MARTIN AGLIPAY, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. MONS. ISABELO DE LOS REYES, JR., AS OBISPO MAXIMO OF THE IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur in Land Registration Case No. 93 (G. L. R. O. Rec. No.
20653), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, as the opposition is supported by good and valid reasons, the petition is hereby denied.

The
counter-petition of the oppositor is likewise denied because the
adverse claim of the oppositor is already annotated in the title and as
the questions seriously involve the controversial issue of ownership of
the litigated lands, the same is not within the province of this Court
in its capacity as a court of land-registration but should be
litigated in an independent civil action.”

The record is to. the effect that on September 25, 1956, the
petitioners-appellees, all surnamed Aglipay, filed with the lower court
a petition alleging, among other things, that they, are the heirs of
the late Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay who died intestate in the City of
Manila on September 1, 1940, leaving nine parcels of land located in
the municipality of Santa Cruz, province of Ilocos Sur, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40; that the oppositor Monsignor
Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., as incumbent Obispo Maximo of the
Philippine Independent Church, is in possession of the said certificate
of title but that notwithstanding repeated demands, he has refused and
still refuses to surrender the same to the petitioners. They pray,
therefore, that the court issue an order requiring Monsignor de los
Reyes to deliver to them the duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 40 pursuant to section 111 of the Land Registration Act.

By way of answer and opposition to this petition,
oppositor-appellant alleged that the real properties described in the
petition are owned by the “Iglesia Filipina Independiente” and
registered in the name of Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay only in his
capacity as the then. Supreme Bishop of said Church or as a corporation
sole; that on May 17, 1956, the oppositor registered an adverse claim
on behalf of the “Iglesia Filipina Independiente”, pursuant to section
110, Act No. 496; that the oppositor church has always been in the
possession of the properties, in question and has enjoyed the fruits
thereof; and that the petitioners have been guilty of laches in
allowing more than 16 years to elapse before presenting any claim on
these properties. Upon these basis, oppositor de los Reyes filed its
counter-petition for registration.

On October 23, 1956, the court urged the parties to submit
memoranda “in support of the proposition that the Court, acting as land
registration court, may, under section 111, Act 496, order the
surrender of the Certificate of Title in question notwithstanding a
question of ownership raised by the oppositor”. After compliance with
such mandate of the court, the contending parties were allowed to
present their respective evidence, which had some bearing on the
question of ownership. Thereafter, a decision was rendered dismissing
both the petition and counter-petition; but oppositor appealed to this
Court insofar as that portion of the judgment that does not order the
issuance of a new title in the name of the “Iglesia Filipina
Independiente” is concerned.

The appellant insists (1) that the trial court has jurisdiction over
the issue of ownership, (2) that the case. was actually tried by the
court not as a land registration court but as a court of general
jurisdiction, passing upon the question of title with the acquiescence
of the parties; and (3) that an independent civil action to resolve the
question of ownership would be unnecessary and superfluous. Wherefore,
appellant prays that judgment be rendered “ordering the Register of
Deeds for Ilocos Sur to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40 and
issue a new title in the name of the “Iglesia Filipina Independiente'”.

It appears that the parties were allowed merely to present evidence
to enable the court below, acting as a land registration court, to rule
intelligently on the propriety and merits of the petition and of the
opposition. It was in that capacity and understanding that the court’s
jurisdiction was invoked and on that same score that the hearing on the
case proceeded. The lower court apparently, did not view the evidence
introduced as sufficient to apprise it fully on the issue of ownership
between the contestants and enable it to settle finally the point of
inquiry. Thus, it only decided that the opposition to the surrender of
the certificates was supported by good and valid grounds and was not
frivolous or Vexatious as to entitle the petitioners to the summary
relief they sought. Note should be made of the fact that the court did
not make any definite finding nor conclusion as to who owns the
properties in dispute, and in the case we find no reversible error in
such, abstention. We have held in Director of Lands vs. Register of Deeds, 49 Off. Gaz., 937, that—

“Section 112 authorizes, in our opinion, only
alterations which do not impair rights recorded in the decree, or
alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to
by all parties concerned or alteration to correct obvious mistakes.”

True it is that there have been instances wherein this Court
sanctioned deviations from the otherwise rigid rule that the
jurisdiction of a Land Registration Court, being special and limited in
character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to
cases involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or
ordinary civil actions (See Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Serafica, 61 Phil., 93; Caoibes vs. Sison, 102 Phil., 19; Luna, et al., vs. Santos and Ariola, 102 Phil., 588; Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co., et al., vs. Reyes & Tantoco, 92 Phil., 177; Cruz vs.
Tan, 93 Phil., 348; 49 Off. Gaz., 2254). From those eases, however, we
may at once gather that the peculiarity of the exceptions is based not
alone on the fact that Land Registration Courts are likewise the same
Courts of First Instance, but also on the following premises: (1)
mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence in submitting the
aforesaid issues for determination by the court in the registration
proceedings; (2) full opportunity given to the parties in the
presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the
evidence in support thereto; and (3) consideration by the court that
the evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering
a decision upon those issues. The latter condition is a matter that
largely lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, which we
believe, has not been abused in the instant case.

That the court below should prefer that the issue of ownership be
ventilated in an independent civil action, thereby placing the parties
in status quo in the meanwhile, may not be said to be
improper under the circumstances, especially in view of the conflicting
claims of both parties (Jimenez vs. De Castro, 67 Phil., 398).

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.