

From the records it appears that Ramon E. Saura and Estela P.
Sindico were contesting for nomination as the official candidate of the
Nacionalista Party in the fourth district of Pangasinan in the
congressional elections of November 12, 1957. On August 23, 1957, the
parties entered into a written agreement bearing the same date,
containing among other matters stated therein, a pledge that—

“Each aspirant shall respect the result of the
aforesaid convention, i.e., no one of us shall either run as a rebel or
independent candidate after losing in said convention.”

In the provincial convention held by the Nacionalista Party on
August 31, 1957, Saura was elected and. proclaimed the Party’s official
congressional candidate for the aforesaid district of Pangasinan.
Nonetheless, Sindico, in disregard of the covenant, filed, on September
6, 1957, her certificate of, candidacy for the same office with the
Commission on Elections, and she openly and actively campaigned for her
election. Wherefore, on October 5, 1957, plaintiff Saura commenced this
suit for the recovery of damages. Upon motion of the defendant, the
lower court, in its order of November 19, 1957, dismissed the complaint
on the basis that the agreement sued upon is null and void, in that (1)
the subject matter of the contract, being a public office, is not
within the commerce of man; and (2) the “pledge” was in curtailment of
the free exercise of elective franchise and therefore against public
policy. Hence, this appeal.

We agree with the lower court in adjudging the contract or agreement
in question a nullity. Among those that may not be the subject matter
(object) of contracts are certain rights of individuals, Which the law
and public policy have deemed wise to exclude from the commerce of man.
Among them ,are the political, fights conferred upon citizens,
including, but not limited to, one’s right to vote, the right to
present one’s candidacy to the people and to be voted to public office,
provided, however, that all the qualifications prescribed by law
obtain. Such rights may not, therefore, be bargained away or
surrendered for consideration by the citizen nor unduly curtailed with
impunity, for they are conferred . not for individual or private
benefit or advantage but for the public good and interest.

Constitutional and statutory provisions fix the qualifications of
persons who may be eligible for certain elective public offices. Said
requirements may neither be enlarged nor reduced by mere agreements
between private parties. A voter possessing all the qualifications
required to fill an office may, by himself or through a political party
or group, present his candidacy without further limitations than those
provided by law.

“Every voter has a right to be a candidate for
public office if he possesses the qualifications required to fill the
office. It does not necessarily follow that he can be the candidate of a particular political party.
The statute provides when and how one may be a candidate of a political
party. If he cannot fill the requirement m as to be the candidate of
the political party of his choice, he may still be a candidate at the
general election by petition. The right of the voter to vote at the
general election for whom, he pleases cannot be limited.” (Roberts vs.
Cleveland, Secretary of State of the State of New Mexico, 48 NM 226,
149 P (2d) 120, 153 A.L.R. 635, 637-638) (Italics supplied.) .

In common law, certain agreements in consideration
of the withdrawal of candidates for office have invariably been
condemned by the courts as being against public policy, be it a
withdrawal from the race for nomination, or after nomination, from the
race for election. (See notes in 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 289 and cases
cited therein; 18 Am. Jur. Sec. 352, pp. 399-400)

In the case at hand, plaintiff complains on account of defendant’s
alleged violation of the “pledge” in question by filing her own
certificate of candidacy for a seat in the Congress of the Philippines
and in openly and actively campaigning for her election. In the face of
the preceding considerations, we certainly cannot entertain,
plaintiff’s action, which would result in limiting the choice of the,
electors to only those persons selected by a small group or by party
bosses.

The case of Pendleton vs. Pace, 9 S. W. (2nd) 437, cited by
the appellant, is clearly inapplicable. The court there only sanctioned
the validity of an agreement by the opposing candidates for nomination
setting aside and re-submitting the nomination for another primary
election on account of the protest or contest filed by the losing
candidate in the first primary election. To abandon the contest
proceedings, the candidates for nomination agreed to submit again their
nomination to the electors in the subsequent primary.

Appellant likewise cites and quotes a portion of our ruling in Monsale vs.
Nico, 83 Phil., 758; 46 Off. Gaz., 210, to the effect that it is not
incompetent for a candidate to withdraw or annul his certificate of
candidacy. This is not in point, for while we stated there that he may
do so, there being no legal prohibition against such a voluntary
withdrawal, it does not follow, nor did we imply anywhere in the
decision, that in case there is any agreement or consideration for such
a withdrawal, said agreement or consideration should be held valid or
given effect.

We find it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the parties.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.